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 Although nothing in either the theorist’s or the author’s oeuvre indicates one’s direct 
awareness of the other, Bakhtin and Nabokov both displayed a surprisingly similar concern for 
the interrelationship between ethics and literary aesthetics.  This shared concern was no doubt 
shaped by Bakhtin and Nabokov’s common Silver Age background, which was rife with 
political, artistic and theological discourses regarding the nature of artistic creation, the created 
nature of man, and man’s ability to continue the process of self-creation.  Both Bakhtin and 
Nabokov thus elaborated on the ethical dynamic between self and other within a commonly held, 
deeply aestheticized view of life that regards perception and representation of the other as the 
artistic creation of that other.  Bakhtin and Nabokov’s conceptual parallel is further extended by 
the fact that both of their elaborations of this dynamic are specific responses to the work of 
Fyodor Dostoevsky.  The purpose of this dissertation is, then, to explore further the conceptual 
convergences and antagonisms inherent in the seemingly similar aestheticized ethics of Bakhtin 
and Nabokov.  Particular attention is paid to the author and theorist’s intellectual influences, 
especially with regards to Nabokov, since only a proper intellectual contextualization of Bakhtin 
and Nabokov’s allusively language will allow us a meaningful interpretation of their accounts of 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
As the following monograph will be directed to both specialists of Russian culture and specialists  
of other literary and/or cultural disciplines, I will be following both “System I” and “System II” of 




In the text and all discursive parts of the endnotes, Shaw’s “System I” is used, which anglicizes 
Russian proper names: the “y”-ending is used instead of “ii;” “yu”/”ya” is used instead of “iu”/“ia.”  
Exceptions to this system of transliteration will be observed (1) in quotations taken from Nabokov, 
who uses his own system (e.g. “Dostoevski” instead of “Dostoevsky”); (2) in the rendering of the 
name of “Aikhenvald” [Айхенвальд], which would normally be transliterated “Aikhenval’d” 
according to this system; and (3) in the rendering of quotations appearing in old orthography: these 
have all been converted to new orthography and thence transliterated.  
 
 
When citing Russian sources in the bibliography and notes, I use the Library of Congress system 
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INTRODUCTION: WHY BAKTHIN AND NABOKOV? 
 In his lectures on Dostoevsky, Nabokov famously accuses Dostoevsky’s characters of 
lacking psychological development: “throughout the book,” the author-professor tells his student-
readers, “they do not develop as personalities.  We get them all complete at the beginning of the 
tale, and so they remain without any considerable changes although their surroundings may alter 
and the most extraordinary things may happen to them.”1  Nabokov then singles out Raskolnikov 
as an example of the Dostoevskian ‘flat hero’ and says that, though he does undergo a 
developmental trajectory “...from premeditated murder to the promise of an achievement of some 
kind of harmony with the outer world...[,]” this development lacks the aspect of psychological 
interiority; i.e. “all this happens somehow from without: innerly even Raskolnikov does not go 
through any true development of personality, and the other heroes of Dostoevski [sic] do even less 
so.”2  Next, referring now to all Dostoevsky characters in general, Nabokov essentially accuses 
Dostoevsky of being a ‘totalitarian’ author: “Let us always remember that basically Dostoevski is 
a writer of mystery stories where every character, once introduced to us, remains the same to the 
bitter end, complete with his special features and personal habits, and that they all are treated 
throughout the book they happen to be in like chessmen in a complicated chess problem.”3   
 These statements strike the student of Russian literature and literary theory as interesting 
and significant in that they are in diametrical opposition to Mikhail Bakhtin’s assessments of 
                                                 
 1 LoRL, 109. 
 2 Ibid.  Nabokov does allow Dostoevsky a measure of dynamism and development, but only at the level of 
plot: “The only thing that develops, vacillates, takes unexpected sharp turns, deviates completely to include new 
people and circumstances, is the plot.” 
 3 Ibid.  This “complicated chess problem” is the plot: “Being an intricate plotter, Dostoevski succeeds in 
holding the reader’s attention; he builds up his climaxes and keeps up his suspenses with consummate mastery.  But 
if you re-read a book of his you have already read once so that you are familiar with the surprises and complications 




Dostoevsky in general and of Raskolnikov in particular.  To Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s manner of 
composing characters is not lacking in psychological interiority – on the contrary, Dostoevsky’s 
hallmark as a writer is his close attention to this very aspect, for he “sees [the] depths outside 
himself, in the souls of others.”4  Dostoevsky, Bakhtin would counter, couldn’t possibly treat his 
characters as objects, or as chess pieces in a game, or, to use his language, monologically, for his 
greatness as an author lies precisely in his employment of a compositional methodology quite 
contrary to the one imputed to him by Nabokov.  “We consider Dostoevsky one of the greatest 
innovators in the realm of artistic form.  He created, in our opinion, a completely new type of 
artistic thinking...called polyphonic.”5  Through this polyphonic rendering of characters, “[t]he 
character is treated as ideologically authoritative and independent; he is perceived as the author of 
a fully weighted ideological conception of his own, and not as the object of Dostoevsky’s finalizing 
artistic vision.”6  Since Dostoevsky’s characters are not, in fact, objects employed by the author in 
some game, scheme or plan – says Bakhtin – they are masters of their own selves and, as such, can 
and do develop according to their own ever-revisable plan – in other words, finalizability lies in 
their own hands and not in their author’s.  Bakhtin affirms both these characters’ ‘non-object’ 
status and the possibility of their development in a discussion of Dostoevsky’s attitude toward the 
psychology of his day: 
 [h]e saw in it a degrading reification of a person’s soul, a discounting of its freedom and  
 its unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness which in  
 Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in fact Dostoevsky always  
 represents a person on the threshold of a final decision, at a moment of crisis, at an  
 unfinalizable – and unpredeterminable – turning point for his soul.7     
                                                 
 4 Indeed, this was Dostoevsky’s assessment of himself as well: “They call me a psychologist; this is not 
true. I am merely a realist in the higher sense, that is, I portray all the depths of the human soul.” See PDP, 61/Ss: 
VI, 71.  Bakhtin quotes Dostoevsky from Biografiia, pis’ma i zametki iz zapisnoi knigi F. M. Dostoevskogo (St. 
Petersburg, 1883), 373.  
 5 PDP, 3 /Ss: VI, 7. 
 6 Ibid, 5 /Ss: VI, 9. 




 Nabokov’s decidedly — though perhaps unwittingly8 — anti-Bakhtinian conception of 
Dostoevsky and his heroes presents us with a paradox, for he accuses Dostoevsky of engaging in 
precisely the very same kind of monologic relationships that he himself proudly asserts with his 
heroes.  “My characters are galley slaves,” Nabokov told George Plimpton in an interview.9  It is 
obvious that Nabokov was here explicitly rejecting a relationship between the author and his or 
her heroes, a relationship Bakhtin would label as polyphonic, for, in setting up the question that 
would elicit the above response, Plimpton described to Nabokov the relationship that the author E. 
M. Forster had with his characters thus: “E. M. Forster speaks of his major characters sometimes 
taking over and dictating the course of his novels.”  Plimpton then asked Nabokov: “[h]as this ever 
been a problem for you, or are you in complete command?”10 After trashing the author in question 
in typical fashion, Nabokov then trashed the idea of character freedom itself: “[it] was not he [i.e., 
Forster] who fathered that trite little whimsy about characters getting out of hand; it is as old as 
the quills, although of course one sympathizes with his people if they try to wriggle out of that trip 
to India or wherever he takes them.  My characters are galley slaves.”11  Similarly, in a 1977 BBC 
                                                 
 8 Nabokov’s conception of Dostoevsky is most likely unwittingly anti-Bakhtinian since it seems unlikely 
that Nabokov ever read Bakhtin.  However, in a posting on NABOKOV-L, Alexander Dolinin points to a textual 
juncture that could have provided Nabokov the chance to cross paths with Bakhtin: “The first edition of Bakhtin's 
book on Dostoevsky was published in 1929 and astutely reviewed by Petr Bitsilli in a 1930 issue of "Sovremennye 
zapiski," side by side with a part of "Luzhin's Defense" and Tsetlin's  review of "Chorb." This means that Nabokov 
could have read at least Bitsilli's review if not Bakhtin  himself. Yet in a lecture on Dostoevsky given in 1931, 
Nabokov discusses Marxist, Freudian and religious biases in Dostoevsky criticism of the 1920's, yet he does not 
refer to Bakhtin's theory of so-called "polyphonic novel." See Alexander Dolinin, “RE: Nabokov & Bakhtin,” 
NABOKOV-L, 25 September 2004, at https://listserv.ucsb.edu/lsv-cgi-bin/wa?A2=NABOKV-L;7adaa0a2.0409 
(last accessed 13 March 2013).  As for Bakhtin’s reading of Nabokov, Marina Kostalevsky says in her Dostoevsky 
and Solov’ev: The Art of Integral Vision (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) ix-x, that “I remember bringing 
him [Bakhtin] books by Berdiaev, Mikhail Chekhov, Evreinov..., and Nabokov...”  To date, I am not aware of 
Bakhtin ever mentioning Nabokov, much less of discussing him at any length in any of his papers in the extant, 
unpublished archive or elsewhere. 
 9 SO, 81. 
 10 Ibid. 
 11 Cf. Bakhtin on Dostoevsky’s polyphonicity: “Dostoevsky...creates not voiceless slaves...but free people, 
capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him” 
(PDP, 6 /Ss: VI, 11.)  
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interview, Nabokov, affirmed that his relationship with his books isn’t merely dictatorial but 
despotically so: “I have seen a whole avenue of imagined trees losing their leaves at the threat of 
my passage.”12 
 Though Nabokov’s metatextual comments are famously unreliable, Nabokov’s essential 
self-description as a monologist is, by and large, backed up by the plots of his novels.  For example, 
the whole denouement of Invitation to a Beheading (1936) involves the presumed intervention of 
the author-narrator, who tears down the very reality he created like a theater set in order to allow 
his hero character to transcend reality. 13   In Bend Sinister (1947), we see an almost exact 
replication of this ending (the set is torn apart, the hero who is about to be executed is either 
whisked away or transcended), except that the narrator-authorial intervention is here not suggested 
at all but bluntly enacted: the abrupt end of the hero’s narrative is immediately followed by a 
mundane description of the narrator-author’s writerly reality:  
 He saw the toad crouching at the foot of the wall, shaking, dissolving, speeding up his  
 shrill incantations, protecting his dimming face with his transparent arm, and Krug  
 ran towards him, and just a fraction of an instant before another and better bullet hit him,  
 he shouted again: You, you – and the wall vanished, like a rapidly withdrawn slide, and I  
 stretched myself and got up from among the chaos of written and rewritten pages, to  
 investigate the sudden twang that something had made in striking the wire netting of my  
 window. 
  As I had thought, a big moth was clinging with furry feet to the netting, on the  
 night’s side; its marbled wings kept vibrating, its eyes glowed like two miniature coals.  I 
 had just time to make out its streamlined brownish-pink body and a twinned spot of  
 colour; and then it let go and swung back into the warm damp darkness. 
  Well, that was all.  The various parts of my comparative paradise – the bedside  
 lamp, the sleeping tablets, the glass of milk – looked with perfect submission into my  
 eyes.  I knew that the immortality I had conferred on the poor fellow was a slippery  
 sophism, a play upon words.  But the very last lap of his life had been happy and it had  
 been proven to him that death was but a question of style...”14 
 
                                                 
 12 See Nabokov, “The Last Interview,” interview with Robert Robinson in Peter Quennell (ed.) Vladimir 
Nabokov: A Tribute (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 113-28. 
 13 ITaB, 223. 
 14 BS, 240-241. 
 
5 
The ease with which the narrator-author of Bend Sinister comments upon the very narrative whose 
frame he breaks stands in stark contrast to the kind of monologistic relationship that we would see 
in Nabokov’s subsequent novel, Lolita.  The neat parallel between Humbert Humbert, the author 
of the embedded narrative, and his heroine’s15 ethically fraught, asymmetric power relationship on 
the one hand and their equally asymmetric, monological narrator-character relationship on the 
other suggests a powerful condemnation of monologism – monologism as high crime.  The 
repudiation of monologism in Lolita arguably implies the privileging of an ethically more 
defensible relationship between author and hero; a relationship akin, perhaps, to Bakhtinian 
dialogism or polyphony. 
 It is clear, then, that Nabokov’s attitude toward the concept of monologism is far from 
straightforward: at times it approximates the Bakhtinian attitude, at times it opposes it 
diametrically.  Yet despite this opaque attitude it is nevertheless obvious that at least a significant 
part of the set of narratological practices that Bakhtin labels as monologistic is of intimate concern 
to Nabokov’s writing.  Nabokov’s work, for example, is famously rife with authorial asides, 
implicit and explicit self-references, and heroes who are themselves authors, and heroes who 
author narratives within novels.16  Furthermore, a careful reading of Nabokov’s œuvre will reveal 
that he frequently confronts other concepts theorized by Bakhtin besides the monological.  Novels 
such as the Eye, The Defense, and again, Lolita, also focus on ethical and inter-characterological 
situations that seem to dramatize strikingly the Bakhtinian concepts of ‘the last word’ and of the 
‘loophole.’   
                                                 
 15 I use the words ‘hero’ and ‘heroine’ in the Russian sense of ‘character,’ as in the title of Bakhtin’s 
Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.  
 16 For a comprehensive catalogue of instances of monologism in Nabokov’s works, see Pekka Tammi, 
Problems of Nabokov’s Poetics (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia [Academia Scientarum Fennica], 1985). 
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 It is, then, our assumption that Nabokov doesn’t merely graze the concepts of monologism, 
polyphony, and dialogism tangentially in his writing.  These operate, in one form or another, at the 
heart of his writing.  The seemingly Bakhtinian kind of monologism observed in Nabokov’s œuvre 
is not an element that passively or subconsciously determines the aesthetics, epistemology, 
metaphysics, and ethics expressed therein but rather an intentional component which is founded 
on, and as a result of, Nabokov’s particular view of these.  In other words, Nabokov’s monologism, 
where it abides, is conscious, intentional, and expressive.  And yet – as we saw in the example of 
Lolita – despite Nabokov’s celebration of monologistic discourse in both authorial metatext and 
narratorial behavior, the monologism demonstrated in these strategies can also be highly unstable.  
These instabilities, whether intentional or unintentional, create textual spaces that are either (1) not 
absolutely monologic, and therefore reserve a  meaningful space for dialogism, or (2) seemingly 
absolutely monologic yet marked by discrepancies — or clues — that threaten a total 
distabilization of the hegemonic voice, ultimately implying an absent, but nevertheless 
aesthetically (ethically, and perhaps metaphysically) relevant heterophony/glossia.  It is obvious, 
then, not only that Nabokov and Bakhtin share conceptual interests, but that this set of shared 
interests inhabits a space intersected by the narratological-compositional plane on the one hand 
and the ethical plane on the other.  For both Bakhtin and Nabokov, the narratological arrangement 
of a novel has intrinsic ethical implications.  It is thus not surprising that both their views of 
interpersonal ethics are always founded upon a metaphor of the self reading the other.   
 The interesting coincidence of textual and ethical concerns between these two giants of 
literature and literary theory could be explained in part by their respective relationships with 
Dostoevsky.  Bakhtin’s theories of monologism, the loophole, polyphony, dialogism, among 
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others, may waver in their theoretic accuracy with respect to Dostoevsky, 17  but they are 
nevertheless inspired in major part by this author.  As for Nabokov’s relationship with Dostoevsky, 
there is an overwhelming body of evidence that, his public attitude toward Dostoevsky 
notwithstanding, Nabokov’s relationship to this author was far from the simple one of repudiation 
– as he himself would have us believe – but of denial, repudiation, as well as silent appropriation.18  
As Julian Connolly says, despite  
 enormous differences in artistic temperament, stylistic technique, and philosophical  
 world view [and] Nabokov’s professed antipathy for Dostoevsky’s excesses...the   
 evidence of his prose fiction reveals a more complex relationship <...> Nabokov found in  
 Dostoevsky’s work a stimulating set of ideas and techniques that helped shape his own  
 unique portraits of human imagination and obsession.19  
 
Connolly points to one possible explanation for the proximity of Bakhtin and Nabokov’s concerns 
when he says that “Dostoevsky’s fiction provided Nabokov with provocative models of human 
imagination, both in terms of the kinds of visions attributed to his fictional characters and in terms 
of the way these visions are conveyed to the reader (that is, through particular kinds of first-person, 
confessional narratives)”20  Indeed, it is in Nabokov’s own first-person narratives, as I will argue 
                                                 
 17 Bakhtin’s conception of Dostoevsky has seen plenty of criticism and reappraisal; see, for example, S. 
Lomidze, “Rereading Dostoevsky and Bakhtin,” Russian Studies in Literature 38.4 (Fall 2002), 39-57; Gary 
Rosenshield, Crime and Punishment: The techniques of the Omniscient Author (Lisse: Peter de Ridder, 1978).  
Rosenshield argues that “the points of view of [Dostoevsky’s] characters...are subordinated to the higher point of 
view of the narrator” (127). 
 18 See, for example: Julian W. Connolly, “Nabokov’s (Re)Visions of Dostoevsky,” in Nabokov and His 
Fiction: New Perspectives, ed. Connolly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 141–57; Alexander 
Dolinin, “Caning of Modernist Profaners: Parody in Despair,” Cycnos 12.2 (1995), 43–54 (see also a longer version 
at http://www.libraries.psu.edu/nabokov/doli1.htm); Aleksandr Dolinin, “Nabokov, Dostoevskii, i dostoevshchina,” 
Staroe literaturnoe obozrenie 1 (277) (2001) at http://magazines.russ.ru/slo/2001/1/dol.html (last accessed May 17 
2013); Katherine Tiernan O’Connor, “Rereading Lolita, Reconsidering Nabokov’s Relationship with Dostoevskij,” 
Slavic and East European Journal 33.1 (Spring 1989), 64–77; Melvin Seiden, “Nabokov and Dostoevsky,” 
Contemporary Literature 13.4 (Autumn 1972), 423–44; L. N. Tselkova, “Roman Nabokova ‘Lolita’ i ‘ispoved’’ 
Stavrogina,” Nabokovskii vestnik 1 (1998), 125– 34; Sergei Davydov, “Dostoevsky and Nabokov: The Morality of 
Structure in Crime and Punishment and Despair,” Dostoevsky Studies 3 (1982), 158-170; Pekka Tammi, “Invitation 
to a Decoding: Dostoevskij as Subtext in Nabokov’s Priglašenie na kazn’,” Scando-Slavica 32.1 (1986), 51–72; and 
N. A. Fateeva, in “Dostoevskii i Nabokov: O dialogichnosti i intertekstual’nosti ‘Otchaianiia’” Russian Literature 
51 (2002): 31–48. 
 19 Connolly, 141. 
 20 Ibid. 
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in the last chapter of this study, that the author toys most intensely with the Bakhtinian categories 
of monologism, dialogism, and polyphony.   
 Yet Dostoevsky cannot be given all the credit for placing Bakhtin and Nabokov within 
conceptual proximity, for certain conceptual affinities between them seem have their provenance 
in traditions older than the 19th century author.  For example, Nabokov has frequently voiced his 
profession of a “monistic” worldview,21 whereas Bakhtin regards “monism” as the source of 
monologism.22 Despite Bakhtin’s negative attitude toward monism, his position vis-à-vis this and 
other Idealist concepts is actually more complicated than would seem at first blush.  Ultimately, it 
has been argued, that Bakhtin’s fervor for polyphonicity and plurivocality harks back to a different 
concept of Unity, that of the Orthodox, and specifically Patristic, conception of Unity within 
diversity.23  Bakhtin and Nabokov’s respective views of unity and diversity should, then, be 
viewed from the wider cultural, artistic, and philosophic context of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, when a process of Idealist thought germinated and then culminated in the Silver Age’s 
reaction against the (formerly prevailing) positivistic and (ascendant) materialist ideologies. 
 If Bakhtin and Nabokov are demonstrably part of the same narratological and ethical 
conversation, with some of the same philological sources, it seems puzzling that no serious study 
has been conceived to undertake an in-depth comparison of Bakhtin’s conceptions of monologism 
and other concepts and the meaning that Nabokov might attribute to them as they are deployed in 
his novels.  This is not to say that there have not been studies pitting Nabokov and Bakhtin together.  
                                                 
 21 See SO, 85, 124.  
 22 See PDP, 80-81. 
 23 Alexandar Mihailovic, “Bakhtin’s Dialogue with Russian Orthodoxy and Critique of Linguistic 
Universalism,” in Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino (eds.) Bakhtin and Religion (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 2001), 124-126.  See also Mihailovic’s book Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology of 
Discourse (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1997)  
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As of the present moment (2015), two books have been written that intersect Bakhtin and Nabokov 
in one way or another.  First, there is Vadim Linetskii’s “Anti-Bakhtin”: luchshaia kniga o 
Vladimire Nabokove.24   None of the chapters of this book feature a concrete comparison of 
Bakhtinian categories as employed by the theorist himself and Nabokov.  Caryl Emerson is of the 
opinion that “the book is mediocre and derivative.”25  There is also Pekka Tammi’s invaluable 
Problems of Nabokov’s Poetics: A Narratological Analysis.  Tammi’s book is an incisive 
dissection and catalogue of Nabokov’s narratological strategies and, as such, it employs the 
Bakhtinian categories of monologism and polyphony.  The difference between Tammi’s study and 
the one that we would like to present here is that we intend not only to utilize Bakhtin’s categories 
as tools to analyze the construction of Nabokov’s narratives but to compare the ethical-
philosophical assumptions of these categories with Nabokov’s own to see if Nabokov presents any 
sort of alternative.  Tammi also ultimately brands Nabokov as a monologist — “We may talk of a 
pronouncedly anti-polyphonic feature in the author's writing: an overriding tendency to make 
explicit the presence of a creative consciousness behind every fictive construction" (100) — an 
assessment that we seek to complicate.  One book, Maurice Couturier’s Nabokov ou la tyrannie 
de l’auteur (1993) tackles the issue of Nabokovian monologism by offering an extensive 
description of the function of Nabokov’s ‘interpretative tyranny,’ but restricts itself to an 
explication du texte which, though useful, does not place Nabokov’s tyranny in relation to 
Bakhtin’s categories nor in relation to the philosophical context that the author and literary theorist 
shared.26  
                                                 
 24 (Saint Petersburg: Tip. im. Kotliakova, 1994).  
 25 see The First hundred years of Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 135.  
 26 See Maurice Couturier, Nabokov ou la tyrannie de l’auteur (Paris: Seuil, 1993)  . 
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 Bakhtin and Nabokov’s names appear in other, much shorter studies as well.  There is an 
article by Stephen Blackwell that focuses on Nabokov’s conversation with Dostoevsky and 
relegates Bakhtin to the role of mediator: “Bakhtin helps us to see what Nabokov and 
Dostoevsky have in common, bringing into greater relief the significance of...Dostoevskian 
themes for Nabokov’s art.”27  The article nevertheless affirms our suspicions that what Nabokov 
addresses in Dostoevsky ’s oeuvre was also part of what Bakhtin himself focused on in 
Dostoevsky.  Blackwell's study ultimately focuses on how Nabokov employs what Bakhtin calls 
the “loophole,” a concept which addresses “the incommensurability between one’s desire for 
self-definition and that of the others to define one; [and] the inescapable tendency of all 
narration, all words, to impinge upon the freedom of individuals to define and create themselves” 
(140).  Since, as we shall argue in chapter four, Nabokov’s idiosyncratic deployment of 
monologism is strictly connected with his deployment of the loophole — a strategy that  
Bakhtinian regards as strictly dialogic —Blackwell’s article is invaluable because it helps us 
contextualize the orientation of Nabokov’s monologism.28  However, neither Blackwell, nor any 
of the scholars just mentioned have explored the implications of the monologism exhibited by 
Nabokov’s intrinsic narrators.  We propose to rectify the situation with a study that seeks to flesh 
out a great conversation that could have been had between two giants of literature and theory.  
Yet the necessity of constructing a dialogue between Bakhtin and Nabokov does not find its 
                                                 
 
27
 p. 140; see “Dostoevskian Problems in Nabokov’s Poetics,” in John Bartle, Michael Finke, and Vadim 
Liapunov (eds.) From Petersburg to Bloomington: Studies Presented in Honor of Nina Perlina (Bloomington, IN: 
Slavica, 2012) 137-154.  
 
28
 Two other articles place Bakhtin and Nabokov together in interpretative context. One of them is an 
impressionistic and abstract comparison of the concept of ‘repentance’ in Bakhtin, Nabokov and Venedikt Erofeev.  
It does not touch the concerns of our study.  See T. B. Lyubimova, “literaturnie obliki neosoznannogo pokayania 
(M. Bakhtin, V. Nabokov, Ven. Erofeev)” Dialog, Karnaval, Khronotop 4.13 (1995) 53-77.  The other is a short and 
fragmentary meditation on the theme of the ‘mirror’ in Despair.  It deals with the concerns of this study if only in a  
tangential manner.  See Vardan Ayrapetyan, “Nabokov v zerkale Germana” Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop 4.29 
(1999) 4-10.  
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basis only in their thematically criss-crossing thoughts on Dostoevsky and their evolution from a 
common context.  The contemporary image of Nabokov as a writer has already been fraught with 
assessments weighed on Bakhtin’s dichotomous scale of ‘polyphonic vs. monologic.’    
 
 
NABOKOVEDENIE AS SEMIOTIC TOTALITARIANISM 
 One of the most conspicuous aspects of the history of American Nabokov studies, from its 
very beginnings after the publication of Lolita up until the present, is the predominance of two 
overarching interpretative paradigms.  The first to arrive in the scholarly scene, termed the 
“aesthetic movement” by some scholars, is, not surprisingly, marked by a “focus on the intricate 
artifices of Nabokov’s deceptive fictions,” such as his allusive, stylistic, linguistic and novelistic 
structures.  According to a recent survey of Nabokov scholarship, this early trend, represented by 
scholars such as Stegner, Proffer, Appel, Lokrantz, Bodenstein, and Grayson, was, according to 
Pekka Tammi, very susceptible to Nabokov29’s body of metatextual aesthetic “dicta.”30  The 
second movement, a reaction to the first, attempted to bring the metafictional element in 
Nabokov’s œuvre “into close alignment with the metaphysical.”31 This trend is most clearly 
                                                 
 29 Leland de la Durantaye, “Lolita in Lolita, or the Garden, the Gate, and the Critics,” Nabokov Studies 10 
(2006), 15.  See also Maurice Couturier’s introductory overview to the Pleïade edition of Nabokov’s early works; 
“Introduction,” Œvres romanesques complètes Vol. I (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), ix-xlix.  
 30 See Tammi’s Problems of Nabokov’s Poetics, 4.  See also de la Durantaye, 15.  See Page Stegner, 
Escape Into Aesthetics: The Art of Vladimir Nabokov (New York: Dial Press, 1966); Carl Proffer, Keys to Lolita 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968); Alfred Appel’s commentary in Vladimir Nabokov, The Annotated 
Lolita (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); Jessie Thomas Lokrantz, The Underside of the Weave: Some Stylistic 
Devices Used by Vladimir Nabokov (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, Phil.Diss., 1973); J. H. Bodenstein, “The 
Excitement of Verbal Adventure”: A Study of Vladimir Nabokov’s English Prose, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: Ruprecht-
Karl-Universität zu Heidelberg, 1977); Jane Grayson, Nabokov Translated: A Comparison of Nabokov’s Russian 
and English Prose (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); Alexander D. Nakhimovsky, “A Linguistic Study of 
Nabokov’s Russian Prose,” The Slavic and East European Journal 21.1, 78-87. 
 31 de la Durantaye, 20.   
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demonstrated in Vladimir Alexandrov’s Nabokov’s Otherworld (1991), whose title displays the 
chief concept of the movement.  Nabokov scholars such as Ellen Pifer and D. Barton Johnson 
employed the concept of Nabokov’s metaphysical “otherworldliness” to support ‘ethical’ readings 
of Lolita, Pnin, and Pale Fire, amongst other works. 32   In the mid 1990s, however, the 
“metaphysical-ethical” countermovement itself began to draw a considerable amount of criticism, 
and a third phase tried to carve a path of moderation between two perceived extremes.  Of the 
common criticisms put forth, two have resounded with particular frequency.  The first points to 
the existence of a methodological disconnect between the two scholarly ‘ideologies.’  According 
to Maurice Couturier, “[the] metaphysical approach to Nabokov’s œuvre…ends up erasing all of 
that part that is erotic, playful [jouissive], and even poetic...At the same time, without doubt, one 
could reproach those ludic and playful [critiques] of not taking into account the philosophical and 
ethical dimension [of Nabokov’s works].”33  The second criticism maintains that the hermeneutic 
significance that the aesthetic and ethical interpretations have given to ex-cathedra 
pronouncements by the author and his family is an example of uncritical scholarship.  Just as early 
American scholarship was under the sway of Nabokov’s discourse on his own works so the 
scholarship of the “ethical turn” has repeatedly taken recourse to Véra Nabokov’s “revelation” that 
central to her husband’s works lay the theme of “otherworldliness” (potustoronnost’).34 
                                                 
 32 See Ellen Pifer, Nabokov and the Novel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980) 
and D. Barton Johnson, Worlds in Regression: Some Novels of Vladimir Nabokov (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1985) For 
other works writing from this perspective, see Galya Diment, “Review: Nabokov: The Mystery of Literary 
Structures,” SEEJ 34.2 (Summer, 1990), 269-270; Brian Boyd and D. Barton Johnson. “Prologue: The Otherworld,” 
Nabokov’s World. Vol. I: The Shape of Nabokov’s World. Ed. J. Grayson, A. McMillin, and P. Meyer (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 20;  Leona Toker, Nabokov: The Mystery of Literary Structures (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) and Julian Connolly, Nabokov's Early Fiction: Patterns of Self and Other (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
 33 Couturier, x. 
 34 For examples of the requisite mention and explanation of the term potustoronnost’, see Alexandrov, 
Nabokov’s Otherworld, and Johnson, World in Regression, and Toker, Nabokov: The Mystery of Literary Structures. 
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 Undoubtedly, more than a few recent critical works have attempted to deal with the 
seemingly irreconcilable ethical and aesthetic Nabokovs created by a scholarly tradition 
accustomed to exclusionary readings.  Some scholars, such as Toker, Boyd, Blackwell and de la 
Durantaye have dedicated studies to the illumination of how one aspect arises from the other.35  
Nevertheless, there are scholars, such as Cornwell and Naiman, who profess a strict hermeneutic 
loyalty to an aesthetic Nabokov and charge that “ethical” readings of Nabokov and Lolita in 
particular, are, at bottom, the product of selective textual analyses and subjective projections on 
the part of scholars.  36 
 Thus the problem of the occlusion of one aspect by reading strategies that favor the other 
remains unsolved.  Though attempts to deal with this situation have been made, the pervasive 
scholarly habit of producing readings of Nabokov’s works that accord with his authorial metatext 
persists unabated.  Thus, for example, de la Durantaye’s recent Style is Matter (2007), which 
argues that the ethical repercussions of Lolita are supported by its aesthetics, devotes quite a bit of 
space to explicating the sentiment of various Nabokov metatexts  and debunking the “cruel” ones 
by referring to more “generous ones.”37   
                                                 
 35 Toker, ibid. See Boyd’s Nabokov’s Ada: The Place of Consciousness (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1985); 
Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.); Vladimir Nabokov: The 
American Years. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991) and Nabokov’s Pale Fire: The Magic of Artistic 
Discovery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); see also Boyd and Johnson’s “Prologue: The 
Otherworld;” Blackwell’s Zina’s Paradox: The Figured Reader in Nabokov’s Gift (New York: Peter Lang, 2000); 
Leland de la Durantaye, Style is Matter (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 2007). 
 36 See Eric Naiman, Nabokov, Perversely (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 148-160.  See also 
Johnson and Boyd, 19-26 and Neil Cornwell, Vladimir Nabokov (Plymouth, England, Northcote House and the 
British Council, 1999). 
 37 De la Durantaye does a thorough job of taking a quote from Nabokov and seeking either echoes or 
contradictions in other parts of Nabokov’s texts and metatexts.  However it should be noted that most of his points 
of departure are quotes.  Thus De la Durantaye practices a critical kind of author hermeneutics.  See for example his 
exegesis of Nabokov’s afterword to Lolita, where he exposes the contradiction of Nabokov’s sententious “Lolita has 
no moral in tow...” with the contradictory definition of art “(curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy)” presented in 
the next sentence of the quoted paragraph. 
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 De la Durantaye’s case is but one example of the hold that Nabokov’s metatextual 
discourse has on nabokovedenie or Nabokov studies.  The pervasiveness of this interpretative 
mode is such that one scholar, Monika Greenleaf, has claimed that Nabokov scholars do nothing 
but engage in author-sanctioned hermeneutics.  “One of the curious ironies of nabokovovedenie 
[sic] is,” according to Greenleaf… 
 that its practitioners, while displaying an opinionated individualism and iconoclasm vis-à-
vis their (or their adopted) culture’s idées reçues, actually march in lockstep when it comes 
to aesthetic taste and the sarcastic, coercive manner of its enforcement…In its 
unquestioning cult of the genius-personality, the latter’s access to “the Absolute,” and the 
concomitant elevation of an interpretative elite over the race of ordinary reader-mortals, 
nabokovovedenie [sic] seems sometimes to mirror the very political and cultural structures 
against which it so vehemently reacts.  At the very least, it seems curiously impervious to 
new questions and new critical approaches from outside its own confines.”38 
 
Greenleaf labels this interpretative behavior as “semiotic totalitarianism,” a term that Gary Saul 
Morson coined in reference to Bakhtin.  According to Morson, “Bakhtin was…opposed to…forms 
of "semiotic totalitarianism"…that is, to theories that presume there is a significance and system 
behind all events.”39  Such theories could be “models of human behavior,… ‘theories of history’ 
(or psychology) which purport to show that, behind the multiplicity of apparently accidental or 
random facts of historical life, there is really a set of rules, a system, or a pattern that can explain 
everything.” 40   Essentially, then, Greenleaf says that Nabokovedy, i.e. Nabokov scholars, 
reproduce the very monologic and finalizing discourse supposedly uttered by Nabokov.  What is 
important here is that, in utilizing Bakhtin 41 ’s theoretical language to describe Nabokov’s 
                                                 
     38 Monika Greenleaf, “Review of Aerial View: Essays on Nabokov's Art and Metaphysics, by Gennady 
Barabtarlo,” Slavic Review 53.4 (Winter, 1994) 1112-1113. 
 39 See his “Dialogue, Monologue, and the Social: A Reply to Ken Hirschkop, Critical Inquiry 11.4 (June 
1985), 679-686. 
 40 See Morson’s “Prosaics: An Approach to the Humanities,” American Scholar 57 (1988), 85. See also 
Caryl Emerson and Gary Saul Morson, "Penultimate Words." The Current in Criticism, Ed. Clayton Koelb and 
Virgil Lokke (West Lafayette, Indiana, Purdue University Press: 1987) 43-64. 
 41 This criticism may seem harsh, especially after the publication of such works as Nabokov and His 
Fiction: New Perspectives. by Julian Connolly (ed.), Nabokov at the Limits: Redrawing Critical Boundaries (1999) 
by Lisa Zunshine (ed.) and Discourse and Ideology in Nabokov's Prose (2002) by Larmour, David H. J (ed.). 
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authorial behavior, Nabokov the author and his textual practices are implicitly essentialized and 
sublated to the monologic pole of the Bakhtinian dichotomy between monologism and its opposites 
(dialogism, polyphony, heteroglossia, among others). 
 And yet, how could a scholar totally ignore Nabokov’s seemingly monologic 
representation of authorship?  What Greenleaf does not mention is that the “semiotic 
totalitarianism,” of which she accuses Nabokovedenie, is, ultimately, of Nabokov’s own 
authorship.42 Monologism is not restricted to Nabokov’s literary output: it is also evident in his 
metatextual behavior towards annotators, scholars, critics, and interviewers.  Nevertheless, as we 
have said above, Nabokov43’s seeming semiotic totalitarianism is contradicted by numerous 
validations of the other.  Thus a comparison between Bakhtin and Nabokov is made necessary for 
two additional reasons.  The first reason has to do with Greenleaf’s unchallenged assumption 
regarding Nabokov’s semiotic totalitarianism.  Never mind that Nabokov has demonstrated an 
ambiguity towards monologic authorial posturings, scholarly discourse about Nabokov already 
treats the premise of his monologism as trivial fact.  Just as Nabokov’s ambiguity toward 
monologic authorial posturings needs to be clarified, the prevailing scholarly notions of his 
monologism also need to be problematized.  The second reason has to do with the inherently ethical 
nature of an exploration into an author’s monologism.  Specifying — as much as this is possible 
— the meaning that monologism as an authorial stance gathers in Nabokov’s works is tantamount 
                                                 
 42 Cf. Jonathan Raban, “Transparent Likenesses,” Encounter 41.3, 75: “Nabokov is his own major 
character: his fictional people make up a paper chase of transparent metaphors which lead straight back to the 
groaning novelist, weighed down by the world he has himself created.”  Also see Donald E. Morton, Vladimir 
Nabokov (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1974), 48: “Nabokov’s talent is essentially that of a stylist [...]. All his 
character must be ‘little Nabokovs’” 
 43 It was, after all, none other than Nabokov who served as the editor for Alfred Appel’s annotations to 
Nabokov’s Lolita.  A cursory reading of the MS of Appel’s The Annotated Lolita, criss-crossed by Nabokov’s 
pencil, will reveal that Nabokov struck out any readings that he seemingly did not like, replacing them with 
comments such as “Please!,” and “Irrelevant, I’m afraid.” See Appel, Alfred. The Annotated Lolita: Preface, 
Introduction and Notes. Emended typescript draft (photocopy), with Vladimir Nabokov's ms. corrections n.d. ms. 
and typescripts, at the Berg Collection, Stephen A. Schwarzman Bldg., New York Public Library. 
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to making a claim regarding Nabokov’s ethics for reasons that we already suggested above.  Thus 
the present study is also a response to a long-running series of readings of Nabokov that take 
Nabokov’s authority in order to make claims about his ethics and is aesthetics.  By looking at the 
way that he regards authorial authority in his works, this study will also make a claim regarding 
Nabokov’s ethics.    
 The proposed study thus seeks (1) to review and closely analyze Bakhtin’s theoretical 
dichotomy of monologism and its opposites as it evolved through his works; (2) explore Bakhtin 
and Nabokov’s common intellectual context in order to elucidate their views on monologism; (3) 
conduct a close reading of Nabokov’s monologistic and non-monologistic practices within his 
prose works; (3) compare these practices to their classical theoretization in Bakhtin in order to (4) 
make sense of Nabokov’s contradictory repudiation of Dostoevsky’s perceived monologic mode 
of operation and (5) see what implications Nabokov’s own monologic and non-monologic 
practices may have for Bakhtin’s theories in general.  Ultimately, the study seeks to (6) critically 
address the problem of Nabokov’s status as essentialized monologist and interpret the meaning of 
these monologic and non-monologic practices with a view towards the repercussions of these 
practices upon the above-mentioned either/or impasse between aesthetic and ethical readings of 
Nabokov. 
 
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ETHICS? 
 Several recent interpretations of Nabokov’s works that make ethical arguments have 
attracted criticism for applying conceptions of ethics that, as critics suggest, lack footing not only 
in Nabokov’s playful and slippery surfaces, but also in the very activity of reading literature.  The 
most recent example of these include feminist interpretations of Lolita by Linda Kauffman  and 
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Elizabeth Patnoe , who have been taken to task for suggesting that Lolita promotes a sort of 
“fiction-transcending” ethics, which can affect the reader, and thus, the real world.  Ironically 44– 
or fittingly, perhaps – Caryl Emerson has lobbed essentially the same criticism against feminist 
and political interpreters of Bakhtin, arguing that Bakhtin is too elusive to be conscripted into 
ideological battles and that such readings always do violence to a theory that flees any and all 
centers.45  Although we agree with Emerson’s summation of Bakhtin’s theory with regards to 
feminism, we do not agree that it flees every center.  We see in this kind of summarization of 
Bakhtin’s ideas a superimposition of his theory of polyphony.  What sort of center Bakhtin flees 
to is something that we would like to elucidate when we consider the assumptions that both Bakhtin 
and Nabokov hold with respect to the author and his created world.  In any case, I would like to 
use a definition on which both Bakhtin and Nabokov would seem to agree.  Both author and thinker 
employ a common set of tropes which metaphorize the act of reading literature, such as: reading 
as seeing the world, reading as being in the world, reading as reading the other, writing the 
world/the other as reading the world/other.  Nabokov has said – and we bring what he says with 
the full understanding that it is to be scrutinized in the study by comparing it to what he wrote – 
that reading a text effectively means reading it with curiosity, tenderness, and empathy (LRL, 316-
17), and for Bakhtin, the significance of Dostoevsky’s œuvre is the author’s liberation of the voice 
of the hero-as-other.  Thus, if reading a text is but another way of reading the other, it follows that 
what happens between characters and narrators in a text is but a metaphor for what happens 
                                                 
 44 See Patnoe’s “Discourse, Ideology, and Hegemony: The Double dramas in and around Lolita.” in 
Larmour, David H.J. (ed) Discourse and Ideology in Nabokov’s Prose (London: Rutledge, 2002); Kauffman’s 
“Framing Lolita: Is There a Woman in the Text?” in Special Delivery: Epistolary Modes in Modern Fiction 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  See also Naiman, 148-160, where he also criticizes Rorty 1989 and 
Boyd 1991 for laboring under the same assumptions.  
 45 See her “Bakhtin and Women: A Nontopic with Immense Implications,” in Helena Goscilo (ed) Fruits of 
Her Plume: Essays on Contemporary Russian Women’s Culture (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).   
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between the reader and the text and the reader and his/her other qua people in the world.  Naiman’s 
focus on “real-world effects” is really a focus on empirically measurable changes, on ethical 
‘actions’ as opposed to ethical dispositions.  The ethics I want to focus on is the ethics inherent in 
both Bakhtin and Nabokov’s ego-personalist accounts of reading the text and the other ethically, 
where ethical disposition is positively related to perceptual and interpretative perspicuity.   
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF MONOLOGISM 
 
 As we have said in the introduction, Bakhtin and Nabokov’s pregnant yet unfulfilled 
dialogue on the concept of monologism and its opposites has two clear, common sources: 
Dostoevsky and the philosophical and artistic discourses of the Silver Age.   The goal of this first 
chapter will be to explain how Bakhtin’s concept of monologism emerged from the philosophical 
concept of monism within the context of Silver Age intellectual culture.  Nabokov’s Silver Age 
context will then occupy the middle two chapters of this study.  Lastly, Bakhtin and Nabokov’s 
specific dialogue on Dostoevsky will be the focus of the fourth chapter of this study.  Thus the 
philological excavation will ultimately serve and be subservient to a typological comparison. 
 
WHAT IS MONOLOGISM?       
 The Silver Age philosophical connection that binds Bakhtin and Nabokov together 
curiously parallels the structure of their connection within the context of Dostoevsky.  Whereas 
they both take Dostoevsky as the point of departure for related ideas, some of these ideas 
diametrically oppose each other in much the same way that an object opposes its reflection in a 
mirror: they are at the same time alike and yet totally different.  For example, as discussed above, 
Bakhtin and Nabokov both theorized about monologism, yet the latter essentially labeled 
Dostoevsky a monologist while the former labeled him a polyphonist.  With the Silver Age, in a 
similar twist, Bakhtin repudiates something that Nabokov professes wholeheartedly.  What is 
intriguing about the both repudiated and professed concept, the concept of monism, is that it is, 
according to Bakhtin, intrinsically connected to the concept of monologism: 
 Ideological monologism found its clearest and theoretically most precise expression in  
 idealistic philosophy.  The monistic principle, that is, the affirmation of the unity of  
 existence, is, in idealism, transformed into the unity of the consciousness. <...> In an  
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 environment of philosophical monologism the genuine interaction of consciousnesses is  
 impossible, and thus genuine dialogue is impossible as well.46 
 
Though Nabokov accused Dostoevsky of monologism, without naming Bakhtin’s concept, he does 
seem to profess what Bakhtin says engendered that very concept in the first place.  In response to 
an interviewer’s request to elaborate on his self-characterization as an “indivisible monist,” 
Nabokov explains that “[m]onism, which implies a oneness of basic reality, is seen to be divisible 
when, say,  ‘mind’ sneakily splits away from ‘matter’ in the reasoning of a muddled monist or 
half-hearted materialist.”47  Nabokov thus strongly implies that he believes in a reality conceived 
as a oneness characterized by an undivided unity between mind and matter.  Is this oneness of 
reality qua indivisible unity of mind and matter the same as Bakhtin’s “unity of consciousness”?  
It would seem so.  The kind of monism that Nabokov believes in, which contemporary 
philosophers call “priority monism,” is a view of the world as made up of many parts that are 
nevertheless ontologically subsequent to a prior and singular whole.48  Some priority monisms see 
matter as the most fundamental substance, and some others see mind or spirit (Geiste) or 
consciousness as the most fundamental substance. 49  According to Jonathan Schaffer, Plato’s 
cosmology, the Neoplatonic systems of Plotinus and Proclus and Hegel’s historiosophy, among 
many others, are considered priority monisms.  All of these, in one way or another, hold some sort 
of über-consciousness as the most prior, basic whole from which the plurality that populates the 
                                                 
 46 PDP, 80-81. 
 47 SO, 124. 
 48 Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole,” The Philosophical Review 119.1 (2010): 31-76.  
 49 Leopold Stubenberg, “Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoherent, and Mislabeled Doctrine?” Reduction 
and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, August 




universe ensues.50  When we read further in the section where Bakhtin indicates monism as the 
conceptual ancestor of monologism, we realize that this — the priority monism of consciousness 
— is the kind of monism he has in mind: 
  The unity of consciousness, replacing the unity of existence, is inevitably   
 transformed into the unity of a single consciousness; when this occurs it makes absolutely 
 no difference what metaphysical form the unity takes: “consciousness in    
 general” (“Bewusstsein überhaupt”), “the absolute I,” “the absolute spirit,” “the   
 normative consciousness,” and so forth.51   
 
In fact, Bakhtin in this passage takes a rather broad view of German Idealism, specifically Kant 
and Hegel, and sees any generalization of consciousness — whether minimal, like Kant’s, which 
is restricted to epistemology, or maximizing, like Hegel’s, which sees all plurality as derived from 
the Absolute Idea52 — as a “monizing” enterprise.  According to Bakhtin’s broad definition, then, 
any world view which collapses individual and plural consciousnesses into a singular one that 
stands prior to them and somehow subsumes them is considered a monism: 
 Alongside this unified and inevitably single consciousness can be found a    
 multitude of empirical human consciousnesses.  From the point of view of 
 “consciousness in general” this plurality of consciousnesses is accidental and, so to  
 speak, superfluous.  Everything in them that is essential and true is incorporated into the  
 unified context of “consciousness in general” and deprived of its individuality.  That  
 which is individual, that which distinguishes one consciousness from another and from  
 others, is cognitively not essential and belongs to the realm of an individual human  
 being’s psychical organization and limitations.  From the point of view of truth, there are  
 no individual consciousnesses.  Idealism recognizes only one principle of cognitive  
 individualization: error. True judgments are not attached to a personality, but correspond  
 to some unified, systematically monologic context.  Only error individualizes.    
 Everything that is true finds a place for itself within the boundaries of a single   
 consciousness, and if it does not actually find for itself such a place, this is so for reasons  
 incidental and extraneous to the truth itself.  In the ideal a single consciousness and a  
                                                 
 50  Schaffer, Jonathan, "Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/monism/>.  See also Pauliina Remes, 
Neoplatonism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 4. 
 51PDP, 80-81; Ss VI, 92. 
 52 "Absolute Idealism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia 




 single mouth are absolutely sufficient for maximally full cognition; there is no need for a  
 multitude of consciousnesses, and no basis for it.53 
 
Bakhtin’s condemnation of monism for reserving truth for its idea of “The One”54 while marking 
the individual as erroneous could be applied to any monism, including Nabokov’s.  In Plato’s 
Timaeus, the physical world is fashioned by the Demiurge who uses the one ideal, singular world 
as his model.55 The derived physical world, however, is a mere false shadow of that ideal world.  
Hegel’s Absolute Idea, consummated at the end of history, is the full truth, while all of its 
constituent theses and antitheses are but fragments of this truth.  Indeed the process in monist 
narratives from plural reality to monistic metaphysical telos is analogous to the hermeneutic 
process inherent in Bakhtin’s view of monologic novels: however the plural character 
consciousnesses are given in the course of the narrative, by the story’s end they all come together 
to build one final, whole perspective: the author’s.  In this respect, the characters’ perspectives are 
erroneous in themselves.  In Nabokov, several indisputably monologic narratives are directly 
metaphorical of a monistic progression of the earthly plural to the divine singular.  A prime 
example is Bend Sinister, whose denouement (i.e., its telos) sees the disappearance of the main 
character and the introduction of a divine-like author’s own reality.56   At the end (again, the telos) 
of the Real life of Sebastian Knight, the narrator lets the readers in on the secret that he has learned 
at the end of his many travails: “that the soul is but a manner of being — not a constant state — 
that any soul may be yours, if you find and follow its undulations.”57 In Strong Opinions, Nabokov 
                                                 
 53 PDP, 80-81; Ss VI, 92.  
 54  This is the appellation that Plotinus gives to the monistic divine figure in his Enneads. See Plotinus, The 
Six Enneads, Great books of the Western World V. 17 Trans. Stephen MacKenna and B.S. Page (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984) V.2.1. 
 55 Plato, Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, Great books of the Western World, V 6. Trans. Benjamin Jowett 
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984), 22c; 39d.  
 56 See Susan Bromberg Schaeffer’s “‘Bend Sinister’ and the Novelist as Anthropomorphic Deity,” The 
Centennial Review 17.2 (Spring 1973), p. 115-151. 
 57 RLoSK, 204.  
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said that “I write for myself in multiplicate, a not unfamiliar phenomenon on the horizons of 
shimmering desserts.”58 Time and again, Nabokov has expressed and professed a view of reality 
where false “shimmering” phenomena point to a true, metaphysical and singular realm.  Nabokov, 
as we see, commits exactly what Bakhtin finds objectionable in monism and monologism: he 
deindividuates the ultimate ontology of the world; he singularizes ultimate Being. 
 Yet doesn’t Bakhtin also champion another kind of unity; i.e. polyphony?  Though he 
argues that a monological author cancels out the voices of his characters by insisting on the 
semiotic and ideological priority of his own, does not the polyphonic author still gather a plurality 
of voices inside a singularized textual end-product, the novel?  Or is polyphony the full reversal 
of a history of philosophical conceptions of the ‘one over the many?’59  In other words, is Bakhtin’s 
polyphony the axiological elevation of plurality over any ontological and/or political singularity?  
As we have mentioned before, the task of our study is to see how Bakhtin and Nabokov’s 
respective deployments of monologism compare to one another.  Yet since monologism qua 
semiotic and discursive — and even political — hegemony is always metaphorical of metaphysical 
unity (monism), our study is also necessarily a comparison of Bakhtin and Nabokov’s metaphysics.  
Since polyphony can be viewed as a kind of unity within Bakhtin’s thought — a unity which he 
strives for and with which he supplants monologism — then it must affect the meaning of 
Bakhtin’s ultimate conceptions concerning teleology, eschatology, and yes, ontology — the 
ultimate sense of the world’s structure.  If polyphony can tell us anything about Bakhtin’s thoughts 
of the world, then it must necessarily be compared to Nabokov’s monism-monologism — that is, 
Nabokov’s teleology, eschatology and ontology.  Since Bakhtin and Nabokov ultimately drew 
                                                 
 58 SO, 114.  
 59 The metaphysical conception that pits “the one over many,” a conception that Bakhtin would label 
“monistic” and hence monologic, was ascribed to Plato by Aristotle.  See Aristotle's Metaphysics, trans. H. Lawson-
Tancred (London, Penguin, 1998) 990b13, 1079a9. 
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their beliefs from a common source; a common geographical, intellectual, artistic and cultural 
milieu, it makes sense that a comparison of their views on monism, unity and monologism should 
begin with a sketch of the intellectual atmosphere of the Silver Age.  This sketch begins 
immediately below.    After this a sketch, we will discuss Bakhtin’s twin concepts of monologism 
and polyphony.  In doing so, we will trace the origins of these two concepts in his early thought in 
order to uncover any connections between their embryonic forms and their late stages of 
formulation.  The ultimate goal of this chapter is to have as full a picture of Bakhtin’s metaphysics 
as will allow us to effectively compare with Nabokov.  
 
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND IDEALISM IN RUSSIA’S LONG 19TH CENTURY   
 Bakhtin and Nabokov were born a mere four years apart in the last decade of the the 19th 
century, when the Russian Empire, and Europe in general, were undergoing a period of intellectual, 
cultural and political turbulence.60  The whole European continent saw in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries a series of philosophical systems and artistic currents of a variety of epistemological 
stripes and metaphysical allegiances: positivist and materialist thinkers from Auguste Comte and 
Ernst Mach to Chernyshevsky, Marx and Lenin, 61  who continued Kant’s repudiation of 
metaphysics and his belief in the possibility of finding universal laws of nature which could be 
exploited for intellectual and social progress; Neo-idealists of all genres – from Bergson, on the 
one hand, who charged scientific discourse with ossifying the ever-changing life-force which fuels 
                                                 
 60 Bakhtin was born on 17 (5) November, 1895 and Nabokov on 22 (10) April, 1899. 
 61 For Mach’s role in the definition of positivism as a scientific ideology, see Edward Skidelsky, Ernst 
Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 9-21, on p. 18 we find: 
“Mach...exercised a curious influence on the development of political instrumentalism.  A number of Bolsheviks, 
Alexander Bogdanov prominently among them, were attracted to his and Avernarius’s philosophy, discnerning in it 
the epistemological counterpart to their own doctrine of revolutionary voluntarism.  So popular was this heresy that 
Lenin felt stirred to write a tract denouncing it – while at the same time quietly incorporating many of its ideas into 
his own political practice.”  
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our dynamic and creative perception and knowledge of the world, to Solov’ev, who advocated for 
a return to a monistic mysticism of self-perfection drawn from patristic, Platonic, and Romantic 
sources.  The poetry of the Silver Age similarly advocated for a transcendence carried through 
aesthetic theurgy and, towards the 1910s, for a Nietzschean reevaluation of values and a Dionysian 
apocalypticism.62  A third tradition, the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, essentially hybridized 
Kant and Hegel in order to make the latter’s epistemological categories elastic enough to deal with 
a world of dizzying technological and scientific progress.  Hermann Cohen, the founder of this 
new line of thought, proclaimed a vision of science as the ever progressing investigation into the 
scientific object, which he figured as a slowly unraveling, Kantian ding-an-sich. 63   Later 
Marburgers, such as Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, expanded Cohen’s view of science into a 
view of culture at large: science, the arts, language, religion, law, and philosophy all follow their 
own progressive, and never-ending, evolution.64  In this tradition, Hegel’s historicity is kept, and 
the concept of epistemological unity is validated, albeit in a way that is only asymptotically 
revealed and never fully perfected.   
 Of all the factors that came together to provoke the development of the Silver Age, the 
most immediate catalysts were the various strands of positivistic ideology which were, according 
to Randall Poole, “remarkably pervasive in Russia from the middle of the nineteenth century”65  
According to Poole, the Weltanschauung of this thoroughly materialist ideology was marked by 
a... 
                                                 
 62 For a summary of the themes of Silver Age poetry see Boris Gasparov, “Poetry of the Silver Age,” in 
Evgeny Dobrenko and Marina Balina, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Twentieth-Century Russian Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-20. 
 63 See Hermann Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1885), 206. 
 64 Skidelsky, 22-51.  
 65 Randall Poole, “The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant in the Moscow Psychological Society,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas 60.2 (1999), 319.  Poole’s article focuses on the philosophical component of the Silver Age 
reaction towards positivism.  For the artistic reaction, see Boris Gasparov, “Poetry of the Silver Age.” 
 
26 
[1] reductionism...which dismissed as a meaningless proposition (neither analytic nor 
empirical) the possibility of being beyond the positively-given data of sense experience, 
i.e., phenomena in space and time...[2] scientism, the claim, consistent with the positivist 
reduction of being to natural phenomena, that the methodology of the natural sciences 
covered everything; and [3] utopianism, the hope that the application of natural scientific 
methods to man and society would make human existence as regular and well-ordered as 
nature.  The defining trait was reductionism or, in other words, naturalism or atheism: the 
reduction of being to nature.66 
 
The reductionism, scientism and utopianism of positivistic ideologies were countered in Silver 
Age Russia by a plethora of distinctively Neo-idealist ideologies that advocated a return to an 
earnest search for metaphysics, a re-evaluation of science, and the formulation of a different 
conception of utopia or unity, one that was always metaphysical and, at times, full of apocalyptic 
undertones.67  This constellation of Russian Neo-idealist ideologies incorporated, on the one hand, 
the fruits of an earlier Orthodox religious revival, impelled by the popular rediscovery of the 
progressive and personalist anthropology of patristic texts, and, on the other hand, old and new 
German philosophic currents: Romantic and Idealist philosophy, and Neo-Kantianism.68    
 The Neo-idealist ideologies of the Silver Age covered the whole gamut from the  
professional philosophy embodied by the Moscow Psychological Society to the literary theory, 
                                                 
 66 Ibid. 
 67 See Ellis [L. L. Kobylinskii], Russkie simvolisty (Moscow: Musaget, 1910), 31; Gasparov, 1-20; Leonid 
I. Strakhovsky, “The Silver Age of Russian Poetry: Symbolism and Acmeism,” Canadian Slavonic Papers vol. 4 
(1959), 61-87; and Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, “Religious Humanism in the Russian Silver Age,” 246-247 and 
Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, “Eschatology and Hope in Silver Age Thought,” 285-304; both in G. M. and Randall A. 
Poole (eds.) A History of Russian Philosophy: 1830-1930 – Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 68 G.M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole “Introduction: The Humanist Tradition in Russian Philosophy,” in 
G. M. and Randall A. Poole (eds.) A History of Russian Philosophy: 1830-1930 – Faith, Reason, and the Defense of 
Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9-10.  For the history of this rediscovery, see 
Patrick Lally Michelson, “The First and Most Sacred Right:” Religious Freedom and the Liberation of the Russian 
Nation, 1825-1905 (Diss. University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2007) Ch. 1, § 4, “Translating the Holy Fathers: The 
Sacred Tradition of Theocentric Humanism in Russia’s Spiritual Academies” 59-72.  For the influence of Religious 
trends upon Silver Age poetry, see Irina Paperno, “On the Nature of the Word: Theological Sources of 
Mandelshtam’s Dialogue with the Symbolists,” in Christianity and the Eastern Slavs, vol. 2 of Robert P. Hughes 
and I. Paperno (eds.) Russian Culture in Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 287-310.  
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poetic – and later – prose works of the Symbolists and Acmeists.69   As for the specifically 
philosophical component of the Silver Age response to positivism, it originated almost wholesale 
from one of the most important institutions of professional systematic philosophy in Russia, the 
Moscow Psychological Society, the “philosophical center of the revolt against positivism in the 
Russian Silver Age,” according to Poole.70  The society’s response to positivism was in the areas 
of “ethics, epistemology, ontology and social philosophy.”71  The society sought to defend “the 
self against positivist reductionism and naturalism, a defense that took the form...of a modernized, 
theoretically explicit theism, in which the value of the person is seen as rooted in transcendent 
being (personalism).”72  By appropriating Kantian thought for their own devices and highlighting 
its idealist aspects, members of the Psychological Society attempted to raise a bulwark against an 
over-confident positivist philosophy.73  The Society also attempted to critique the currents of 
German Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology in vogue at the time, which, according to Sergey 
and Evgeny Trubetskoi – two of the leading neo-Idealists from the Moscow Psychological Society 
– sought to equate “thought” and “being” and threatened to abstract and “theoretize” any definition 
of personhood: “From abstract concepts it is possible to neither draw out nor understand anything 
concrete – it is impossible to understand the person, as a real factor of the historical process.”74  
As such, the Society exerted a great deal of effort articulating a modern idealist personalism to 
fight off the abstraction and reductionism of Neo-Kantianism and of positivism as well as the 
                                                 
 69 Poole, “The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant...,” 319. 
 70 Randall Poole, “The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant...,” 319. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 See Poole, Randall. Neo-Idealist Philosophy in the Russian Liberation Movement: The Moscow 
Psychological Society and Its Symposium, “Problems of Idealism,”  (Washington, DC: Kennan Institute for 
Advanced Russian Studies, 1996) 1. 
 73 Ibid.  
 74 S. N. Trubetskoi, “Osnovaniia idealizma,” Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo, 
II, Filosofskie stat’i, (Moskva: Tip. G. Lissnera i D. Sobko, 1908), 190.  Translation mine. 
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latter’s determinism.  Many of the personalist aspects of the Neo-Idealism that the Society 
promoted ultimately finds their source in platonic and patristic thought. 75   The Society 
disseminated its philosophical positions through its ambitious journal Voprosy filosofii i 
psikhologii (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology), whose list of contributors reads like the 
authoritative catalogue of fin-de-siècle Russian intellectual history and attests to the fusion of 
Religious-theological and philosophical interests: L. Tolstoy, V. Solov’ev, S. Bulgakov, N. 
Berdiaev, N. Lossky, S. Frank, V. Zenkovsky, S. Trubetskoi, E. Trubetskoi, G. Spet, P. 
Novgorodtsev, S. Kotliarevsky, N.D. Vinogradov and countless others.76 
 
THE SEARCH FOR A BETTER UNITY 
 A great many of the personalist world views that were formulated during the Silver Age 
by influential Russian thinkers, a great many of these perpetuated the age-old philosophical 
narrative — ‘the one over the many’ — where the phenomenal world is seen as fragmented and 
in need of a monistic integration of one sort or another.  According to Sergey Averintsev,  
 the imperative of overcoming the ill unmerging [durnoy nesliyannosti] of culture and  
 life…is very characteristic of the Russian philosophical tradition as a whole, even in  
 the mouths of the Slavophiles, who demanded an “integral knowledge,” then in the  
 mouth of Vladimir Solov’ev, who criticized abstract principles…[.]  Russian symbolism,  
 especially in that movement (“Realistic symbolism”) tied to Vyacheslav Ivanov’s name,  
 in its own way, emphatically proclaimed the unity of culture and life.77 
 
Indeed, what is remarkable about the many Silver Age narratives of priority monism is the close 
analogical nature that they bear to each other.  These narratives of transcendental process find their 
                                                 
 75 See G.M. Hamburg and Randall Poole, “Introduction,” 1-23. See also “The Neo-Idealist Reception...,” 
319-343. 
 76 Ibid.  Solov’ev, Bulgakov and Frank were religious thinkers in their own right.  Tolstoy, Lossky, and 
Berdiaev incorporated religious elements into their ideas.  Prince Sergei Trubetskoi wrote a book and articles on the 
doctrine of the logos in its Stoic (pre-Christian), Judaic and Christian historical contexts; See Sergei Trubetskoi, 
Uchenie o Logose v ego istorii: filosofsko-istoricheskoe issledovanie, Ed. S. V. Iakovlev (Saint Petersburg: 
Izdadel’stvo Olega Abyshko, 2009).   
 77 Ss I, 444; translation mine. 
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prototype precisely in the Neoplatonic process of henosis and in the analogous Orthodox 
theological process of theosis.  Theosis, however, was brought out from obscurity and popularized 
only in the 19th century.  According to Patrick Michelson, “despite normative declarations that 
theosis and homoiosis theoi  [assimilation unto God] constitute the “very essence” of Orthodox 
anthropology, patristic and Platonic categories about man’s dynamic relationship to God likely did 
not enter the Russian Church until nearly eight-hundred fifty years after its founding.”78  “Rather,” 
Michelson says  
 Russia’s so-called theological liberalism was partly the result of a sustained translation  
 and hermeneutic project that began in the 1820s to introduce Russia’s reading public to  
 its patristic heritage.  As this massive literary project proceeded over the course of nearly  
 seventy years, it often became entwined in contemporary political and cultural debates  
 about historiosophy, anthropology, and national liberation.  It was this confluence of  
 events, e.g. the translation of the Greek Fathers into Russian, the search among educated  
 society for language to talk about Russia’s historical lineage and trajectory, and the  
 dramatic transformation of imperial society engendered by the Great Reforms, that  
 generated an anthropology of theocentric freedom that eventually found residence in  
 parts of Russian liberalism.”79    
 
 One immediate intellectual ancestor to nearly every Silver Age thinker, poet, and member 
of the Moscow Psychological Society, was Vladimir Solov’ev. 80   His particular brand of 
philosophy reintroduced a strong element of Platonism into an already platonizing patristic 
theological heritage and combined this with a broad knowledge of German Romanticism, Idealism, 
and Neo-Kantianism. 81    According to Irina Paperno, “Solov’evian Symbolism adopted the 
                                                 
      78 Michelson, 34. 
 79 Ibid., 35. 
 80 For Solov’ev’s significance for the Silver Age literature and literary theory, see Irina Paperno, “The 
Meaning of Art: Symbolist Theories,” in I. Paperno and Joan Delaney Grossman (eds.) Creating Life: the Aesthetic 
Utopia of Russian Modernism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 13-23; and Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, 
“Who is Solov’ev and What is Sophia?” in Kornblatt (ed.) Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir 
Solov’ev (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1-98.  For Solov’ev’s significance for Silver Age philosophy, see 
Poole, “The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant...,” 324.   
 81 Solov’iev’s indebtedness to Platonism, Neo-platonism and the platinizing patristic heritage cannot be 
over-stressed: “Unlike the majority of university-educated Russians of his time, he had read Plato in the original, 
and could distinguish Platonic thought from Neoplatonism, and Neoplatonism from Orthodox theology and 
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romantic, Neoplatonic notion of the dualism of ‘this world’ and ‘the other world,’ or Jenseits (the 
duality of real and ideal, flesh and soul, matter and spirit, human and divine, outer and inner, 
objective and subjective, object and idea).”82 As in these other philosophic systems, Solov’ev’s 
account of man’s theotic ascent is a merging of the physical and spiritual realms.  An important 
part of this account is the process of aesthetic education.   “Art (or beauty), along with love, serves 
as a major vehicle of synthesis...[i.e.] the consolidation and ‘complete mutual penetration’ of [the 
aforementioned] antithetical entities and realms.”83 Indeed, aesthetic perception is, for Solov’ev, 
the revelation of unities in nature that are ultimately metaphorical of the world’s unity with God:84 
 “...if this designation [as beautiful phenomenon; prekrasnoe iavlenie] undoubtedly  
 belongs to the diamond, then this is obviously because neither the dark matter [i.e. of  
 coal], nor the luminous principle enjoy a one-sided predominance, but mutually penetrate 
 each other in a certain, ideal balance...In this unconfused and indivisible unity of matter    
 and light [V etom nesliiannom i nerazdel’nom soedinenii veshchestva i sveta] both retain  
 their natures, but neither one nor the other is seen individually, and only the luciferous  
 matter [svetonosnaia materiia] and incarnated light, – illuminated coal [prosvetlennyi  
 ugol’] and petrified rainbow [okamenevshaia raduga].85  
 
In utilizing the words nesliiannyi and nerazdel’nyi to describe the ‘unconfused mixture’ of two 
physical phenomena suggestive of the platonizing metaphysico-epistemological duality – matter 
(black coal, no less) and light, Solov’ev makes specific reference to the theology of Maximus the 
Confessor (ca. 580 C.E. – 13 August 662), who was the first to use those words in elaborating the 
famous dyophysite (i.e. “two-nature”) and dyothelite (i.e. “two-willed”) arguments concerning the 
                                                 
European Romanticism, both deeply indebted to it;” see Kornblatt’s “The Transfiguration of Plato in the Erotic 
Philosophy of Vladimir Solov’ev,” Religion & Literature 24.2 (Summer, 1992), 38.  According to Kornblatt, Prince 
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information on Solov’ev’s own brand of metaphysical monism, heavily influenced by Plato and Neoplatonism, see 
Anatolii Tykholaz, Platon i platonizm v russkoi religioznoi filosofii vtoroi poloviny XIX-nachala XX vekov (Kiev: 
“Insait”, 2003), 149-200. 
 82 Paperno, 21. 
 83 Paperno, 13 
 84 Vladimir Solov’ev, “Beauty and Nature,” Sobranie sochinenii (St. Petersburg, 1911-1914), VI, 76.  
 85 Ibid., 36-37.  
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nature of Christ – arguments which were later made canonical at the council of Chalcedon in 451 
C.E.  The gist of this doctrine is that the human nature and human will and the divine nature and 
divine will of Christ exist in an “unconfused and indivisible” union within him.86  Maximus the 
Confessor’s dyophysite Christology is inextricably connected to the soteriological dynamic 
inherent in the theological distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness.’87  This distinction had been 
elaborated into its classical form by Origen (ca. 184/5 - ca. 253-254), following Clement of 
Alexandria.88 The dynamic traces a specifically Christian conception of the unity between man 
and God, which the church fathers saw as encapsulated in God’s creation of man in his image.  
The unity is then realized by man’s assumption of God’s likeness through a process of ethical 
education.89   Solov’ev was only too aware of the process of divine Becoming and the teleological 
progression from image to likeness theorized by the church fathers.  For example, in “The History 
and Future of theocracy” (1885), Solov’ev has the dialectic of image and likeness firmly in mind 
when he speaks of “mere” versus “true” humanity:  
 Man [chelovek], wanting to remain only man [chelovekom], wanting always to limit  
 himself within the bounds of the sole nature of man [chelovecheskoi prirody], thereby  
 ceases to be true man [chelovekom], the lawful son of humanity [zakonnym synom  
 chelovecheskim], and the more he lifts himself over human limitedness [chelovecheskoi  
 ogranichennost’iu], the closer he gets to true humanity [chelovechnosti].  The true man  
 and lawful son of humanity in an unconditional sense is the Godman Christ, who had  
 overcome human limitedness unconditionally.  Being the end and goal [kontsom i tsel’iu] 
 of human nature, the Godman...is for us an element [nachatok] or determining basis  
 [opredeliaiushchaia osnova] for a new superhuman developmental form, in which  
                                                 
 86 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor 2nd 
Ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 31-32. 
 87 Ibid., 127. 
 88 Thunberg, 122. See also Ilaria Ramelli, “Christian Soteriology and Christian Platonism: Origen, Gregory 
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(August 2007), 325-326. 
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Origen, Traité des Principes [Peri Archon; De Principiis] Trans. Marguerit Harl, Gilles Dorival, and Alain Le 
Boulluec (Paris: Études Agustiniennes, 1976) 3,6,1. 
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 humanity, rising above itself, unifies essentially [sushchestvenno soediniaetsia] with  
 Divinity the composition [sostav] of the Kingdom of God.90 
 
Solov’ev makes explicit here the relationship between the Maximian dyophysite Christology and 
man’s dialectical progression from image to likeness.  In incarnating himself [i.e. voplotivshis’], 
Christ adopted a second nature in order to show that man can do so as well by transforming himself 
[i.e. preobrashchaias’].  Solov’iev ultimately ties the teleological process of divine Becoming with 
the idea of an ultimate, universal metaphysical union with the divine principle.  This union has the 
characteristics of a priority monism since it seems to imply the loss of individuality, and hence a 
loss of plurality, which means that the unindividuated unity stands as metaphysically prior.  The 
loss of individuality is seen, for example, in Solov’ev’s idea of androgyne, or the unification of 
the sexes: 
 The Eternal God made man, according to His image [obraz] and likeness [podobie] he  
 made him: man and woman, he made them.  This means that the Divine image and  
 likeness, that which is to be subjected to reestablishment [podlezhit vosstanovleniu],  
 corresponds not to a half, not to a half person [polu cheloveka], but to the whole person,  
 i.e. to the positive union [soedineniu] of the male and female principles [muzheskogo i  
 zhenskogo nachala], – true andgroginism – without the external mixture of forms, –  
 which is monstrous, – and without the inner separation of personality and life, – which is  
 imperfection and the beginning of death.91  
 
We also see a hint of a loss of individuality, as well as the idea of a union with the divine principle, 
in the notion of Bogochelovechestvo which includes within it not only the notion of the 
perfectibility of man – an individual process – but the notion of the universal restitution of an 
original image – apokatastasis [“restitution, reestablishment, reconstitution,” in Russian, 
                                                 
 90 Vladimir Solov’ev, Sobranie sochinenii vol. IV, 2nd. Edition, Ed. S. Solov’ev and E. L. Radlova (Saint 
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 91 See Solov’ev’s “Zhiznenaia drama Platona” [Plato’s Life Drama] in Sobranie sochinenii vol. IX, 2nd. 




vosstanovlenie].92  Indeed, Solov’ev, in the second quote, speaks of the “reestablishment” [in 
Russian, vosstanovlenie] of the “whole person” with respect to the notion of an androgynous 
whole, and in the first quote, describes a general unification of humanity with the Kingdom of 
God.93  
FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY IN BAKHTIN 
 Bakhtin’s first theoretical monograph, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, written some two 
decades after Solov’ev’s death (sometime between 1918 and 1924), nevertheless shows the 
influence of the latter as well as of the philosophical climate conditioned by the Moscow 
Psychological Society and of the Silver Age at large.94  Like the Silver Age in general, Bakhtin’s 
philosophy and literary criticism was characterized by a hint of a Neoplatonic desire for 
metaphysical unity.  Yet Bakhtin would also borrow the idea of unity-as-receding-horizon from 
the Neo-Kantians and harmonize it with the Orthodox theological conceptions of the trinity and of 
personal theosis which are predicated on a view of unity as always within diversity.95  
                                                 
 92 See Ramelli, “Christian Soteriology and Platonism...,” 314-338. 
 93 The sources of the concept of apokatastasis are of both Christian and Platonic extraction, even though 
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 Toward a Philosophy of the Act specifically attacks the methodological monism found in 
Kant’s universalizing principle of moral conduct, his categorical imperative.  In this sense the work 
is a sort of anti-Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals since it tries to posit a new kind of anti-
universalistic moral principle after demolishing the universalistic groundwork.  In so doing, the 
work tries to address the very questions posed by most of the other members of the Moscow 
Psychological Society: is it possible to see “objects” in a holistic way that does not reduce them to 
either theory or irrational sentiment; is there a way to describe the “other” as a real factor in the 
historical process, without generalizing him or her into a universal law that erases the immediacy 
and concreteness of the specific moment?  
 This question Bakhtin poses by presupposing the world, following the prevailing 
ontological structural topos of his cultural and philosophical milieu, as already fragmented.  Thus, 
from the very start of his career, the notions of Unity and Plurality have occupied a central place 
in Bakhtin’s thought.  In Philosophy of the Act, the concepts are seen in the attack of Kant’s and 
other’s methodological unities, a lament over a lack of a more important or fundamental unity, and 
in two kinds of fragmentation that exist in its place.  The first kind of fragmentation separates the 
individual from a full participation with Being.96  Full participation with Being can only come by 
choosing to author the ethical deed, i.e., choosing to live life and perform the myriad acts possible 
within life intentionally, responsibly, and actively (i.e., not unintentionally, or fleeing 
                                                 
M. Bakhtina (ot Germana Kogena k Maksu Sheleru),” in V. Makhlin (ed.) Bakhtinsky sbornik vol. 3 (Moskva: 
Prometey, 1997), 162-181.  For Bakhtin’s later reliance on Cassirer, see Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: 
Philosophy, Culture and Politics (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 16, 22, 105-128.  Craig Brandist, “Bakhtin, Cassirer 
and Symbolic Forms,” Radical Philosophy 89 (September/October 1997)  20-27; Brian Poole, “Bakhtin and 
Cassirer: The Philosophical Origins of Bakhtin’s Carnival Messianism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 97.3/4 (1998) 
537-578. For the influence of Orthodox theology upon Bakhtin, see Charles Lock, “Bakhtin and the Tropes of 
Orthodoxy,” in Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino (eds.) Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling for Faith (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 97-120; and Alexandar Mihailovic, Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
Theology of Discourse (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 17-50. 
 96 By “Being,” Bakhtin intends “all Being,” thus the whole universe, the whole of history, etc. 
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responsibility for it, and not passively.).97  The second kind of fragmentation is caused by the 
various cultural and scientific perspectives or ideologies that attempt to describe the ethical deed.98  
Bakhtin does not explicitly brand the multiple methodological perspectives as the consequences 
of a ‘fall’ from a positive, metaphysical unity; at least, not in Toward a Philosophy of the Act.  
What Bakhtin does say is that a fragmentation occurs between life, as uniquely lived from 
contextual moment to contextual moment by the individual, and those perspectives precisely 
because these latter treat the contents of the individual’s life as exchangeable and self-equal values 
that they then pluck from one context and drop into another in order to systematize a universal law 
that governs whatever specific theoretical or aesthetic discourse in question.99   According to 
Bakhtin, 
 “[t]he act of our activity, of our living experience [nashego perezhivaniia], like a two- 
 faced Janus, faces two different sides [gliadit v raznie storony]: the objective unity of the  
 cultural sphere and the unrepeatable uniqueness of experienced life, but there is no one,  
 unique plane where both faces mutually determine each other with relation to one,  
 unique unity.”100 
 
At the beginning of Toward a Philosophy of the Act, as at other peculiar moments throughout his 
career, Bakhtin hints at the possibility of a positive realization of unity: “This unique unity can 
only be the unique event of on-going being, all of the theoretical and the aesthetic must be 
determined — as its moment [kak moment ego], of course, no longer in theoretical and aesthetic 
terminologies.”101 However, this unity can never be the unity in the truly monistic sense of the 
word.  Since Being qua on-going event is given and posited for the individual to respond to within 
the context of a uniquely lived life by this individual and no one else, then this means that the 
                                                 
 97 Ss I, 38-39. 
 98 Bakhtin’s “ethical deed” has a very broad sense: it is any action taken by me which I do intentionally  
and answer for it. S.S. Averintsev says that “man’s life, the open eventness of being in its human aspect of 
answerability [otvetvennosti] is, in reality, one sheer deed [sploshnoe postuplenie]” (Ss I, 444) 
 99 TPA, 1-2, with my own modifications to the translation; Ss I, 7. 
 100 Ss I, 7-8; translation mine.  See also TPA, 2. 
 101 Ibid, 8; translation mine.  See TPA, 3. 
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achievement of this individual’s unity with Being-as-event cannot be the achievement of the unity, 
for there must be as many unions with Beings-as-event as there are “selves.”  And since each self 
relates to Being from a once-occurring and unique place, then there must be many places, many 
worlds, from within which each consciousness implicates him or herself to Being with their Being-
making deed:   
 [A]s many individual centers of answerability [otvetstvennosti], unique participative  
 subjects as there are, and there is an endless plurality [mnozhestvo], there are as many  
 different worlds of event/co-being [sobytiia], if the face [lik] of an event/co-being   
 [sobytiia] is determined from the unique place of a participant [in Being — F.P.] then  
 there are as many different faces as there are many different unique places, but where is  
 that one, unique and unitary face?  Since my relation is essential to the world…then, for  
 me, this acknowledged value, the emotional-volitional picture of the world is one, and for 
 the other another.102 
 
 Thus one may argue that Bakhtin doesn’t present a conception of priority monism in 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, but a sort of atomisitic view of Being that exists in a fundamental 
plurality and these plural consciousnesses are themselves fragmented both by different 
methodological perspectives and by their yet-to-be accomplished participation with Being.  It is as 
if Leibniz’s monads were themselves fragmented by cultural methodologies: each individual 
consciousness has a unique in-itself image and one determined by the world of culture (i.e. ethics, 
aesthetics, and the sciences).  Yet each single image of each consciousness also needs fulfillment 
— full participation with Being — by following its own personal path of ethical action.  Thus 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act describes a dual telos: the unification of the methodological 
perspectives somehow within the unique, on-going, super-contextualized lives of each individual 
consciousness, and the ethical self-actualization of these very same consciousnesses through the 
ethical deed.103  
                                                 
 102 Ibid, 42-43.  See TPA, 45. Translation mine. 
 103 On Leibniz’s theory of Monads, see his Monadology, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991).  
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 Despite a telos which ends in multiplicity, the teleology presented in Towards a Philosophy 
of the Act does come with the usual characteristics of the prototypical narrative of fragmentation 
and unification characteristic of the Platonic, Neoplatonic, and patristic teleologies.  These 
characteristics include: the movement from ontological fragmentation to unity, and at least two 
procedural catalysts for this movement, a spiritual and self-less loving orientation toward the other 
and toward unity and a moral-ethical process of education (paideia and morphosis). 104  In 
Philosophy of the Act, the teleological movement leads from a fragmentation between the 
individual and Being and another fragmentation between his individual life context and the world 
of culture toward toward the full participative unity with Being and the unity between Life and 
Culture.  The way in which the first unity is brought about; that is, the way in which one’s being 
as a hyper-contextualized ongoing event, unites with Being, is by acting ethically, and acting 
ethically is, as said above, acting intentionally and not passively.  As we shall see below, Bakhtin 
couches the movement toward this unity in language that is at the same time pregnant with 
significance for Platonic, Patristic, Orthodox and Silver Age thought.  Though the fragmentation 
of one’s being from Being is not absolute, unity with Being still needs to be fulfilled through the 
ethical act.  If this is not done, then a more complete separation between the self and on-going 
Being occurs.  The teleological process begins when one finds oneself in life, in Being.  Thus one 
is given Being, but further participation within this Being also needs to be fulfilled — this further 
participation is posited as a future task.  Thus what we have is a narrative or dialectic of ethical 
progress or education which begins from a passively given ontology which is to evolve into an 
actively performed ethical deed that has been set up as a task: 
 I participate in unique being [ya prichastno k edinstvennomu bytiyu]: I am in it.    
 Furthermore here are given, distinctly and indivisibly [nesliiano i nerazdel’no] [:] the  
                                                 
 104 See Pauliina Remes, “Introduction: Neoplatonism today,” in The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism, 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 1-11.  See also Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism 
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 aspects of passivity and activeness  — I happen to find myself in being [ya okazalsya v  
 bytii] (passivity) and I actively participate in it — as well as the aspects of givenness  
 [dannosti] and positedness [zadannosti] — my uniqueness is given, but at the same time  
 it is only insofar as it is actively fulfilled by me [osushchestvlena mnoyu] as uniqueness,  
 it is always in the act, the deed, i.e., it is posited [zadana] — and the aspects of being and  
 the Ought [bytie i dolzhenstvovanie]: I am actual, unsubstitutable and, because of this,  
 should fulfill my uniqueness.105 
 
The specific pair of terms with which Bakhtin denotes the ethical-moral movement, ‘givenness’ 
and ‘positedness’ (dannosti, zadannosti) along with the movement itself reveals a solid link 
between Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act to the broader concerns of the Silver Age.106  The 
Russian terms dannoe and zadannoe are ultimately direct translations of Kant’s Gegeben and 
Aufgegeben.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that since science cannot know the 
world as a thing-in-itself, it cannot establish a complete and definite knowledge about it as a 
given.  Science can only progress toward a greater knowledge of the world through indefinite 
steps.  The indefinite progress of knowledge about the world is then set up as an eternal and 
asymptotic task (in German aufgegeben, in Russian zadannoe).107  Hermann Cohen, one of the 
founders of Neo-Kantianism in Marburg, popularized the use of Gegeben and Aufgegeben late in 
the 19th century in his philosophical readings of Kant.  Due to his influence upon Bakhtin, 
several scholars have suggested that he is the source of Bakhtin’s usage of dannost’ and 
zadannost’.108 However, we find that Silver Age thinkers as well as critics of the 1910s and 
                                                 
 105 Ss I, 39-40; translation mine.  Aleksandar Mihailovic points to the appearance of eucharistic language in 
Bakhtin.  See Mihailovic, Corporeal Words…, 17-50.   
 106 zadan(a)(o)(y) is also sometimes rendered as “set up as a task.”  
 107 See Caryl Emerson’s The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 219. For a more in-depth account of the Gegeben vs. Aufgegeben dichotomy and its 
relationship with Bakhtin’s view of unfinalizability, see Dmitrii Nikulin’s On Dialogue (Oxford, UK: Lexington 
Books, 2006), 62-67.  See also Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Great books of the Western World V. 39, trans. 
Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1992), pp 129-172.  
 108 See Michael Eskin’s Ethics and Dialogue in the Works of Levinas, Bakhtin, Mandelshtam, and Celan 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 73.  See also Emerson’s The First Hundred Years, 219.  See also L. 
Gogotishvili’s  commentary to Towards a Philosophy of the Act in Ss I, p. 602-603.  
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1920s such as Evgenii Trubetskoi, Sergei N. Bulgakov, Vyacheslav Ivanov, Nikolai Berdiaev, 
and Grigory Landau amongst others, employed the terms dannost’ and zadannost’ at around the 
same time that Bakhtin worked on Toward a Philosophy of the Act — 1918-1924 — and even 
earlier.109  Though we do not dispute the fact that Bakhtin read and was influenced by Hermann 
Cohen, it seems to us more logical to suggest that Bakhtin may have used more proximal echoes 
of dannost’/zadannost’ especially since his usage of these terms accords more with the 
metaphysical sense found in the writers mentioned above than with Kant’s or Cohen’s 
specifically scientific view of “givenness” and “positedness.”  Evgenii Trubetskoi, for example, 
in a book published in 1914, wrote that “the divine idea is not given [dannoe] from the 
beginning.  The world in its empirical state does not implicate itself in it [ee ne vmeshaet]; in the 
phenomenon of the becoming [stanoviashcheisia], perfecting [sovershenstvuiushcheisia] 
universal idea, the world cannot be adequate and full; insofar as the idea of this world is set up as 
a task [ideia dlia etogo mira est’ zadannoe].”110 Similarly, Vyacheslav Ivanov wrote in 1916 that 
“Sobornost’”, the Slavophile metaphysical ideal of ecclesiastic unity “is a task, and is not a 
given [Sobornost’ — zadanie, a ne dannost’].111  In a 1925 article that appeared in the Parisian 
émigré journal Put’, Berdiaev expresses a similar thought with regards to Solov’ev’s theology: 
“Vladmir Solov’ev…incessantly reminded us that christianity is not only a given [dannost’], but 
                                                 
 109  See Ss I, 351-352. 
 110 The book was originally published as Smysl zhizni (Moskva: Tovarishchestvo typography A.I. 
Mamontova, 1914).  See Kn. Evgenii Trubetskoi, Smysl zhizni (Berlin: Knigoizdatel’stvo, 1922), 133. 
 111 This article was first publshed in 1916 in the newspaper Utro Rosii.  See Viacheslav Ivanov, “Legion i 
sobornost’,”in Rodnoe i vselenskoe, ed. V.M. Tolmacheva (Moskva: Respublika, 1994), 100. Vyacheslav Ivanov 
and his iteration of the idea of “sobornost’” will be treated in more detail later in the chapter, in conjunction with 
Bakhtin’s later idea of polyphony.  For further comparisons between Bakhin and Ivanov, see Ss II, 432-517; S.G. 
Bocharov “Bakhtin-filolog: kniga o Dostoevskom,” in Voprosy literatury 2 (2006), 48-67; Oksana A. Kravchenko, 
“Kontseptsiia ‘Romana-tragedii’: polemika M. Bakhtina s Viach. Ivanovym,” in Novyi filologicheskii vestnik 1.16 
(2011), 120-128; and Filipp Sapienza, “Mikhail Bakhtin, Vyacheslav Ivanov, and the Rhetorical culture of the 
Russian Third Renaissance,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 37.2 (2004), 123-142. 
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a task [zadanie], addressed to human freedom and activity [aktivnosti]. ”112 In “Ideia 
bogochelovechestva Vl. Solov’eva” [“Vl. Solovjev’s Idea of Godmanhood,” 1925] another 
article dedicated to Solov’ev’s ‘basic idea,’ Berdiaev elaborates what he had expressed in Put’ 
thus: “Christ’s affair/deed [Delo Khristovo] in the world is, before anything, love.  And the deeds 
of love [dela liubvi] are needed, according to the Solov’ev’ian consciousness, not for the 
justification of deeds or faith, but for the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. ‘Humanity, — he 
[Solov’ev] writes, — should not only receive the grace and truth [istinu], given in Christ, but 
also fulfill [osushchestvliat’] this grace and truth in its own and historical life.’ ‘Besides the 
leadership of the power of the universe [rukovodstva vselenskoi vlasti], the fulfillment 
[sovershenie] of the Church or the creation of a christian culture in the world also demands the 
actions of personal human forces [deistviia lichnykh chelovecheskikh sil.]’”113  It is obvious that 
Evgenii Trubetskoi, Ivanov and Berdiaev were referring to the Solov’evian iteration of the 
narrative of universal becoming.  Throughout the Silver Age this narrative ran parallel to the one 
that describes personal development and which is rendered by Solov’ev’s language from 
Genesis, viz. that the moral-ethical progress of man starts with God's image [obraz] and is 
oriented towards God’s likeness [podobie].  In fact, we see the pair dannost’/zadannost’ applied 
to this same biblical language in Sergei Bulgakov: “Human creativity [chelovecheskoe 
tvorchestvo] creates not an “image,” which is given, but “a likeness”, which is posited [zadano]; 
it produces in the free, work [trudovoi], and historical process that which preeternally is as an 
                                                 
 112 Nikolai Berdiaev, “Evraziitsy [Eurasians],” Put’  no. 1 (Sentiabr’ 1925), 138. 
 113 This article was first published under the title “Ideia bogochelovechestva Vl. Solov’eva [The idea of 
Godmanhood in Vl. Solov’ev]” in Perezvon (1925).  See Nikolai Berdiaev, “Osnovnaia idea Vl. Solov’eva,” N.A. 
Berdiaev o russkoi filosofii, ed. B.V. Emel’yanova and A.I. Novikova (Sverdlovsk: Izdatel’stvo Ural’skogo 
universiteta, 1991), Chast’ 2, p. 46.  
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ideal proto-image [pervoobraz].”114  Already by 1924 it seems that the language associated with 
“givenness” and “positedness” was growing stale — or so thought Grigory Landau.  In an article 
on “Pushkin as a Mentor [vospitatel’],” Landau explains that “the Russian soul” and “Russian 
life” was reflected in Pushkin, not simply its being but also its potentiality; “to use boring 
philosophizing words — [what] is reflected is not only the givenness of the people [narodnaia 
dannost’], but the positedness of the people [narodnaia zadannost’].”115 
 In any case, it seems that Bakhtin’s use of the terms dannost’/zadannost’, despite their 
ultimate provenance in Kant, is in more of a dialogical relationship with the metaphysical outlook 
of his intellectual milieu and with its vision of the moral-ethical development of the individual 
than with a specifically Kantian or Neo-Kantian epistemological attitude.  Bakhtin’s ethical 
orientation toward the religious philosophy of his era is corroborated by his employment of 
language found in the church fathers and Solov’ev in order to describe the two natures of Christ, 
which is the ultimate precondition for man’s ability to adopt a divine nature and the dialectic 
between image and likeness that leads to this nature.  Let us recall that the two natures of Christ 
are, according to Solov’ev and Maximus the Confessor, ‘distinct yet undivided/indivisible’ — in 
Russian: nesliiano i nerazdel’no.  In Bakhtin, the passive (given, dan) and active (zadan, posited) 
aspects of man’s moral-ontological progress  are also distinct (nesliiany) and 
undivided/indivisible (nerazdel’ny). Thus, in both Bakhtin’s teleology from a passive, primordial 
ontology to an active, ethical, participative ontology, and in the patristic and Orthodox teleology 
from man to Godman — I am ‘given’ a nature, full of potential, which is up to me to fulfill through 
ethical actions.  Fulfilling this potential allows me to achieve a sort of unity.  It should be noted 
                                                 
 114 This book was first published as Filosofiia khoziaistva (Moskva, 1912).  See Sergei Bulgakov, 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (New York: Chalidze Publications, 1982), 140. 
 115 This article was first published in Rul’ in 1924.  See Grigorii Landau, “Pushkin, kak vospitatel’” in A.S. 
Pushkin: pro et contra (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel’stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 2000), 8.    
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that in much of patristic and Orthodox thought, and in Bakhtin’s thought as well, the ultimate unity 
is one that always preserves individuality.  But the “non-monistic,” ultimate metaphysical unity, 
in the patristic and Orthodox cases, as well as Bakhtin’s individualized final unity with Being, 
always parallels its pagan textual sources of inspiration — the monisms of Plato, and the 
Neoplatonists — and in this parallel there is always a hint of a strictly henotic monism where the 
assimilation of disparate worldly phenomena is total.  Though Bakhtin’s incorporation of Orthodox 
thought is seen only in the “bread crumbs” of specific theological terminology, his incorporation 
of the Platonic dialectical process of ethical Becoming is illuminated by a direct reference to Plato:   
 the common contraposition of eternal truth and our pernicious temporality has a non- 
 theoretical meaning, for this proposition includes within itself a slightly valuative flavor  
 and assumes an emotional-volitional character: here is the eternal truth (and that is good), 
 and here is our transitory and deficient temporary life (and that is bad).  But in this case  
 we have to do with an instance of participative thinking (which seeks to overcome its  
 own givenness [dannost’] for the sake of what-is-to-be-attained [zadannosti]) sustained in 
 a penitent tone; this participative thinking, however, proceeds within that architectonic of  
 Being-as-event which is affirmed and founded by us.  This is the nature of Plato’s  
 conception.116  
 
 Even in platonizing Christian theology there is made, however, a basic ontological 
distinction between natural naturans and natura naturata, the single God that created a plurality 
of creatures and these creatures, who, though they have a divine potentiality, ultimately cannot 
create.117  Thus the Christian narrative of the return to the Maker is not analogous to the what 
happens in Neoplatonic narratives, i.e. total ontological assimilation.  Another major structural 
difference between neoplatonic and Orthodox teleological narratives has already been alluded to:  
the unity within diversity afforded by a view of heavenly unity as sobornost’ (conciliar or 
ecclesiastic unity) is also likewise opposed to this total ontological assimilation.  Nevertheless, one 
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of the main over-arching arguments of this study is that both Bakhtin and Nabokov maintain a 
world view that blurs aesthetics with ethics and metaphysics.  This allows both author and critic 
to blur the lines between authorship and divine creation and hence, between natura naturans and 
natura naturata. 
* * * 
 Another view of individualized unity in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, this one modeled 
upon a rationally universalizing unity, is inherent in the concept of “architectonics.”  According 
to Don Bialostosky, the concept of architectonics comes from Kant. 118   In Kant, “an 
architectonic…[is] the art of constructing systems.  A systematic unity is what raises ordinary 
knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge.”  
As for system, Kant says that it is “the unity of manifold modes of knowledge under one idea.  
This idea is the concept provided by reason — of the form of a whole — in so far as the concept 
determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the position which the parts 
occupy relative to one another.”119  Whereas Kant’s architectonic is tasked with the subsumption 
of all the parts pertaining to an ideal whole for a specific area of culture, Bakhtin’s architectonic 
retains the structure of parts to a whole, but these parts are concrete and unique, they pertain 
directly and contextually to the performed deed.  Whereas Kant’s architectonic is controlled by the 
ultimate concept (i.e. the conceptual whole),120 Bakhtin’s architectonic scaffolds the valued hero 
and his or her deed descriptively: “…the center of value in the event-architectonic of aesthetic 
seeing is man as a lovingly affirmed concrete actuality, and not as a something with self-identical 
                                                 
 118 See his article “Architectonics, Rhetoric, and Poetics in the Bakhtin School’s Early Phenomenological 
and Sociological Texts,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 36.4 (Autumn, 20016), 356. 
 119 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Bedford Books, 
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content.”121 Although the Bakhtinian, like the Kantian, architectonic can be the scaffolding for an 
idea (in Kant) or “hero” (in Bakhtin) pertaining to any   cultural methodology, in Philosophy of 
the Act, as well as in the subsequent Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity, it is the methodology 
of aesthetic seeing that is privileged.  The “world of aesthetic seeing — the world of culture…by 
virtue of its concreteness and ‘permeatedness’ in its emotional-volitional tone — is, of all the 
cultural-abstract worlds (in their isolation), the closest to the one and unique world of the deed.”122  
 Bakhtin’s architectonic of aesthetic seeing also leads us to another one of his 
reconfigurations of the topoi of monistic teleologies: eros.  In Plotinus, for example, the concept 
of love is differentiated into physical and spiritual love following Plato’s cosmology.  While 
physical love separates man from the divine One, spiritual love is what propels the individual to 
the One.123 In Solov’ev’s modern Neoplatonism, on the contrary, the originally Platonic distinction 
between body and spirit is dissolved when it comes to eros.  Nevertheless, acts of erotic pathos do 
bring man closer to God, according to Solov’ev.  “Each act of erotic pathos is the incarnation of 
heavenly spirit into matter, creating, or “giving birth” to a new whole, a Godman, not 
metaphorically but literally like Christ.”124  For Bakhtin, eros also leads to a sort of unity.  If 
viewed against the background of Platonic and Neoplatonic concepts of eros, Bakhtin’s  
conceptualization of eros or “loving contemplation,” is spiritual in the sense that it concerns the 
“spirit” of a concrete person or “hero” of a certain deed and in the fact that it is “un-self-
interested.”125 Nevertheless, this “loving contemplation” as Bakhtin calls it, is not directed toward 
                                                 
 121 TPA, 63.  
 122 Ss I, 56; translation mine. 
 123 See Plotinus, The Six Enneads, Great books of the Western World V. 17 Trans. Stephen MacKenna and 
B.S. Page (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984) VI.9.9.  Plotinus also calls the One an eromenon (loved one) 
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 124 Judith Kornblatt, “The Transfiguration of Plato in the Erotic Philosophy of Vladimir Solov’ev,” 44. 
 125 This is Vadim Liapunov’s translation for “beskorystnaya liubov’.” 
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a desired divine One.  Its purpose in the fulfillment of the aesthetic unity of the architectonic of 
the person that is observed, the hero:   
 [o]ne can speak of objective aesthetic love as constituting the principle of aesthetic seeing 
 (except that “love” should not be understood in a passive psychological sense).  The  
 valued manifoldness of Being as human (as correlated with the human being) can present  
 itself only to a loving contemplation.  Only love is capable of holding and making fast all 
 this multiformity and diversity, without losing and dissipating it, without leaving behind a 
 mere skeleton of basic lines and sense-moments.  Only un-self-interested love of the  
 principle of “I love him not because he is good, but he is good because I love him,” only  
 lovingly interested attention, is capable of generating a sufficiently intent power to  
 encompass and retain the concrete manifoldness of Being, without impoverishing and  
 schematizing it.  An indifferent or hostile reaction is always a reaction that impoverishes  
 and decomposes its object: it seeks to pass over the object in all its manifoldness, to  
 ignore it or to overcome it… 
  Lovelessness, indifference, will never be able to generate sufficient power to slow 
 down and linger intently over an object, to hold and sculpt every detail and particular in  
 it, however minute.  Only love is capable of being aesthetically productive; only in  
 correlation with the loved is fullness of the manifold possible.126 
 
The architectonic created around the valued person by aesthetic seeing reveals not only the 
manifoldness of his or her Being, but also illuminates the whole world surrounding this person as 
if from his or her perspective: “…everything in this world acquires significance, meaning, and 
value only in correlation with man—as that which is human.  All possible Being and all possible 
meaning are arranged around the human being as the center and the sole value; everything (and 
here aesthetic seeing has no bounds) must be correlated with the human being, must become 
human.”127 Thus aesthetic seeing is the rendering of the hero from his own perspective in a manner 
that is also interpretatively charitable to him or her — presumably this manner is also a part of the 
hero’s perspective.  Yet in predicating the possibility of slow, lingering, context-sensitive 
observation upon the loving disposition of aesthetic seeing, Bakhthin makes the implication that 
the reason why other methodologies don’t come as close as aesthetic seeing in bridging the gap 
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between culture and context-specific life has to do with the absence in these methodologies of a 
loving consideration or contemplation.  These methodologies, in short, have no loving interest in 
— or even love for — the described hero and therefore have no interest in his in-itself integrity.    
 In Philosophy of the Act, however close the unified, yet ever-particular, aesthetic 
architectonic gets to the described object, the hero, it is still only an approximation to the ethical 
drama of the actual, once-occurent life.  Yet aesthetic seeing is still better than what the cultural 
methodologies offer, which is, according to Bakhtin, a theoretical transcription of the observed 
object which reduces the uniqueness of its particulars to fungible instances of some universal 
law.128  The “theoretism” of cultural methodologies thus offers not a truth (pravda) but The truth 
(istina) (58).  Bakhtin ultimately aligns this reductive theoretical transcription to a rigorously 
monistic view of either Being or of consciousness.  For the privileging of The truth or universality 
over a truth or the particulars  
 leads, in materialism, to the theoretical unity of being… [a] kind of consistent and  
 permanent self-equal substrate, a wholly given, dull unity, or some kind of self-equal law, 
 a principle, a force.  In idealism [this privileging] leads to the theoretical unity of   
 consciousness: I am a certain mathematical principle of the unity of a serial   
 consciousness, for it should, before anything, initially be an identity, a self-identical  
 concept (36-37).  
 
Essentially, according to Bakhtin, the application of cultural methodologies — the application of 
the scientific method, of psychological description, of ethical judgment, of biological observation 
— slices whatever unique tethers the observed object or person may have to its organic milieu and 
replaces this object or person within a monistic construct, repurposing the object or person so as 
to align it not with its own telos but with the telos of the construct as a whole.  As we can see, 
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theoretism is nothing if not monologism at the level of narratives authored by the cultural 
methodologies.129  
 In the last six paragraphs of Toward a Philosophy of the act, Bakhtin gives a pithy 
description of the architectonic of actual life.  This architectonic subsumes the aesthetic 
architectonic within it.  Since only the aesthetic architectonic allows me a way to visualize the 
world through the eyes of the other, only the combination of these two architectonics allows me to 
juxtapose the other’s point of view (or the others’ points of view) of the world with my own unique 
one: “As we will see in detail later, to contemplate aesthetically — means to carry the object into 
the system of values [tsennostnyi plan] of the other.”130  The architectonic of actual life, is given 
[dana] as an interaction of ethical deeds as performed by “myself” towards others.  The ethical 
deed is accomplished towards others by lovingly contemplating them.  These are the deeds that 
are precisely assigned to be accomplished [zadany] and their continuous accomplishment and 
interaction creates a continuous event architectonic of life.131 In the penultimate paragraph of the 
work, Bakhtin cements the connection between the performance of the ethical act and the 
interactivity between “I” and the other: “The concrete ought [dolzhenstvovanie] is an architectonic 
ought [dolzhenstvovanie]: to actualize one’s unique place [mesto] in unique event-being, and it 
[the place] is determined before anything else — as a value juxtaposition [protivopostavlenie] of 
I and other.”132 This architectonic which includes myself and “all others for me” is “given and 
posited” [dana i zadana].  “It is the posited [zadannyi] plan of my orientation in co-being/being 
                                                 
 129 See L. Gogotishvili’s comment to Toward a Philosophy of the Act: “Th[e] critique of [Kant’s] 
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first, to our knowledge, fixation of that Bakhtinian idea from which develops the multi-aspectual critique of 
monologism, a critique that was constant throughout all periods of Bakhtin’s career.”  See Ss I, 464n9, translation 
mine. 
 130 Ss I, 67-68.  
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[sobytiia-bytiia], the architectonic, unceasingly and actively fulfilled by my responsible deed, 
exalted by my deed and stable only because of it” (68).  Bakhtin says that the “sense” of the 
juxtaposition of myself and the other is “absolute self-exclusion.”  The concept of ethical or 
responsible self-exclusion, explained only in passing in one other passage of the work, seems to 
be associated with the Christian notion of self-less love for the other, as Bakhtin mentions Christ’s 
act of self-exclusion (his martyrdom) as one that is nevertheless not to be confused by an escape 
from Being.133 Bakhtin suggests that in order to act ethically towards others, we must always 
eliminate our self from the equation of their observation, and that only in this way, i.e. through 
selfless self-excluding contemplation, can their image have fullness and come alive for us.  
Ultimately, Bakhtin’s presentation of the architectonic of actual life as a site of interactivity 
between myself and others executed through self-exclusionary ethical deeds and the association of 
this with the architectonic of aesthetic seeing suggest an early form of his theory of polyphony. 
PLURALITY OF WORDS VERSUS THE SINGULARITY OF THE WORD   
 As Bakhtin’s thought evolved throughout his career, his view of theoretism or “monizing 
methodologies” expanded to include any point of view — from that of an entire scientific system 
to that of the idiosyncratic ideology of one person — which tries to subsume all other points of 
view under its own organizing logos.  Bakhtin elaborated other core concepts, such as the loving 
observation of the hero as (an approximatively) unifying methodology, yet this remained 
recognizably close to its earliest articulation even in his later works.  Shortly after writing Toward 
a Philosophy of the Act sometime in the early to mid 1920s, Bakhtin would focus on this very 
methodology in Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.134  In 1929, Bakhtin published the first 
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edition of his book on Dostoevsky, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art [Problemy Tvorchestva 
Dostoevskogo], where the concept of aesthetic seeing was first applied extensively.  Bakthin would 
rewrite this book and publish it in 1963 as Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.135  Two of the most 
important Bakhtinian concepts for this study, that of monologism and polyphony, also began their 
formulation in Toward a Philosophy of the Act but found their most iconic reconceptualization in 
Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book.  Monologism as a fact of life, and especially, a fact of art, originated 
in Bakhtin’s known written oeuvre with the “theoretism” of cultural methodologies which he 
describes in Towards a Philosophy of the Act.136  In this early work, it is this theoretical impulse, 
the “will-to-theory,” so to speak, which fragments — through its process of transcription — the 
ethical act and the individual committing it into the world of life and the world of culture.  In 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin would go on to describe monologism in very similar 
terms.  Both theoretism and monologism, according to Bakhtin, view truth as an internally 
consistent integral hierarchy with exchangeable parts.  Anything that does not share an identity 
with the true, or anything that is not an exchangeable part of it, is not true or even part of what is 
true.  Since Truth (i.e. istina), whether theoretical or monological, figures as a universalized 
category, all particulars in the world must align with it.  Bakhtin also associates  theoretical 
transcription and monologism with monism.  Yet, whereas theoretism may lead to both monistic 
materialism and monistic Idealism, monologism is associated only with Idealist monisms 
(monisms of consciousness), which makes monologism a sort of monopsychism, a oneness or 
                                                 
 135 This edition was a reworking of the first edition mostly along the lines of phraseological updates and an 
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fact that his contemporary reception is based on this version of the book on Dostoevsky and on its language.  See Ss 
VI, 483-498; See also Emerson and Morson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford, CA: Stanford, 
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singularization of consciousness.  Ultimately, monologism refers to the negatively qualified pole 
of the “one,” in the timeless dichotomy of the ‘one over the many:’ “[a]longside this unified and 
inevitably single consciousness can be found a multitude of empirical human consciousnesses.  
From the point of view of ‘consciousness in general’ this plurality of consciousnesses is accidental 
and, so to speak, superfluous.”137   
 Thus we see that the implication that Bakhtin made in Towards a Philosophy of the Act, 
viz. that behind a particular methodological view of Truth (e.g., an “ethical,” or “scientific” view 
of Truth) stands a particular consciousness, is made explicit in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  
By wrangling together theoretical formulations of monistic consciousness such as Kant’s ethical 
and epistemological “general” subject, the Idealistic unities of consciousness such as “‘the 
absolute I,’ ‘the absolute spirit,’ [and] ’the normative consciousness,’”138 Bakhtin, in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, distilled and synthesized the aspect of unifying consciousness inherent in 
his original view of the methodological theoretism and re-formulated it into the elegantly simple 
view that is monologism.  This latter is any rationalizing conscious center that typifies and 
theorizes other entities, conscious or not, along its organizing principle — along its ideology, its 
Weltanschauung.  In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, this rationalizing center is the monological 
author.139 
 Bakhtin’s re-working of the idea of theoretism in the book on Dostoevsky also recreates 
the drama of the fragmentation of the world, as described in Towards a Philosophy of the Act, in 
a new key.  Just as the cultural methodologies drive a split between the world of culture and the 
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world of once-occurent life in Towards a Philosophy of the Act, the monological author splits the 
possible unified image of the hero into the author’s image of the hero and the hero’s own:  
 In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he  
 acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that is, within  
 the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is, he cannot  
 exceed the limits of his own character, typicality or temperament without violating the  
 author’s monologic design concerning him.  Such an image is constructed in the objective 
 authorial world, objective in relation to the hero’s consciousness; the construction of that  
 authorial world with its points of view and finalizing definitions presupposes a fixed  
 external position, a fixed authorial field of vision [krugozor].  The self-consciousness of  
 the hero is inserted into this rigid framework, to which the hero has no access from within 
 and which is part of the authorial consciousness defining and representing him — and is  
 presented against the firm background of the external world.140  
 
Yet, as we can see from this quote, the hero’s image is also the locus of another conceptual import 
from Toward a Philosophy of the Act, the dialectic of ethical self-progress, which itself bridges 
the gap between oneself as the potential ethical actor and the world of Being.  Thus Bakhtin makes 
the monological author the site of the two original fragmentations described in Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act.  Not only does the monological author, in a process analogous to cultural 
methodologies, produce an image of the hero (the described object) that accords with his or her 
own organizing principle (and diverges from the hero’s own), he or she also bars the hero from 
ethical self-actualization.  The author both generalizes the hero’s image and petrifies any possible 
development.  In the language of Towards a Philosophy of the Act, the author has committed an 
ethical misdeed toward his other, his hero, by not according him a loving contemplation that 
excludes the self. 
  The main idea of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, however, is how Dostoevsky reverses 
the trend set by a history of monological authors through a method of composing novels and heroes 
which Bakhtin terms “polyphonic.”  As in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin, in both 
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editions of his book on Dostoevsky, counters one systematizing unity with a unity which allows 
for the ontological independence and uniqueness of its particulars.  We can clearly see how 
Polyphony arose from Bakhtin’s earlier notions of aesthetic architectonic and the architectonic of 
actual life.  In these concepts, as in polyphony, the ‘self’ is curbed through self-excluding, ethical 
action to allow a full, loving visualization and rendering of the ‘other’ which allows this other to 
retain its ontological independence; its own place in the world.  The ‘other’ is allowed to 
encompass both the specific person and the world as he or she sees it.  This other is also allowed 
to encompass what he or she will be, and thus, what he or she presently is not.  Polyphony could 
be treated as a collection of methods whereby an author constructs an architectonic of aesthetic 
seeing which renders the hero as independent on the level of the utterance recorded within the 
verbal work of art.  On polyphony as a collection of such methods, Bakthin says, rhetorically:  
 [T]he hero as a point of view, as an opinion on the world and on himself, requires utterly  
 special methods of discovery and artistic characterization.  And this is so because what  
 must be discovered and characterized here is not the specific existence of the hero, not his 
 fixed image, but the sum total of his consciousness and self-consciousness, ultimately the  
 hero’s final world on himself and on his world.141 
 
Bakhtin is, of course, speaking here of polyphony and what is to be discovered and characterized 
through it has been done, according to him, by Dostoevsky: 
 All the stable and objective qualities of a hero—his social position, the degree to which  
 he is sociologically or characterologically typical, his habitus, his spiritual profile and  
 even his very physical appearance—that is, everything that usually serves an author in  
 creating a fixed and stable image of the hero, “who he is,” becomes in Dostoevsky the  
 object of the hero’s own introspection, the subject of his self-consciousness; and the  
 subject of the author’s visualization and representation turns out to be in fact a function of 
 this self-consciousness.  At a time when the self-consciousness of a character was usually 
 seen merely as an element of his reality, as merely one of the features of his integrated  
 image, here, on the contrary, all of reality becomes an element of the character’s self- 
 consciousness.142 
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Thus, in both polyphony and in the architectonic of aesthetic seeing, “everything in th[e] world 
acquires significance, meaning, and value only in correlation with man.”143 In the decidedly more 
ecstatic language of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, this sentiment is rendered thus: “In 
Dostoevsky you don’t find the hero side by side the world he lives in.  The hero devours the world 
and this latter is given through him.”144   
 Though Bakhtin implies a plurality of others in his subdivision between the architectonics 
that model the visualization of my self and the other in Towards a Philosophy of the Act, this work 
does not dwell much on multiplicity (43).  In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, multiplicity is 
made explicit: “[s]ide by side the hero are other heroes and their own versions of the world, or 
rather, their own words.”145  Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony thus fleshes out the architectonic of 
aesthetic seeing by making explicit the implied aspect of multiplicity of individuals.  In fact, 
multiplicity is the dominant aspect of the concept of polyphony:   
The plurality of independent and unalloyed [nesliiannykh] voices and consciousnesses, the 
authentic polyphony of the fully valid voices is the real basic particularity of Dostoevsky’s 
novels. A multiplicity of characters and fates in one sole [edinom] objective world in the 
light of the sole [edinogo] author’s consciousness is not what unfolds in his works, but here 
is combined, namely, a plurality of consciousness with equal rights with their worlds, 
keeping their unalloyedness [nesliianost’], in the unity of some event.  In actuality, in the 
very design of the artist, Dostoevsky’s main heroes are not objects of the author's word, 
but subjects of their own, immediately signifying [znachashchego] word.146 
 
Polyphony, then, is the concept of multiplicity which Bakhtin opposes to the singularity of 
monologism.  Just like the multiplicity of points of ethical departure in the architectonic of actual 
life yields multiple views of the world, indeed multiple worlds, so does Polyphony yield multiple 
consciousnesses which multiply the world.   
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 Yet in countering what he views as a woefully inadequate, singularizing, epistemological 
and aesthetic method with an inclusive one, Bakhtin does not seem to want to throw out all of the 
monistic presumptions inherent in monologism, for as in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin 
is still in search of a way back to some sort of unity of Being.  This is seen in the fact that, according 
to him, Dostoevsky gathers, through the methods of polyphony, all of the heroes within “the unity 
of some event,” i.e. within the work of art.  It is with respect to the aspect of unity that the concept 
of Polyphony stands out from its conceptual predecessors in Toward a Philosophy of the Act.  The 
reason for this is perhaps due to the fact though the concept of polyphony seems to have been 
present in prototypical form (the architectonic of aesthetic seeing) in Toward a Philosophy of the 
Act, the idea of this kind of unity also drew inspiration from other conceptualizations of unity in 
currency during the Silver Age.  One major influence upon Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony is 
Viacheslav Ivanov.  According to the most recent commentators of Bakhtin’s first edition of the 
Dostoevsky book, “…Viacheslav Ivanov’s article “Dostoevsky and the tragedy novel” (1911) 
was…unconditionally…the most important and primary of the direct sources to the conception of 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art.”147  Another article by Ivanov, “Two elements of Contemporary 
Symbolism,” points to where Bakhtin could have found material to refine his view of 
Polyphony.148 The notion (in the above quote) of a unity-within-diversity, of an “unalloyed” whole 
made rich precisely because its parts retain an independence perceived from within that whole is 
also characteristic of Ivanov’s own concept of polyphony:  
 Polyphony in music corresponds to the moment of equilibrium between the signifying  
 and inventive principles of art…  Every participant of the polyphonic chorus is individual 
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 and, as it were, subjective.  But the harmonic restoration of the structure of chords fully  
 confirms the objective purposefulness of the seeming discord.  Both the choral or   
 polyphonic, the orchestra and the church organ, formally serve as a defense of musical  
 objectivism and realism against invasion by the forces of subjective lyrical arbitrariness,  
 and to this day their aesthetic enjoyment is closely linked to the way they calm our, one  
 might say, musical conscience by the collective [sobornyi] authority of general   
 animation, supported harmoniously by voices or instruments”149    
 
As we can see from the passage above, Ivanov’s view of polyphony, though seemingly rooted 
within the context of music, nevertheless occupies a pole in a tension against a purely subjective 
and singularizing element, the “ forces of subjective lyrical arbitrariness.”  In this polyphony and 
lyricism we can see another precursor to the dichotomy of polyphony-monologism.  Furthermore, 
we must pay special attention to Ivanov’s use of the word sobornyi [ecclesiastic] which harks back 
to the Slavophile ideal of sobornost’.  In another article, “Legion and Sobornost’,” Ivanov gives a 
definition of sobornost’ as   
 an ideal of a type of union where the uniting individuals [lichnosti] attain complete  
 openness and definition of their singular [edinstvennoi], unrepeatable [nepovtorimoi] and  
 original essence, of their completely-ransomed, creative freedom, which makes each  
 individual a word that is verbalized, new and necessary for all. In every individual the  
 Word took on flesh [plot’] and dwells within everyone, and in everyone it sounds   
 different, but the word of each finds an echo [otzvuk'] in everyone, and everyone is one  
 free consent, for everyone is one Word [Slovo].       
  Sobornost' is a task [zadanie] and not a given [dannosti']; it has never fulfilled  
 itself on earth completely and lastingly, and it can never be found here or there, like God.  
 But, like the Spirit, it breathes where it wants and always gives life hourly in kind human  
 unions.150  
 
We have already noted earlier how Ivanov’s usage of dannost’/zadannost’ links his view of the 
metaphysical, ecclesiastic unity of sobornost’ with Bakhtin’s view of individual moral progress 
(man is given a passive ontology that he is to fulfill).  Now we notice that both sobornost’ and 
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Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony are analogous and that both stand as macrocosmic correlates to 
the microcosmic narrative of the individual journey toward moral-ethical fulfillment.  Both 
Bakhtin and Ivanov maintain that their unities retain the individuality of its members.  In fact, 
Bakhtin uses Maximus the Confessor’s language (nesliannost’) to further qualify the separateness 
in polyphony.  Similarly, Ivanov’s conception of sobornost’ uses language we have previously 
seen in Bakhtin’s conceptual precursor to polyphony.  Note the parallels between Ivanov’s concept 
of sobornost’ (above) and Bakhtin’s earlier notion of plural unity (below): “I am in communion 
with being in a singular [edinstvennoi] and unrepeatable [nepovtorimoi] manner; I occupy, in 
singular being, the singular [edinstvennoi], unrepeatable [nepovtorimoi] and un-substitutable 
place, impenetrable by the other” (38).  
 Ultimately, of course, the idea of sobornost’ comes from Aleksei Khomiakov, who 
“derived the neologism…from the adjective sobornaia [i.e., universal, in Greek, katholikos],” as 
expressed in the Nicene Creed.151 In Khomiakov, too, the understanding of sobornost’ is of a 
spiritual unity, a “conciliar unity,” where individual freedom is vouchsafed.  Khomiakov himself 
says that “[t]he Church is freedom in unity,” and that “the unity of the Church is nothing but the 
concord of personal freedoms.”152  That Bakhtin was perhaps trying to telegraph the sense of a 
“conciliar” or “ecclesiastic” unity — a unity of believers in God who nevertheless retain the 
authority of their individuality and free will for themselves — through the concept of polyphony 
is not far-fetched.  The concept of unity that allows for the freedom of individuality is already 
inherent in polyphony.  Indeed, Bakhtin has made several parallels between Dostoevsky’s 
                                                 
 151 See Sergey Horujy, “Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism,” in 
Hamburg and Poole, 47. 
 152 A.S. Khomiakov, “Neskol’ko slov pravoslavnogo khristianina o zapadnykh veroispovedaniiakh. Po 
povodu odnogo okruzhnogo poslaniia Parizhskogo arkhiepiskopa” in Sochineniia, 2 vols. (Moscow: Medium, 
1994), vol. 2, 66, 209.”  Translation by Patrick Michelson in Horujy, p. 47.  
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polyphonicity and ecclesiastic unity.  Early in Problems of Dostoevskys’ Poetics, Bakhtin counters 
B. M. Engelhardt’s view that Dostoevsky’s world develops like a “philosophical monologue, 
unfolding dialectically…in Hegelian terms…” by saying that “Dostoevsky’s world is profoundly 
pluralistic.  If we were to seek an image toward which this whole world gravitates, an image in 
the spirit of Dostoevsky’s own worldview, then it would be the church as a communion of 
unmerged souls, where sinners and righteous men come together…”153  As we can see, this idea 
of church as a communion of unmerged souls is profoundly Orthodox and in keeping with 
Khomiakov’s concept of sobornost’.  Nevertheless, further into this discussion, Bakhtin plays 
down the significance of the parallel between polyphony and church communion:  
 But even the image of the church remains only an image, explaining nothing of the  
 structure of the novel itself.  The artistic task resolved by the novel is in essence   
 independent of that secondhand ideological refraction which perhaps occasionally  
 accompanied it in Dostoevsky’s consciousness.  The concrete artistic links between the  
 various planes of the novel, their combination the unity of the work, must be explained  
 and demonstrated by the material of the novel itself, and both “Hegelian spirit” and 
 “church” distract equally form this immediate task.154 
    
It seems that Bakhtin here is avoiding the specific semantic connotations of “church,” all the while 
validating the aspect of unmerged communion in polyphony.  Or it could be that this abrupt de-
emphasis has more to do with an Aesopean strategy aimed at the superadressed censor-readers of 
the book.  In any case, this is not the only instance in which Bakhtin compares the interaction of 
Dostoevsky’s characters to an Orthodox communion of individuals within the church.   In Rakhil’ 
Mirkina’s notes of one of Bakhtin’s lectures on the history of Russian literature, given in the 1920s, 
there appear comments Bakhtin made à propos the final episode of The Brothers Karamazov, “the 
Speech at the Stone,” which he describes as a dramatization of just such a spiritual and ecclesiastic 
union: 
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 On Iliusha’s grave a small, children’s church is made [malen’kaia detskaia tserkov’].   
 And here a response is made to Ivan, as it were.  Dostoevsky shows that it is not   
 impossible to build, but that one should, happiness on the unhappiness of others.  Only  
 that harmony, which is founded on live suffering, has a live soul.  Around the   
 suffering and death of the tortured boy a union [soiuz] is formed.  In this consist the  
 teachings of Christianity.  Christ’s…innocent blood is placed on the foundation of the  
 church, whose purpose is the union [ob’edinenie] and salvation of people.  Thus the  
 episode with the boys reproduces the novel.  But this episode does not finalize the novel,  
 but merely brilliantly presages [predreshaet] it.155 
 
Bakhtin’s hesitant association of polyphony with sobornost’ and the contradiction inherent in the 
last sentence of the quote above seem to indicate how Bakhtin perhaps struggled how to frame the 
concept of unity as a positively qualified, pseudo-metaphysical telos that nevertheless does not 
finalize the individual, unique elements thereby unified.  Bakhtin himself seems to have been 
cognizant of this difficulty, for, in his short preface to the second edition of the book on 
Dostoevsky, he says that “even in this new edition the book cannot pretend to a complete analysis 
of the questions it raises, especially questions as complex as that of the whole in a polyphonic 
novel.” 156  Nevertheless, Bakhtin did leave clues throughout the book, which, if assembled 
together, could give us a clearer, if still rather contradictory, picture of what kind of unity he saw 
in polyphony. 
 The first of these clues has to do with his elaboration of aesthetic seeing, or loving 
contemplation, in the book on Dostoevsky.  The elaboration is, of course, polyphony itself.  It is 
through the polyphonic method that Dostoevsky curtails his own subjectivity and allows for his 
heroes to have their own.  It must be said, however, that the elaboration does tone down, for the 
most part, language associated with “love,” “spiritual love” and “Christian love.”  As we 
remember, in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, the concept of aesthetic seeing was qualified as a 
                                                 
 155 Ss II, 288, 561, translation mine.  
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“loving contemplation,” a contemplation that is spiritual insofar as the observer had to adopt a 
Christ-like self-exclusion in order to successfully contemplate the other. 157   In Problem of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin signals his own personal allegiance to what he sees as Dostoevsky’s 
self-exclusionary contemplation of the other by railing against the kind of aesthetic contemplation 
performed by the monological author.  This kind of contemplation occurs, for example, in 
Dostoevsky’s Poor Folk, where Devushkin comes to believe with horror that his whole life had 
already been encapsulated by Gogol and his hero Akaky Akakievich in the Overcoat.  “[Y]et at 
the same time” Bakhtin says, “[Devushkin] sensed the falseness” of this belief.  He then continues: 
  This peculiar “revolt” of the hero against his literary finalization [zavershennosti]  
 is presented by Dostoevsky in the consistent, primitive forms of Devushkin’s   
 consciousness and speech. 
  The serious and deeper meaning of this revolt might be expressed this way: a  
 living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand,  
 finalizing cognitive process [nel’zia prevrashchat’ zhivogo cheloveka v bezglasnyi  
ob’’ekt zaochnogo zavershaiushchego poznaniia].  In a human being there is always 
something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, 
something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand [zaochnomu] definition.158   
 
From a dialogical point of view, this passage by the creator of “dialogism,” is complex and 
significant.  Who is speaking here? Dostoevsky? Bakhtin?  Is Bakhtin paraphrasing or translating 
Dostoevsky?  Or is Bakhtin using Dostoevsky to express himself?  One salient clue in Bakhtin’s 
language which points to the latter possibility is the immediate progression from the artistic and 
literary context to the context of actual life.  Bakhtin speaks not of Dostoevsky’s heroes but of 
“human beings,” that is, of “living human beings.”  Thus the purported description of an 
underlying aesthetic method employed in a scene in Poor Folk resembles more of an instance of 
outright moral-ethical grandstanding.  Here, as in other places in Bakhtin, aesthetics and literary 
criticism transform, in the blink of an eye, into ethics. 
                                                 
 157 Ss I, 19, 68.  
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* * * 
 As we previously saw, Bakhtin seems not to know how to incorporate Dostoevsky’s 
christianity into his use of polyphony.  We see an ambivalence in his simultaneous 
acknowledgment and repudiations of christian analogies in Dostoevsky’s method.  Nevertheless, 
in describing Dostoevsky’s polyphonically oriented world view, Bakhtin essentially paints a 
picture of a plurivocal unity within diversity, i.e. polyphony as sobornost’.  Furthermore, this unity 
is seen as ultimately bound together by the authority of Christ:   
 [W]hat unfolds before Dostoevsky is not a world of objects, illuminated and ordered by  
 his monologic thought, but a world of yoked-together semantic human orientations.  
 Among them Dostoevsky seeks the highest and most authoritative orientation and he  
 perceives it not as his own true thought, but as another authentic human being and his  
 discourse.  The image of the ideal human being or the image of Christ represents for him  
 the resolution of ideological quests.  This image or this highest voice must crown the  
 world of voices, must organize and subdue it.159  
 
In other words, the image of the ideal human being / Christ is cast as a sort of “lead-voice,” a 
potentially monologic voice that is nevertheless not Dostoevsky’s own and which can spare him 
the burden of monologic solipsism.  Yet in also casting Christ (i.e. “the ideal human being”) as the 
“resolution of ideological quests,” Bakhtin seems to be imparting a heavy, monologically (and 
indeed, monistic) Christian as well as Platonic (“ideal human being,” “resolution of quest,”) thread 
into his view of polyphony-sobornost’.   
 This Christian and platonic macrocosmic teleology is made all the more evident when we 
realize that Bakhtin also weaves into Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics the microcosmic teleology 
which constitutes one of the main ethical dramas in Toward a Philosophy of the Act.  In Problems 
of Dostoevskys Poetics, Bakhtin glosses the authoring of the posited [zadannii], ethical act — 
which works toward the fulfillment of one’s active ontology — as the finding of one’s own word.  
                                                 
 159 PDP, 97. 
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When a polyphonic author allows the hero his or her own voice, then that hero is free to pursue 
the fulfillment of his posited [zadanii] potentiality and/or divine likeness [podobie] by finding his 
or her own word or idea.  In fact, Dostoevsky’s polyphonic method, according to Bakhtin, does 
more than just set the hero free to this pursuit, it provokes and stimulates him to find his own word: 
“the whole of Dostoevsky’s artistic construction of the novel is directed to the opening [raskrytie] 
and clarification of this, the hero’s word.”160  The hero, however, can lose his way to his word if 
he tries to deflect other’s defining words.161  It is clear that the hero’s word in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics is precisely a higher ontology set up [zadana] to be fulfilled.  In notes he 
composed late in his life, Bakhtin returns to the notion of the word as a fulfillable ontology: 
“Quests for my own word are in fact quests for a word that is not my own, a word that is more 
than myself; this is a striving to depart from one’s own words, with which nothing essential can 
be said.”162  If we tie these thoughts on finding one’s own word to the one’s he offered in Problems 
of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, what we see is a clear picture of a process of moral-ethical education qua 
ontological development: I am ethically and even ontologically not fully-formed until I find my 
own way (my own word) in Being.  This is perhaps the late Bakhtin’s clearest parallel to the 
teleology inherent in Maximus the Confessor’s dialectic from image to likeness.  In this teleology, 
one cannot but help noticing a covert monism, and hence, monologism.  If the finding of my own 
word takes me further from “my own word” or “my own Being,” if the fulfillment of this ontology 
                                                 
 160 Ss VI, 63; translation mine.  
 161 PDP, 51; Ss VI, 60-61.  In Towards a Philosophy of the Act, the loss of one’s word is rendered by the 
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 162 “From Notes Made in 1970-71,” 149, SG 
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takes me to a word or Being that is Superior to the one that was given me — and if all around me 
are to fulfill the same ontology (that of the Superior Being or Word) — how can Bakhtin also 
argue that individuality is not lost?  How does Bakhtin argue that polyphony is the aesthetic and 
literary equivalent of laissez-faire individualism and yet also argue that it is the structure that 
conditions our collective search for another (or at the very least part of another), superior, and 
same divine ontology?  If there is even a hint of henosis of substance in polyphony, then Bakhtin’s 
concept is a contradiction in terms. 
 
DOSTOEVSKY AS UNITY 
 Another aspect of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics that points to Bakhtin’s covert desire 
for a monistic unity is found in his usage of the trope of the Poet as seer and/or as mirror of the 
world.  This trope is suggestive of a monism since the vision, dream or prophecy the poet sings 
about is a window to a true reality that only he or she can see.  Since this reality is qualified as 
truth and is otherwise inaccessible from the position of a less true reality, it stands to reason that 
the trope of the poet seer is always indicative of a view of the world that dual: on the one hand 
there is the world as we, non-poet-seers, usually see it and, on the other, the world as it truly is / 
will be and/or the world from which our mundane world derives that only the poet seer can see.  
In these kinds of dualities, one world or reality is always privileged over the other.  The trope of 
the poet seer has a long history, one of the first figurations of the poet as prophet being the poet-
singer Orpheus from Greek mythology.  However, usage of the trope lapsed after late antiquity.163  
Nevertheless Romanticism revived the trope and in the 19th century, writers such as Mallarmé, 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as well as many French, German and Russian thinkers, writers and poets 
                                                 
 163 See Gwendolyn Bays, “The Orphic Vision of Nerval, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud,” Comparative 
Literature Studies 4.1/2: The Symbolist Movement (1967), 18. 
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in the 19th and 20th centuries would write about Orpheus, or Dionysius or Wagner or Pushkin as 
prophet-seers who could see the totality that invisibly binds the phenomena visible to the mundane 
eye.164   
 Two important characteristics of the trope of the poet as seer have to do with the Orphic 
myth.  The first is the fatal condition underlying the poet’s divine vision: the power of prophesy is 
granted only through some sort of self-sacrifice.  In the myth of Orpheus, for example, his 
prophetic powers come only from his severed head, after being ripped to shreds by the Maenads 
during the frenzied violence of a Bacchic mystery rite.165  In a more modern take of the orphic 
sacrifice — in Schopenhauer’s view of the genius poet, for example — the poet can see the truth 
and entirety of the universe only by divesting himself of his individuality and merging with the 
universe.166 We see a similar divestment in Bakhtin’s notions of self-exclusion and the self-
exclusionary and loving contemplation of all that which exists outside of my “I.”  Even the 
commentators of Bakhtin’s collected works see in “self-exclusion” a sort of mysterial sacrifice: 
 [The] ‘I’ — is the mystery sacrifice of Bakhtin’s moral philosophy — or its tragic hero,  
 foreordained to death by the cathartic teleology of tragedy (the mystery and tragedy are  
 mentioned in the text but twice, yet in a maximally significant place: they are brought in  
 Toward a Philosophy of the Act as sorts of analogy of the architectonic structuring of the  
 world of the deed).167   
 
                                                 
 164 Indeed, even Pushkin wrote about himself as a seer in such poems as “Prorok [Prophet],” see Aleksandr 
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 166 On Schopenhauer’s notion of the genius poet, see the next chapter of this study.  
 167 Ss I, 357.  
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In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics it is Dostoevsky who serves as Bakhtin’s poet-seer (or  
perhaps Bakhtin is the mere interpreter of Dostoevsky, the poet seer).  Yet does Dostoevsky 
commit some sort of self-exclusionary self-sacrifice in order to attain some sort of prophetic 
power?  It is here were the language of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics clarifies the concepts 
found in Toward a Philosophy of the Act.  Even in the latter work, the execution of self-exclusion 
is only an action that happens when the “I” engages the architectonic of aesthetic seeing, which is 
the architectonic that regulates my relationship with everything that is not “I” (i.e., the world and 
others).  Thus this self-exclusion remains, if we take Bakhtin’s explanations at face value, within 
the perspectival and/or aesthetic context.  This process of self-exclusion becomes more 
metaphysical and the limitation of its operation to the aesthetic context becomes blurred, however, 
when Bakhtin starts talking about mysteries and Christ’s own “self-exclusion.”  Nevertheless, in 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin purges these metaphors: “[t]he author of a polyphonic 
novel is not required to renounce himself or his own consciousness, but he must to an extraordinary 
extent broaden, deepen and rearrange this consciousness (to be sure, in a specific direction) in 
order to accommodate the autonomous consciousness of others” (68 / 80).  Thus it seems that, in 
the book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin cancels the self-exclusion previously necessary for artistic 
visualization.  Or does he?  Though Bakhtin clearly states that no renunciation is necessary, we 
still get the impression that the idea of self-exclusion is not fully cancelled, but modified, when he 
engages in suspiciously, de-individuating Idealist language (“broaden, deepen and rearrange this 
consciousness”) when describing the transformation Dostoevsky’s consciousness undergoes when 
the latter employs the polyphonic/dialogic method.  More specifically, the language in question is 
curiously reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s conception of the genius poet, who “raises himself…to 
the pure subject of knowing;” i.e. he broadens — and thus divests himself of — his own egotistical 
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desires and his own “I” into the pure, totalizing subject or eye of the world.168 Thus Bakhtin speaks 
of a  
 peculiar active broadening of [Dostoevsky’s] consciousness, not solely in the sense of an  
 assimilation of new objects (human types, character, natural and social phenomena), but  
 primarily in the sense of a special dialogic mode of communication with the autonomous  
 consciousnesses of others, something never before experienced, an active dialogic  
 penetration into the unfinalizable depths of man.”169   
 
Thus Bakhtin not only changes his consciousness, he broadens it in order to, as it were, literally 
make room in his ‘self’ for the placement of others.  Furthermore, through his artistic method, 
Dostoevsky somehow divests himself of an aspect of his own authorial ego, for he executes “the 
destruction of…[the] monological authorial field of vision” (ibid.).  In the end, both 
Schopenhauer’s genius poet and Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky manage to somehow quiet their selfish 
egos in order to gain a broader horizon on the world and thus see it without the impediment of 
their monological desires.   
 Dostoevsky’s position as a visionary of his era in Bakhtin’s thought also aligns with the 
second important characteristic of the trope of the poet seer, which is the commensurateness 
between the power of prophecy, the poet’s artistry, and the poet’s artistic harmony with a given 
(religious or philosophical) epistemology; i.e. the greater his “artistic vision,” the greater his 
artistry and power of prophecy within his art.  Thus, in Plotinus, for example, “[a]rtistic 
excellence…depends upon the quality of the artist’s vision, which improves only as he develops 
spiritually.”170 In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Dostoevsky had a near-totalizing grasp of his 
era: he “keenly sensed…the extraordinary multi-voicedness of his epoch.” 171  Dostoevsky’s 
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supreme position in Bakhtin’s pantheon of artists cannot be overstated: “[i]n the present time 
Dostoevsky — this is the summit achieved in the sphere [v oblasti] of dialogical understanding of 
human thought, of human searchings [iskanii].”172 Like any true poet seer, Bakhtin also suggests, 
in seeming metaphor, that Dostoevsky was also capable of divination:  
  As an artist, Dostoevsky did not create his ideas in the same way philosophers or  
 scholars create theirs—he created images of ideas found, heard, sometimes divined by  
 him in reality itself, that is, ideas already living or entering life as idea-forces.    
 Dostoevsky possessed an extraordinary gift for hearing the dialogue of his epoch, or,  
 more precisely, for hearing his epoch as a great dialogue, for detecting in it not only  
 individual voices, but precisely and predominantly the dialogic relationship among  
 voices, their dialogic interaction […] 
  In the dialogue of his time Dostoevsky also heard resonances of the voice-ideas of 
 the past — both the most recent past (the ‘30s and ‘40s) and the more remote.  Also, as  
 we have just said, he attempted to hear the voice-ideas of the future, trying to divine  
 them, so to speak, from the place prepared for them in the dialogue of the present, just as  
 it is possible to divine a future, as yet unuttered response in an already unfolded dialogue.  
 Thus on the plane of the present there came together and quarreled past, present, and  
 future (PDP, 90; Ss I, 101-102). 
 
 Ultimately, Bakhtin’s image of Dostoevsky as a Poet seer who employs an artistic method 
that curtails any egocentric desire to impose his worldview upon others — to “create” others — 
and which thus broadens his capacity to render others’ reality truthfully seems to have stemmed 
from Vyacheslav Ivanov’s own description of the artist-seer or artist-theurge.  In “Two Elements 
of Contemporary Symbolism,” Ivanov proclaims: “to the artist, the conscious heir of the creative 
forces of the World Soul, to the theurge, corresponds the testament: ‘Successor of the Creating 
Mother [Тvoriashchei Materi], call upon the transformation of the universe.’”173  Ivanov then asks: 
“[b]ut how can man manage the transformation of the universe with his creation [tvorchestvom]?  
Does he populate the land with the creations [sozdaniiami] of his own hands?”  The rhetorical 
question spurs Ivanov to present his own ideal artist.  This artist does not “impress…his ideal on 
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the face of the earth and his design on forms of life,” though he is an “artist-theurge,” he is not “an 
artist-tyrant, of whom Nietzsche dreamed, an artist-enslaver, who re-evaluates all aesthetic values 
and breaks the old tablets of beauty, singularly following his own “will-to-power…”  For Ivanov 
the “theurgical principle in art [khudozhestve] is a principle of the least violence and the most 
perceptiveness.  Not laying one’s will on the surface of things — this is the highest calling of the 
artist, but to observe and proclaim [blagovestvovat’] the inmost will of essences 
[sushchnostei]…He sharpens his hearing.”  Ivanov’s artist must sharpen his hearing and his vision 
in order to “hear what things say” and “to understand the meaning of forms and see the reason 
[razum] of appearances.”  Ivanov concludes that “only such an openness of spirit can make the 
artist the bearer of divine revelations” (ibid.). 
 That Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky is founded squarely upon the Silver Age image of the artist as 
a divine medium that can transform the world is not surprising.  Looking at Toward a Philosophy 
of the Act and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics together, we see in Bakhtin’s thoughts concerning 
ethico-aesthetic action and Dostoevsky’s own ethico-aesthetic procedure in his art an entire 
tapestry woven with the major concepts of his age.  The cornerstone of his conceptual architecture 
is the perfectibility of man, which is vouched for by divine decree.  Thus the key to ethical behavior 
is the conservation of man’s potential.  Likewise, the key to great art is the rendering of the 
potentiality of man and of the world.  Both ethical behavior and artistic creation involve the 
quieting of the egoistic desire to change others and the world into our own image.  On the contrary, 
man must allow others to join in the divine gathering of individuals [sobornost’] if he is to act 
ethically; and acting ethically for Bakhtin is, as we have seen, always parallel to the creation of 
great art.  Yet whereas ethical action towards others allows these others the possibility to join the 
divine gathering, the creator of great art must himself become that divine repository which 
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safeguards the potentiality of all others.  In the next two chapters, we will see how Nabokov, 
following different philosophers and the same Dostoevsky, developed ideas surprisingly similar 
to that of Bakhtin’s monologism, evoked an idiosyncratic reflection of metaphysical utopia and 





CHAPTER TWO: THE BEGINNINGS OF NABOKOV’S SCHOPENHAUERIANISM 
Tracing Nabokov’s influences, metaphysical or otherwise, has always been difficult and 
the author’s resistance to this kind of investigation is, of course, legendary: “No creed or school 
has had any influence on me whatsoever…” “I am not one to provide much sport for influence 
hunters.”174   It is perhaps due to this kind of resistance and discouragement that Nabokov’s 
intellectual and philosophical sources remain an area of much needed growth for literary research.  
As late as 2011, Bryan Boyd suggested that Nabokov’s metaphysics too were in sore need of 
elucidation.  Clarifying this area of Nabokov goes hand in hand with following up with his 
philosophical sources: “[a]part from working out how [Nabokov’s] metaphysics manifests itself 
in individual works there are other tasks still to pursue.  One is to identify the sources of Nabokov’s 
metaphysics.”175   
Nabokov himself has succinctly indicated affinities with certain writers.  Of these, the 
strongest one seems to be with Alexander Blok, a major poet of the Silver Age.  In a January 12, 
1943 letter to Edmund Wilson, he warns the new student of Blok: “be careful: he is one of those 
poets that get into one’s system — and everything else seems unblokish and flat.  I, as most 
Russians went through that stage some twenty-five years ago.”176  Elsewhere he writes that “[t]he 
youth of people of my generation was spent among his poems.”177 Nabokov’s poetry and prose 
exhibit many of the metaphysical themes that characterized Silver Age poetry in general and 
Blok’s in particular.  A frequently noted motif in Nabokov, one shared by Silver Age poets, is of 
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the transcendence into an “otherworld.”178  The metaphysical function of symbols in poets such as 
Blok, Bely, Balmont and Ivanov was paralleled in Nabokov’s works by various layers of meaning, 
from puns, word choice, metaphors, and motifs, to plot structures that point to transcendence.  
However, Nabokov’s Silver Age apprenticeship never followed the Symbolist’s turn toward social 
and apocalyptic themes and Nabokov would, in fact, later repudiate any sort of historicism, 
apocalyptic, utopian or otherwise, in his time in Berlin.  Nevertheless, Nabokov did uphold a kind 
of utopian metaphysics, the kind of priority monism where all things are infused with the divine.   
 Though, as Brian Boyd suggested, much still needs to be done in Nabokov philology, 
especially with regards to his metaphysics, this area of study has become rather productive in very 
recent time.  The “thaw” began when Brian Boyd detailed, in his monumental biography of 
Nabokov, the author’s literary contacts and activities in Berlin of the 1920s.179  Alexander Dolinin 
then directed further scholarly attention toward what Stephen Blackwell would later call “the most 
clearly identifiable formative influence upon [Nabokov],” the literary critic Yuly Aikhenvald.180  
Blackwell’s further excavation has shown that Aikhenvald – an academically trained philosopher, 
translator of philosophy, and former secretary and editor of the first Russian journal devoted 
explicitly to philosophy – is, perhaps, the nearest thing to a literary and philosophical mentor that 
scholars could probably ever find in Nabokov’s literary development.181  Further progress in this 
area of Nabokov philology came with the publication of Dana Dragunoiu’s Vladimir Nabokov and 
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the Poetics of Liberalism (2010) and Thomas Karshan’s Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Play 
(2011), which, along with Blackwell’s study, have done much to deconstruct Nabokov’s myth of 
self-creation by compellingly suggesting and analyzing the transition of several motifs from 
Aikhenvald’s theoretical pieces to Nabokov’s early essayistic lectures, short stories, and even 
novels.182   
 It just so happens that Aikhenvald was a secretary of none other than the Moscow 
Psychological Society, and the editor of its main organ, Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii (Questions 
of ).  Thus Aikhenvald was an integral part of the Russian intelligentsia’s backlash against 
materialism and positivism in the very late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Aikhenvald’s idealist 
pedigree is as pure as any of the members of the Moscow Psychological Society: he wrote a thesis 
on Leibniz and Locke from an idealist perspective, for which he earned a gold medal; he also was 
the translator of Arthur Schopenhauer’s complete works into Russian. 183   Both Leibniz and 
Schopenhauer were instrumental in articulating a modernized metaphysical fundamentalism, the 
latter’s conception being unabashedly monistic. 
 As we shall see below, it is the assumption of this study that Aikhenvald was very much 
influenced by Schopenhauer’s philosophy even while he kept a creatively appropriative 
relationship with it.   It is also the assumption of this study that Aikhenvald himself influenced 
Nabokov in two ways: by disseminating his own amalgamative aesthetic metaphysics and by 
pointing Nabokov to Schopenhauer as another source of aesthetic metaphysics. These assumptions 
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 183 See Artur Shopengauer, Sobranie sochinenii v 4-x tomax, trans. and ed. Iulii. I. Aikhenval’d (I.N. 
Kushnerev and Co.: Moscow, 1903).  See also “Aikhenval’d, Iulii Isaevich,” Russkoe zarubezh’e…, 15-16.  B. 
Zaitsev, who collaborated with Aikhenval’d in Berlin, says that Aikhenval’d “had grown up in the spirit of German 
idealistic philosophy.  He knew Kant and Hegel well, and Schopenhauer was particularly close to him.  He provided 
an excellent translation of The World as Will and Representation.”  See B. Zajcev, Moskva (Munich, 1960) 70. 
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are paramount for our study as it ultimately frames our comparison of Bakhtin and Nabokov.  For, 
while there is virtually no evidence that Nabokov read Bakhtin or was influenced by any of his 
ideas directly, there is a wealth of evidence that Nabokov read and was influenced by 
Schopenhauer.  Ultimately, several this philosopher’s core ideas, as reflected in Nabokov, provide 
a comparative bridge to Bakhtin.  Nabokov’s idiosyncratic conceptualization of monologism 
ultimately stems, we argue, from Schopenhauer’s famous concept of the will, which could be 
considered monologism avant la lettre, if on a far grander scale. 
 There is much evidence that establishes a connection between Schopenhauer and Nabokov 
through Aikhenvald’s brilliant prism.  After being exiled from Russia and sailing to Germany on 
the legendary philosopher’s steamship in September 1922, Aikhenvald arrived in Berlin and 
became involved with the intellectual work buzzing at the time in what was then the Russian 
émigré capital in Europe.  Aikhenvald’s chief activity in Berlin was the editorship of “Literaturnye 
zametki” (“Literary Notes”) the literary criticism section of Rul’ (The Rudder), a newspaper co-
founded by V.D. Nabokov.  Aikhenvald became very well integrated in Russian Berlin’s cultural 
life.  Among the several cultural and academic groups to which he belonged, Aikhenvald notably 
participated in several endeavors alongside the young Vladimir Nabokov.  Both, for example, 
belonged to Arzamas, a literary organization, and both co-founded in 1925 its publishing house.184  
Both Nabokov and Aikhenvald also belonged to the Circle of Berlin Literary Youth.185 Nina 
Berberova attests to Aikhenvald’s early recognition of Nabokov’s significance as an artist: “I heard 
about Nabokov back in Berlin, in 1922. Iu. I. Aikhenvald, a critic at the Russian newspaper Rul’ 
                                                 
 184 Ibid, see also Bryan Boyd’s Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) 230. 
 185 Abram Rejtblat. “Julij Ajchenval’d in Berlin,” Russische Emigration in Deutschland 1918 bis 1941 
(Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1995) 359. 
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spoke to Khodasevich about him as a talented young poet…” 186  Aikhenvald’s first written 
comments on Nabokov appeared the following year, in the January 28, 1923 issue of Rul’, in a 
review of the author’s first two collections of poems: Grozd’ (The Cluster) and Gornii put’ 
(Empyrean Path).  The critic noted Nabokov’s talent and “culturedness,” as well as the 
derivativeness of his poetry.  The latter qualification Aikhenvald politely justified as the “traces of 
a communion with art and literature, with the gifts of Europe.” Aikhenvald was also the first to 
note the motif of Russia and of Rus’, “the motif of separation from it and of a return under her 
native sky” in Nabokov’s works.187  
 Aikhenvald also organized, with Marina Tatarinova, an informal literary circle where 
Nabokov recited his poetry and read critical essays on Pushkin, Gogol, Blok, Soviet literature, 
Freud, Joseph Conrad, on “Generalizations,” and on “People and Things.”   Nabokov also read his 
first full-length work of art, the play The Tragedy of Mr. Morn, and his first prose work, Mary at 
the circle.188  According to Brian Boyd, there came a moment when Aikhenvald became one of 
Nabokov’s most ardent fans.  When, for example, Nabokov read Mary at the Aikhenvald-
Tatarinova gathering, Aikhenvald supposedly exclaimed, paraphrasing Belinsky’s famous praise 
of Dostoevsky, “A new Turgenev has appeared!” and “insisted that Sirin send the novel to Bunin 
for publication in Sovremennye Zapiski (Contemporary Papers)” (256-257). The possibility of 
flippancy aside, Aikhenvald’s admiration for Nabokov appeared to be genuine.  According to 
Boyd, the critic confessed “to cutting out every Sirin piece he saw [in the newspaper] 
and…amass[ing] a whole stack of clippings” (257).  Nabokov not only returned the admiration 
but became Aikhenvald’s friend.  According to Thomas Karshan, 
                                                 
 186 See Berberova’s Kursiv Moi (Russica: New York, 1983) 369. 
 187 Rul’, January 28, 1923. 
 188 Boyd, 229, 256-257. 
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“[I]n September 1926 Aikhenvald gave Nabokov two poems he had written in praise of his 
friend’s poetry.  Nabokov returned the tribute when in February 1927 he published a poem, 
‘Pilgrim’, which he would dedicate to Aikhenvald, whom he salutes as a Dionysiac ‘god 
of the vine’, ‘my laughing god’, with whom he drains cups of ‘heavenly hops’ and dreams 
his way back to Russia.”189 
 
 It was not long before Nabokov, then an impressionable poet in his twenties in Berlin, 
began to exhibit the signs of the far better-read literary critic and aesthete.  Thomas Karshan tells 
us that Nabokov began adopting ideas that had their clear provenance in Aikhenvald’s aesthetics.  
In December 1925, for example, “Nabokov delivered [a] lecture on ‘Play,’…at a literary 
colloquium organized by…Aikhenvald, whose work is saturated in Kantian aesthetics and who 
only three years earlier had published an article [“In Praise of Idleness”] directly addressing 
Schiller’s concept of play.” 190   Nabokov’s play The Tragedy of Mr. Morn also alludes to 
Aikhenvald through the figure of Dandilio and “reproduces the logic and language of Aikhenvald’s 
essay ‘Praise of Idleness.’  Nabokov would return to this characterization in 1929 in his poem “On 
the Death of Iu. I. Aikhenvald,” which ends with him imagining Aikhenvald in heaven, where his 
soul now ‘idles.’”191  
Beyond illustrating the kind of social contact that Aikhenvald and Nabokov had in Berlin, 
Thomas Karshan’s discussion on the influence that Aikhenvald had upon Nabokov focuses on the 
aesthetic concept of play.  Though Karshan’s discussion further illuminates the intellectual 
relationship between Aikhenvald and Nabokov, his focus lies outside of the concerns of this study.  
Dana Dragunoiu’s own study, Vladimir Nabokov and the Poetics of Liberalism, focuses on 
                                                 
 189 From Sobranie sochinenii russkogo perioda v piati tomakh, Various editors, with introductions to each 
volume by Alexander Dolinin, 5 vols (St Petersburg, Symposium, 1999-2000) vol. 2, 544-5. Quoted in Karshan, 50. 
 190 Karshan, 24.  According to Karshan, Nabokov’s essay, “Play,” and essayistic story, “A Guide to 
Berlin,” formed “a reply to Aikhenvald’s twin themes” of play and idleness. 
 191 Karshan, 50. Karshan also points to Nabokov’s short story “The Passenger,” as another example of 
Nabokov’s reception of Aikhenvald’s ideas.  The story deals with two protagonists, an author and a critic, the latter 
which “is a friendly sketch…of Yuliy Ikhenvald.”  Karshan surmises that the story “elaborates the sort of 
conversations Nabokov and Aikhenvald actually had” (50).  See Nabokov’s The Stories of Vladimir Nabokov, Ed. 
Dmitri Nabokov, Trans. Vladimir and Dmitri Nabokov (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995) 187 and 649. 
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concerns closer to our own: the moral dimension of aesthetics – which, according to Dagrunoiu, 
Nabokov partly inherited from Aikhenvald.  A specific parallel lies between Aikhenvald’s 
resolutely moral view of aesthetics in the article, “Immortal Poshlost’” (“Bessmertnaia poshlost’”), 
and Nabokov’s interpretation of the concept of poshlost’, which is only roughly translated as 
“philistinism.”192  Both author and literary critic place poshlost’ in opposition to a kind of guileless 
and authentic “goodness.”193 Aikhenvald says that “he who is good, is not a philistine” [kto dobr, 
tot ne poshl].194  Nabokov, who seems to have been thinking specifically of the Russian adjective 
dobr / dobryi and the concept of dobrota (i.e., generosity, kindness, goodness), replicated 
Aikhenvald’s thought in English years later when he wrote that “the genuine, the guileless, the 
good is never poshlust.”195 
 Though Aikhenvald’s “Immortal Poshlost’” presents an expansive, resolutely 
metaphysical — one would even say, Neoplatonic — aesthetics, Dragunoiu does not trace the 
specifically metaphysical underpinning of these aesthetics upon Nabokov.  The only scholar who 
has specifically touched on the metaphysical parallels between Aikhenvald and Nabokov is 
Stephen Blackwell. 196   Nevertheless, the study of the metaphysical connections between 
Aikhenvald and Nabokov persists in its nascent stages.  Similarly, the philological relationship 
between Schopenhauer and Nabokov, though better studied, still needs further elaboration.  To 
date, only four scholars, Andrey Babikov, Savely Senderovich, Yelena Shvarts, and Leona Toker, 
                                                 
 192 For a sustained definition of the concept of poshlost’ by Nabokov, see his “Philistines and Philistinism” 
in his Lectures on Russian Literature, Ed. Fredson Bowers (New York: Harcourt, 1981), 309-314.  See also 
Nabokov’s discussion of the term in Nikolai Gogol (New York: New Directions, 1961), 63-74.  
 193 Dragunoiu, 145.  
 194 Iulii Aikhenval’d, “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” Pokhvala prazdnosti (Moscow: Kostry, 1922), 48. 
 195 Nabokov, “Philistines and Philistinism,”313. 
 196 See his Zina’s Paradox: The Figured Reader in Nabokov’s The Gift (Peter Lang, 2000), 29-36.  
 
76 
have made an explicit connection between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Nabokov’s works.197  
Leona Toker, however, does not mention Aikhenvald while Senderovich and Shvarts mention only 
that he was “one of the strongest opponents of the Chernyshevskian engagé philosophical and 
literary-critical tradition,” that he “and Nabokov often met in Berlin in the 1920s and became 
friends in spite of their age difference.” Senderovich and Shvarts do, however, make the 
assumption that Nabokov “was acquainted with Schopenhauer through Aikhenvald’s 
[translation].” 198  In any case, Senderovich, Shvarts, Toker and Babikov have revealed very 
compelling evidence that points to Nabokov’s philosophical engagement with Schopenhauer in 
his works.  As we have said before, it is the purpose of this chapter to further the understanding of 
how Nabokov drew upon both Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer for his literary metaphysics.  It is 
our belief that Nabokov internalized and creatively appropriated Schopenhauerian metaphysics 
and aesthetics through Aikhenvald as a dialogical and interpretative intermediary.199    
 That Nabokov could have read and considered Schopenhauer directly — as opposed to 
only hearing or reading Aikhenvald’s own philosophical appropriations — is nevertheless also 
suggested by Nabokov’s own mentioning of the philosopher’s name in at least two instances in his 
                                                 
 197 See Andrei Babikov’s introduction and commentary to Vladimir Nabokov, Tragediia gospodina Morna, 
P’esy, Lektsii o drame, (Sankt-Peterburg: Abzbuka-klassika, 2008); see also Senderovich and Shvarts’ article “‘If 
We Put Our Heads between Our Legs:’ An Introduction to the Theme ‘Vladimir Nabokov and Arthur 
Schopenhauer,’” Nabokov Studies 11 (2007/2008) at 
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/journals/nabokov_studies/v011/11.senderovich.html/ (last accessed 7 
July 2014) and Leona Toker’s “Philosophers as Poets: Reading Nabokov with Schopenhauer and Bergson,” Russian 
Literature TriQuarterly 24 (1991), 185-196. 
 198Senderovich and Shvarts, “‘If We Put Our Heads…” 
 199 It should also be mentioned that Schopenhauer had a wide intellectual reach as well during the Silver 
Age and also before.  See Joachim T. Bär, “Die Äesthetik des Russischen Symbolismus und ihre Beziehung zu 
Schopenhauer,” in Eric von der Luft, ed., Schopenhauer: New Essays in Honor of his 200th Birthday (Lewiston, 
NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), 24-39; Senderovich and Shvarts, “‘If We Put Our Heads…;”  and J.D. West, 
“Neo-Romanticism in the Russian Symbolist Aesthetic,” The Slavonic and East European Review 51.124 (July 
1973), 423-425.  Especially significant is Bely’s discussion of Schopenhauer in his “Krititsism i simvolizm,” Vesy 




life and career.200 Andrei Babikov has also presented compelling evidence that Nabokov first read 
Schopenhauer through Aikhenvald’s translation in Berlin in the early 1920s. 201   Babikov’s 
evidence is a paraphrase of the beginning lines of the second volume of Schopenhauer’s The World 
as Will and Representation, in Aikhenvald’s translation, found in Nabokov’s two act play, “Death” 
[“Smert’”].202  Aikhenvald’s translation reads thus:  
 There are in boundless space [V bespredel’nom prostranstve] innumerable illuminating  
 spheres; around each of them revolves [vrashchaetsia] about a dozen smaller, illuminated 
 ones; hot within, they are covered by а congealing, cold crust [pokryty zastyvshei,  
 kholodnoi koroi], upon which а varnish of mold [pleseni] engendered living and knowing 
 substances [sushchestv], — thus is empirical truth [istina], the real, the world.203   
 
In Nabokov’s “Death,” the tragic hero, Edmund, essentially soliloquizes Schopenhauer’s view of 
this hard scientific truth:  
   …Science 
   told me: “Here is the world, — and I saw 
   An earthen clod in inconceivable space [v prostranstve nepostizhnom] — 
   A wormy [chervivyi] clod, by rotation [vrashcheniem] rounded, 
   Here by mold [plesen’iu], there by rime [ineem] covered…204 
    
The correspondences between philosophical text and dramatic lines are strongest in the 
characterization of earth as covered in a cold, crusty substance [kholodnaia kora, inei, 
respectively] and in mold [plesen’ in both]; and in the indication that this is what science, or 
empirical truth, says about the world.  Nabokov, who is leery of any finalizing statements on the 
                                                 
 200 He mentions Schopenhauer by name in The Gift (Gift, 246). Dmitry Nabokov, VN’s son, also reports a 
conversation he had with his father where the latter said that “his writing…was all there, ready inside his mind, like 
a film to be developed.  A sensation…akin to Schopenhauer’s vision of events as they unfold.” See Dmitry 
Nabokov, “On Revisiting Father’s Room,” Vladimir Nabokov: A Tribute, Ed. Peter Quennell (New York: William 
Morrow, 1980) 129. 
 201 Andrei Babikov, “Notes,” TGM, 553. 
 202 Published in Rul’ 20, 24 May 1923 (Babikov, 553); according to Bryan Boyd, Nabokov worked on this 
play for three months and completed it in March 1923 (Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years, 204). 
 203 Artur Shopengauer, Sobranie sochinenii, v 6 Tom., Trans. Iu. I. Aikhenval’d (Moskva: Terra, 2001), 
Tom 2, 4. Translation mine. 
 204 Smert’ in Tragediia Gospodina Morna, 80.  Babikov’s discussion of this correspondence is on p. 533. 
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part of empirical truth or science, uses Schopenhauer’s equally doubtful position towards these 
epistemologies in order to characterize Edmund’s scientific cast of mind and — later — his despair 
at the meaninglessness of the world as science would have it.205   
 In any case, as we have suggested before, it is our belief that Nabokov engaged a great 
many of Schopenhauer’s ideas within the context of conversations that he had with Aikhenvald.  
Sometimes it seems that Nabokov responds directly to Schopenhauer’s concerns and other times, 
with certain tropes and motifs, its seems that Nabokov responds to Aikhenvald’s own appropriative 
development of this or that Schopenhauerian line of thought.  Since Nabokov’s responses to 
Aikhenvald’s meditations upon Schopenhauer seem to cluster around concepts and issues of 
intimate concern to Bakhtin, and since Aikhenvald provides a more complete picture of Nabokov’s 
internalization of Schopenhauer (which latter forms a conceptual bridge to Bakhtin), our 
discussion below will look at Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald and Nabokov in a mostly triadic 
relationship of dialogue and influence.   
The one theme within which most of Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald, and Nabokov’s concerns 
criss-cross is the artistic medium of theater in the broadest sense.  It is for this reason that, though 
no other textual evidence of the exact nature of the conversations that occurred in the Aikhenvald-
Tatarinova literary gatherings has been made public besides snippets of Aikhenvald’s reactions 
brought forth by Boyd and the texts of Nabokov’s essays and literary readings, one recurrent topic 
of conversation between Aikhenvald and Nabokov would likely have been theater as an aesthetic 
experience.  Andrey Babikov makes this suggestion by relying on the fact that Aikhenvald himself 
was a theater critic while he lived in Russia, the fact that a great deal of Nabokov’s literary output 
during the first half of the 1920s – a period of time that coincides nearly entirely with his friendship 
                                                 
 205 See, for example, Nabokov’s discussion of science in SO, 44-45. 
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with Aikhenvald – was in the form of plays, and the fact that Nabokov’s father, V.D. Nabokov, 
was himself an avid theater-goer.206 As we shall see below, the theme or motif of theater is a 
metaphor that operates in all three thinkers and writers as an expression of the problem of free-
will.  This problem and its couching in the language of theater also touch on other areas in common 
between Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald and Nabokov: (1) a metaphysical ontology that holds the 
Oneness of consciousness as the most prior category (2) a notion of the material world as derived 
from this category, forming an ontologically subsequent and largely Neoplatonistic duality which 
holds matter inferior to spirit;207 (3) a modernist critique of utilitarian science that holds it as arising 
out of the secondary and inferior category of matter and thus beholden to its concerns (4) an 
advocacy for a return to the monistic category and (5) a belief that artistic Genius is the most 
promising conduit for a return to the primordial One.  In what follows, we will discuss these 
conceptual threads as they tie in with one another thematically in Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald and 




SCHOPENHAUERIAN WILL VS. AIKHENVALDIAN POSHLOST’ 
 All three writers and thinkers under review are bound together by one basic belief – a belief 
in monism. Aikhenvald presents his version of monism in “In Praise of Idleness” [“Pokhvala 
prazdnosti”] in an essay entitled “Immortal Poshlost’.”  This essay relies on Schopenhauer yet also 
addresses concerns specific to the Russian Silver Age. In this essay, Aikhenvald clearly establishes 
                                                 
 206 See Babikov, “Izobretenie teatra” in Tragediia Gospodina Morna…, 15-16  
 207 Spirit here is to be taken in the Greek (ψυχή,  psukhe) or German sense (Geist), which retains both the 
connotation of soul and of intellect. 
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the ontological priority of a spiritual monism, a monism of consciousness: “[t]here is an objective 
trait of the primacy [pervenstvo] of spirit [dukha]: matter is dead, but spirit alive, matter is 
immobile by its own self, but spirit, this is motion, and just as spirit is objectively higher than 
matter, so is life objectively higher than death.”208  Though Aikhenvald presents spirit and matter 
as a dichotomy, he makes sure to privilege and prioritize the spiritual category as a singularity 
over and above the dualistic tension of the (spiritual) one versus the (material) many.  For example, 
in his preface to Silhouettes of Russian Writers, Aikhenvald is clear about the priority of 
consciousness over the material world: “The psychic principle itself is not the progeny, but, on the 
contrary, the creator of life.”209 
 Aikhenvald also establishes a strict association between the aesthetic polarity of “style” vs. 
“stylessness” and the moral polarity of “bravery” vs. “cowardice.”  These two tensions are then 
compared to the plarity between monism and dualism:   
 [monism] needs a decisive ‘one of the two,’ one or the other, but not two, not both, not a  
 deal, not a compromise.  There is beauty and grandeur in one-sidedness; they are inherent 
 to monism […] Monism is bravery, dualism is timidity.  Monism is style, dualism is  
 stylelessness.  Only the world-monolith [mir-monolit] pleases aesthetically.  Monism is  
 more artistic than dualism, because monism is conciseness; dualism is overextension  
 [rastianutost’].  Dualism is “to be or not to be?;” monism is “to be.”  For a choice made  
 is affirmation, and affirmation is life. (51) 
 
 The main thematic thrust of “Immortal Poshlost’” is a philosophical grievance precisely 
against the duality of man’s nature, which to Aikhenvald is the origin of all forms of poshlost’.  
He begins the article by quoting part of the eighth and ninth stanzas of Derzhavin’s panpsychist 
poem, “God.”  In this poem, Derzhavin’s lyrical hero claims that  
 [a] small part of the whole universe I am  
 Placed, methinks, in the honorable  
 Middle [Sredine] of its nature [estestva]  
                                                 
 208 Aikhenvald, “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” Pokhvala prazdnosti, 49.  This and all subsequent translations of 
Aikhenvald, including his quotations of poems by Derzhavin and Tiutchev, into English are mine. 
 209 “Teoreticheskie predpodsylki,” in Siluety russkikh pisatelei, v 3-ekh tt. (Berlin: Slovo, 1929), 1: 7.  
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 where You [i.e. God] corporeal creatures ended  
 Where You heavenly spirits began […] 
 
Chastitsa tseloi ia vselennoi, 
Postavlen, mnitsia mne, v pochtennoi 
Sredine estestva ia toi, 
Gde konchil tvarei ty telesnykh, 
Gde nachal ty dukhov nebesnykh […]210   
 
Aikhenvald then questions: “[t]he inchoate intermediateness [Iznachal’nuiu sredinnost’] to which 
we are sentenced in creation [obrecheny v mirozdanii], our primeval mediocrity 
[posredstvennost’], [these] Derzhavin considers honorable [and] golden.  But is that so?” Though 
“the elements of heaven and earth, spirit and matter, are mixed in me in the highest degree,” this 
mixture makes man’s ontology a confused and diffused one: “Man is an alien body in body; man 
is an alien body in spirit, man is this and that, but neither this nor that.”  I am “not even a Godman, 
but — its strange to say — a Godworm [Bogocherv’]…” 211  Aikhenvald’s bathic inversion of 
Solov’iev’s mystical telos is suggested to him by Derzhavin, who, in panpsychist fashion, declares 
himself to be equally several beings, each of quite different ontological rank: “I am a Tsar, I am a 
slave, I am a worm, I am God [ia tsar’ – ia rab – ia cherv’ – ia bog!]”212  
 Though the “Immortal Poshlost’” Aikhenvald speaks of arises out of man’s dual material-
spiritual nature, there nevertheless appears in the essay the suggestion of a conflation between the 
material pole of the material-spiritual duality and the mediocre nature of the duality itself.  This 
suggestion is seen in another of Aikhenvald’s references to Russian poetry, this time to Tiutchev: 
                                                 
 210 “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 18; translation mine.  See G. R. Derzhavin, Stikhotvorenia (Leningrad: 
Biblioteka poeta, 1957), 116. 
 211 “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 18-22.  
 212 quoted in Aikhenvald, “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 18.  See Derzhavin, 116.  The inversion also points to 
Aikhenvald’s catalytic role in Nabokov’s reception of Schopenhauer: in Nabokov’s paraphrase of Schopenhauer, 
quoted above, he not only refers to the earth as covered in a mixture of a cold and crusty substance and mold à la 
Schopenhauer — earth to Nabokov’s Edmund is also a “wormy [chervivyi] earth.” Nabokov’s worm reference 
seems properly contextualized, for in Aikhenvald, Derzhavin, and Nabokov, ‘worminess’ [chervivost’] represents 
the lower bound of the duality between spirit and matter. 
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“O, if only the live wings of the soul, soaring over the crowd, could save it [the soul] from the 
violence of the deathless poshlost’ of people!” [Akh, kogda b zhivye kryl’ia / Dushi, pariashchei 
nad tolpoi, / Ee spasali ot nasil’ia / Bezmernoi poshlosti liudskoi!].213  Here the impulse of the soul 
to ascend, to fly to the spiritual realm is opposed to what it tries to escape on the ground: the 
violence inherent in the deathless poshlost’ of people.  At the very least, the scope of Aikhenvald’s 
metaphysical drama seems to be refocused onto a new dichotomy: on the one hand there is the 
mediocre, intermediate dual position of man at a relatively inferior position, and, on the other, the 
superior space of an undiluted, pure realm of spirit.  The drama is at times tragic due to the 
seemingly insurmountable distance between positions, yet this drama also includes the hope of an 
eventual bridging of these spaces.   
 Ultimately, the concept of poshlost’ as used by both Aikhenvald and Tiutchev is very close 
to Schopenhauer’s concept of the world will and its multiple manifestations in the phenomenal 
world as presented in the latter’s The World as Will and Representation (1818).  In Schopenhauer, 
as in Aikhenvald, there is a fundamental monism that is occluded by a vexed duality.  There is, on 
the one hand, the One world will, and, on the other, its pluralized and temporalized phenomenal 
manifestations.  The world will is quite literally inherent in every bit of matter: it “appears in every 
blindly acting force of nature;” in the so-called “in-animate” forces — magnetism, gravity, 
chemical reactions, and electricity — in the entire hierarchies of the living (“animate”) kingdoms 
— the microbiotic, the vegetative, the animal, and ultimately and most distinctly, the kingdom of 
man.214  However, the one-world-will does not coincide with the ideal summum bonum that is 
                                                 
 213 Aikhenvald, “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 26.  Aikhenvald quotes the poem “Chemu molilas’ ty s 
liubov’iu…”  See F.I. Tiutchev, “Chemu molilas’ ty s liubov’iu…” in Polnoe sobranie stikhotvorenii (Leningrad: 
Sovetskii pisatel’, 1987), 176. 
 214 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation in two Vols. Vol 1 Trans. E.F.J. Payne 
(New York: Dover, 1969), 110.  Henceforth, the first and second volume of this work will be cited as WaWaR I, x-y; 
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Aikhenvald’s monism — or the monism of Neoplatonism, for that matter.  The one-world-will is 
an endless, blind appetite — digestive, sexual, territorial and temporal.  Aikhenvald probably 
summarized Schopenhauer’s concept best when he said that the will is “[a] blind, unquenchable, 
unconquerable impulse for life, the eternal hunger of existence, the wild and unbridled monster 
[which] reigns in the universe, and any form of reason merely serves it, functioning as its pale 
offspring.”215 Schopenhauer explains that the Will’s appetite is geared toward imposing itself in 
such a way that it is most objectified in phenomenal reality; so that a force of nature or life-form’s 
“Idea” (in modern biological parlance we would speak of a life-form’s genetic code) prevails: 
“…the one will, that objectifies itself in all Ideas, strives for the highest possible objectification, 
and in this case gives up the low grades of its phenomenon after a conflict, in order to appear in a 
higher grade that is so much the more powerful.”216 This endless, blind and eternal striving is the 
main and only cause, according to Schopenhauer, of all conflict:  
 Thus everywhere in nature we see contest, struggle, and the fluctuation of victory, and  
 later on we shall recognize in this more distinctly that variance with itself essential to the  
 will.  Every grade of the will’s objectification fights for the matter, the space, and the  
 time of another.  Persistent matter must constantly change the form, since, under the  
 guidance of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly  
 striving to appear, snatch the matter from one another, for each wishes to reveal its own  
 Idea. […] This universal conflict is to be seen most clearly in the animal kingdom.   
 Animals have the vegetable kingdom for their nourishment, and within the animal  
 kingdom again every animal is the prey and food of some other.  This means that the  
 matter in which an animal’s Idea manifests itself must stand aside for the manifestation of 
 another Idea, since every animal can maintain its won existence only by the incessant  
 elimination of another’s.  Thus the will-to-live generally feasts on itself, and is in   
 different forms its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all  
 others, regards nature as manufactured for its own use.  Yet…this same human race  
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 reveals in itself with terrible clearness that conflict, that variance of the will with itself,  
 and we get homo homini lupus [man is the wolf of man].217 
         
One thing that becomes immediately obvious from the quote above is that Schopenhauer’s Will, 
as manifested in worldly phenomena, is conceptually wider than the metaphysical mediocrity 
imposed upon man by the Aikhevaldian concept of poshlost’.  On the other hand, however, the 
concept of poshlost’ seems to dovetail with much of the Schopenhauerian concept of the will.  
Thus, for example, Aikhenvald talks of “government [as] organized poshlost’” (37).  For 
Schopenhauer “[r]epublics tend to anarchy, monarchies to despotism; the mean of constitutional 
monarchy…tends to government by factions” because of the selfish nature of the will.218  In 
Aikhenvald, the physical body is poshloe: “To the “dark kingdom” of poshlost’ belongs the object 
of our shame — all of the immeasurable offensiveness of our body, without which we cannot be, 
which so rudely and insuperably intrudes into the mountain abodes of the spirit…”219 Aikhenvald 
further explains that this intrusion of the corporeal upon the spiritual is reflected in the 
“interference of the quotidian” (38).  He thus makes a link between the poshloe and what is bodily 
practical and necessary for quotidian living, which is the sine qua non for every physical 
manifestation of the will.  Most importantly, both Schopenhauer (as we saw in the quote above) 
and Aikhenvald (45) consider the will and poshlost’, respectively, to be tied to the instinct of self-
preservation. 
 Ultimately, and most pertinently for the focus of this study, poshlost’ is, for Aikhenvald, 
something that ails verbal art:   
 The unattractive heroine of my essay expands its deadening power even over our best  
 achievement — the human word.  Far from always is it a live and creative process of the  
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 spirit, — on the contrary, more often than not, words come out of our mouth that are  
 already withered [vydokhshiesia], aroma-less [bezukhannie], dry, without timbre and  
 sonority.  Just like effaced, dulled coins, they address the market of the vanity of life  
 [rynke zhiteiskoi suety].  When we pronounce them, our colorless, our stale words, we  
 don’t make them, we don’t mint them anew, we don’t experience them, — and the non- 
 experienced, dead word, this is a poshloe word, and it only sedates the soul.220   
 
Here Aikhenvald expounds a view of verbal art that necessitates a continuous process of creativity 
and re-creation if the word is to stay aesthetically fresh.  However this spiritual and creative effort 
seems to meet constant resistance from creatively lazy poshlost’.  Moreover an attention to the 
vanity of life — the addressing of the word to material existence — also dulls and deadens the 
word.   In Schopenhauer, an attention to material existence and a creative laziness are also 
characteristic of the kind of person that is beholden to his or her will, when he or she attempts 
aesthetic contemplation: “He can direct his attention to things only in so far as they have some 
relation to his will …[H]e is very soon finished…with works of art,… He does not linger; he seeks 
only his way in life, or at most all that might at any time become his way.”221 
Aikhenvald’s poshlost’ is just as eternal as Schopenhauer’s will (it is “without end, without 
beginning”), and just like the will that governs the ordinary man, the poshlost’ of man mechanizes 
and automatizes perception thus turning it into a process that merely prolongs material life:  
it brings into his colors its own rawness, it colors with its owncolorlessness all of his life  
behavior,… Man cannot not be poshl, — herein lies our misfortune.  Even in the most live 
and creative soul there is a zone of soullessness, dead points [tochki], these dangerous 
embryos of ‘dead souls,’ fruitless emptiness [besplodnaia pustota]!  Poshlost’ is a halt, a 
break from creation [tvorchestva], mechanization instead of pathos and activity, 
automatism, and routineness.222 
 
Thus we see that there are many aspects in common between the Schopenhauerian concept of the 
Will and the Aikhenvaldian concept of poshlost’.  Both are eternally immanent forces operating 
                                                 
 220 “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 42. 
 221 WaWaR I, 187. 
 222 “Immortal Poshlost’,” 27. 
 
86 
within man’s nature.  In Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer, man is born already poshlyi and/or with 
the blind desire of the Will, respectively.  Both poshlost’ and the Will deaden man’s potential to 
grasp the beautiful — which both philosopher and his translator implicitly regard as within a 
traditional Platonic framework, i.e., the Beautiful as within the realm of the spirit.  When 
Aikhenvald speaks of “dead points” in man, it is a spiritual, not earthly, deadening, and though the 
spirit in Schopenhauer belongs to that area of his philosophy where he most eschews and rewrites 
the traditional Neoplatonic dualities and dichotomies, he nevertheless retains a Platonic reverence 
for beauty, which the Will deadens in man.  Thus poshlost’ and the Will condition the absence of 
beauty in both Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer.  However, there is one important difference between 
the Will and poshlost’, — the Will’s power extends from the seemingly non-animate, to every 
utilitarian impulse of the animate sphere.  In fact, in positing the concept of a Will that conditions 
every force in the universe, Schopenhauer is promoting a monopsychist view of this universe, 
where everything is infused by one unconscious yet life-giving, life-promoting and life-ending 
motivational force that is the Will.  Thus, though unconscious, the Will, inasmuch as it is a 
motivating desire, is like a dark soul that inhabits all of the universe.  Poshlost’, on the other hand, 
is something inherent only in man, as Aikhenvald, relying on his reading of Derzhavin’s 
categorical break-down, posits man as the only being affected by the pull of matter from one side 
and the pull of the spirit from the other.223  Man, for Aikhenvald, seems to be at a fork in the road 
and is thus tormented by the very same choice that tortured Hamlet — everything else, however, 
is in its place, as they should be, it seems.  Man, for Schopenhauer, along with everything else in 
the universe, is where the Will wants it.  Thus, for Schopenhauer, almost everything is already 
poshloe.  For Aikhenvald, not everything is.  For example, Aikhenvald says that the sexual act can 
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sometimes be poshlyi and sometimes spiritual — for Schopenhauer, all passionate love and sex 
are but apparatus-like extensions of the Will which uses them in order to promulgate itself in time 
and space, endlessly.224 
  
SCHOPENHAUERIAN VS. AIKHENVALDIAN SPIRITUAL SELFLESS LOVE 
Wherever the exact conceptual contours of poshlost’ and the Will converge and diverge, 
Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald are in unison when describing the virtues that man needs to exercise 
in order to escape poshlost’ and the Will.  Both Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald posit that selfless 
love for the other is at the heart of the process that brings about a spiritual denial of the earthly 
plane and a union with the monistic principle.  Schopenhauer says that “…love…leads to 
salvation”225 and that “all love…is compassion or sympathy” (374).  It is a  
real goodness of disposition, a goodness that shows itself as pure, i.e., disinterested, 
affection towards others.  Now where this becomes complete, the individuality and fate of 
others are treated entirely like one’s own…the character that has reached the highest 
goodness and perfect magnanimity will sacrifice its well-being and its life completely for 
the well-being of many others. (375)   
 
Similarly, Aikhenvald says that  
 there is granted the potential victory over “intermediateness” [sredinnost’iu].  It is  
 fulfilled in love, in heroism, in beauty and generosity/goodness [v krasote i dobre], in the  
 victory of the idealist attitude.  There, for example, where for the sake of the noble goal  
 the path of most resistance is chosen and the instinct of self-preservation is tamed, there,  
 where the self-loving voice of the body is muted, there, where the surf of the spiritual  
 wave is high, the sticky web of poshlost’ subsides.226 
 
Note that since both Schopenhauer’s will and Aikhenvald’s poshlost’ condition man’s self-serving 
and self-loving nature, both of their accounts of the negation of the will and of poshlost’, equally 
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involve the denial of the self so as to make way for the affirmation of the other.  In Schopenhauer, 
salvation also has an epistemological component along with the moral one.  For if selfishness, i.e. 
the will fully heeded, is like a veil that solipsizes one morally, that blinds one to the suffering of 
another, then selflessness, i.e. the denial of that will, removes the veil and lets in the knowledge of 
another’s suffering.  Yet epistemology and morality operate in Schopenhauer’s philosophy by way 
of a feed-back loop, for what suppresses or “quiets” the will is precisely “the knowledge of its 
inner conflict and its essential vanity, expressing themselves in the suffering of all that lives.” In 
order to see the suffering other, the Will must be quieted; but in order for the Will to be quieted, 
one must realize that the other suffers.  For Schopenhauer, there are “two paths” of quieting the 
will: one in which “that knowledge [of the conflict and vanity of the will and the suffering that it 
causes] is called forth by suffering which is merely and simply known and freely appropriated by 
our seeing through the principium individuationis,” and one involving “suffering immediately felt 
by ourselves.”  The first path is taken by the artist, the second by the ascetic.227 
 
TROPE OF POET SEER IN SCHOPENHAUER & AIKHENVALD 
 Thus, a creatively aesthetic dimension comes to the fore in Schopenhauer’s account of the 
elimination of the Will in that art or aesthetic seeing is that one form of epistemology that allows 
the artist to sympathize with the other’s suffering without having to go through that suffering him 
or herself.  “[I]n the case of individual persons, knowledge can withdraw from th[e] subjection [of 
the Will], throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of the will, exist purely for itself, simply 
as a clear mirror of the world; and this is the source of art.”228  For Schopenhauer, the full 
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appropriation by this aesthetic vision of suffering in the world requires a genius capacity for 
sympathy and perception: 
 genius is the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception, to lose oneself in   
 perception, to remove from the service of the will the knowledge which originally existed 
 for this service.  In other words, genius is the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own 
 interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently to discard our own personality for a  
 time, in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world, and this is not  
 merely for moments, but with the necessary continuity and conscious thought to enable  
 us to repeat by deliberate art what has been apprehended… (185-186). 
 
Elsewhere, Schopenhauer says that “The man of genius excels” at “recognizing in things their 
Ideas, of divesting [himself] for a moment of [his] personality” (194).  These abilities “enable him 
to retain that thoughtful contemplation necessary for him to repeat what is thus known in a 
voluntary and intentional work, such repetition being the work of art” (195).  Ultimately, in 
Schopenhauer, that same selflessness which conditions a total disengagement with one’s will (and 
ultimately, the will) that is necessary for the pure care and love for the other is needed for the 
creation of true art, which is itself an act of selfless love insofar as it is the reproduction of the 
knowledge of the truth of the world — viz. that all will is suffering.  It is for this reason that 
Schopenhauer holds the Genius Poet in such high esteem in his philosophy.229 In perceiving 
aesthetically what mankind, indeed, what the universe feels and does, the Poet unites with a 
positive monism of pure consciousness that has nothing to do with the One will.  In this pure 
monism of consciousness, the will is denied, seen for what it is, and the aesththetic, perceptual and 
sympathetic frame of the individual is widened to the point where there is no more individual, but 
a pure perceiving subject: 
 [A] knowing individual raises himself in the manner described to the pure subject of  
 knowing, and at the same time raises the contemplated object to the Idea; the world as  
 representation then stands out whole and pure, and the complete objectification of the  
 will takes place, for only the Idea is the adequate objectivity of the will. In itself, the Idea  
 includes object and subject in like manner, for these are its sole form.  In it, however,  
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 both are of entirely equal weight; and as the object also is here nothing but the   
 representation of the subject, so the subject, by passing entirely into the perceived object,  
 has also become that object itself, since the entire consciousness is nothing more than its  
 most distinct image.230 
 
Thus, the individual, through a totalizing perception of the world, sees the whole of it and not its 
parts.  Likewise, the same individual is raised from part to whole by virtue of a totalizing 
perception, as totalized perceiving subject.  Ultimately the final boundary between total subject 
and total object disappears.  The individual is deindividuated.  Along the path toward this totalizing 
perspective, the perceiver realizes the truth of the “inner nature” of the world will.  “If we had to 
convey” Schopenhauer says, “to the beholder, for a reflection and in a word, the explanation and 
information about their inner nature, it would be best for us to use the Sanskrit formula…: “Tat 
tvam asi,” which means “This living thing art thou.”231 (220).  Whatever happens at the point of 
pure henosis in Schopenhauer, whether man is finally granted entrance to heaven or becomes 
nothing, cannot be fully known.232 
 Aikhenvald, in his appropriation and transmutation of the Schopenhauerian process of 
henosis, does not leave much space for an epistemological layer aiding in the process.  However, 
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like Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald does promote a similarly messianic view of artistic Genius as seer 
and ‘world-transcender,’ one who transcends via his (or her) works of art.  Thus Aikhenvald too 
promotes the Romantic trope of the poet as seer.  In a piece on Pushkin, for example, Aikhenvald 
recreates Schopenhauer’s metaphysical drama and Russified it by making Pushkin the genius 
artist.233  Like Schopenhauer’s genius or universal poet, Aikhenvald’s Pushkin is devoid of the 
kind of abstract ratiocinative knowledge that promotes the self: “A free spirit, regally carefree, he, 
as an artist, does not betray a trace of intellectualism, of dry deliberativeness.” What Pushkin does 
command, is a capacity for artistic perception and an access to the beautiful: “Neither intermediary 
[promezhutochnaia] work of thought nor even, on the other hand, the inspiration of sudden purely 
mental revelations make up his work, but unmediated intuition, the inspired attainment of the 
beautiful essence of things, - the divination of beauty…”234   
 Like Schopenhauer’s Genius, Pushkin, loses his individuality through his art.  Aikhenvald 
explains the loss of Pushkin’s individuality by way of the metaphor of effacement.  We can more 
fully appreciate Aikhenvald’s account of Pushkin’s effacement by going back to a conceptual 
analogy that Schopenhauer makes between physiognomies and the degree of the individuality of 
a human being.  He says that “[a]t the higher grades of the will’s objectivity, we see individuality 
standing out prominently, especially in man, as the great difference of individual characters, i.e., 
as complete personality, outwardly expressed by strongly marked individual physiognomy, which 
embraces the whole bodily form.”235  Thus the higher the manifestation of the Will, the more 
individualized one’s consciousness becomes, and this high degree of individualization of 
consciousness is correlated to the uniqueness of one’s physiognomy.  Yet Aikhenvald’s Pushkin 
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manages to roll back the high degree of the manifestation of the will in humans through his love 
and art:  
Pushkin, in his sensitiveness [otsyvchivosti; also: kind-heartedness / tenderness / 
responsiveness] somehow loses his face [litso].236 But ‘divinity’ [bozhestvo] also does not 
have a face.  Definite features, physiognomy is intrinsic only to that which is defined [or 
circumscribed], — the universe  [mirozdanie] does not know them, as a whole.  And 
Pushkin, dissolving into sounds, which reproduce everything, answer to everything, 
precisely in this does he find his own self, his great microcosm.237    
 
 After enumerating the variety of Pushkin’s works, and extolling the poet’s ability to 
translate the spirit of so many foreign authors into an authentic Russian idiom and, thereby, to 
impart into this idiom a measure of the foreignness of these authors, Aikhenvald says that the 
omnipresence that Pushkin commands  
 is the manifestation of all the unity of life, which Pushkin carried within himself and  
 which made lawful and executable his brave entreaty - to disappear in the airy ark, there,  
 in the vicinity of God; this - is the internal, organic communion with whomever’s   
 psychology [priobshchennost’ ko vsiakoi psikhologii].  In the most diverse spheres, under 
 the cover of alien nationalities and speech, over the course of centuries, always and  
 everywhere, Pushkin recognizes the one, all-human [vsecheloviecheskoe] heart   
 sympathetically [or compassionately, sochuvstvenno] and deeply, and integrally   
 [nerazdel’no] experiences its joy and sadness, like Mahadeva [an epithet for Shiva] who  
 assumes human form, in order to experience all of people’s happiness and grief   
 himself. (4-5)   
 
Here we see a clear and strong parallel between Aikhenvald’s conception of Pushkin and 
Schopenhauer’s conception of the poet genius or universal poet.  Both Aikhenvald’s Pushkin and 
Schopenhauer’s poet see a “unity of life.”  Both of these are also capable of a “communion with 
the psychology of whomever.”  Aikhenvald’s Pushkin sympathizes with the all-human heart and 
Schopenhauer’s poet sings and writes of “all that has ever moved a human heart.”  Ultimately, 
Pushkin is, for Aikhenvald, like the avatar of an Indian god that wishes to experience “people’s 
happiness and grief himself.” There is no doubt that Aikhenvald’s conception of Pushkin is under 
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the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophical deployment of the Mahavakya, Tat tvam asi, for 
Aikhenvald invokes this line of thought in Schopenhauer directly: “As Schopenhauer notes, 
repeating a piece of Indian wisdom, — the egotist to all that which is external to his personality, 
to all that which is not he, squeamishly says: This I am not, this I am not; he who sympathizes, in 
all nature hears the thousandfold call: Tat tvam asi — this is you, this is also you.”238 
 
THEATER IN SCHOPENHAUER, AIKHENVALD, NABOKOV   
During the time that Aikhenvald and Nabokov both lived in Berlin, the Nabokov seems to 
have treated theater as an earnest genre, at least at the beginning of his career.  Theater was, in 
fact, Nabokov’s genre of choice before he turned to prose.  During the early 1920s, Nabokov wrote 
such plays as “The Wanderers” [Skital’tsy] (1923; written in 1921), “Death” [Smert’] (1923), 
“Grandad” [Dedushka] (1923), “Agasfer” (1923), “The Pole” [Polius] (1924), “The Tragedy of 
Mister Morn” [Tragediia gospodina Morna] and “The Man from the USSR” [Chelovek is 
SSSR].239 A review of Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald and Nabokov’s views on (as well as the latter’s 
experimentation with) theater indeed reveals that, on the one hand, Aikhenvald adapted 
Schopenhauer’s theatrical metaphor to convey a pessimistic theory of theater and that, on the other 
hand, Nabokov appropriated Schopenhauer’s theatrical metaphor along with its intended usage but 
also developed a new theatrical metaphor along Schopenhauerian lines that contradicts 
Aikhenvald’s theory.240  Ultimately, Nabokov’s deployment of the theatrical motifs combine to 
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narrate philosophical themes (monism, spiritual-material duality, the monizing teleology that 
concludes with the deindividuation of the individual) common to Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer.  
These motifs revolve around some generalized aspects of theater, such as acting, masks, the idea 
of taking on another identity, as well as specific types of theater such as Commedia dell’arte and 
puppet theater, in which Schopenhauer saw quintessentially human motivations and behaviors that 
never really change across the ages.  This lack of change thus points to the eternal success of the 
will or of human poshlost’ in shackling human beings to the same circuitous patterns of human 
behavior which prevents them from escaping the basis of these behaviors, i.e. their base, dark 
nature, and moving on to something loftier.    
 Behind Schopenhauer’s theatrical metaphor is a conception of history as totally 
meaningless with respect to positive political, and/or metaphysical, institutional outcomes.  
History for Schopenhauer is the mere playground for the predictable sequence of the 
manifestations of the will.  The progression of history is not merely due to blind chance, but to the 
seemingly accidental motivations and conflicts of the will.  Since the will (the Idea) is the only 
thing that underlies history, history is but the same kind of theater over and over again:  
 In the many different forms and aspects of human life, and in the interminable change of  
 events,…only the Idea [is] abiding and essential, [it is that] in which the will-to-live has  
 its most perfect objectivity, and which shows its different sides in the qualities, passions,  
 errors, and excellences of the human race, in selfishness, hatred, love, fear, boldness,  
 frivolity, stupidity, slyness, with, genius, and so on.  All of these, running and congealing 
 together into a thousand different forms and shapes (individuals), continually produce the 
 history of the great and the small worlds, where in itself it is immaterial whether they are  
 set in motion by nuts or by crowns.  Finally, he will find that in the world it is the same as 
 in the dramas of Gozzi, in all of which the same persons always appear with the same  
 purpose and the same fate.  The motives and incidents certainly are different in each  
 piece, but the spirit of the incidents is the same.  The persons of one piece know nothing  
 of the events of another, in which, of course, they themselves performed.  Therefore, after 
 all the experiences of the earlier pieces, Pantaloon has become no more agile or generous, 
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 Tartaglia no more conscientious, Brighella no more courageous, and Columbine no more  
 modest.241 
 
Elsewhere, Schopenhauer extends the determinism inherent in the Commedia dell’arte stock 
characters and plots to the generically related puppet and marionette theater.  As long as man is 
within the tangles of the will, man’s actions are always determined, and in this all of his movements 
are like a marionette, where the motions are coordinated by something beyond him, but not by 
him.  In the second volume of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer says that  
 The intellect of the normal man, strictly bound to the service of the Will, and therefore  
 really only occupied with the apprehension of motives, may be regarded as a complex  
 system of wires, by means of which each of these puppets is set in motion in the theater  
 of the world. From this arises the dry, grave seriousness of most people, which is   
 surpassed only by that of the brutes, who never laugh.242  
 
Ultimately, only genial perspicacity and capacity for contemplation can cut through these wires: 
 On the other hand, we might compare the genius, with his unfettered intellect, to a living  
 man playing along with the large puppets of the famous puppet-show at Milan, who  
 would be the only one among them who would understand everything, and would  
 therefore gladly leave the stage for a while to enjoy the play from the boxes—that is the  
 perspicacity of genius.243 
 
Schopenhauer’s conception of human history as farcical theater — as Commedia dell’arte or as 
puppet theater — could have provided both Aikhenvald and Nabokov with a philosophical 
metaphor with which to express Silver Age concerns in critical essays and literary works.  In 
“Negation of Theater,” Aikhenvald moves the underlying assumption of Schopenhauer’s 
assessment of history as bound to the blind, yet theatrical, will to a view of theater as similarly 
                                                 
 241 WaWaR I, 183. The present discussion of Schopenhauer’s metaphor for theater is a summary of 
Senderovich and Shvart’s argument in “‘If We Put Our Heads…”.   All Schopenhauer quotes from this point until 
before our exposition of Aikhenvald’s thoughts on theater appear in Senderovich and Shvart’s article.  We have 
found it necessary to incorporate their argument here as the purpose of this chapter is to solidify and give nuance to 
the connection and comparison between Shopenhauer and Nabokov, a project originitiated by these two scholars.  
Their discussion is thus a necessary prolegomenon. 
 242 WaWaR II, 386. 
 243 WaWaR II, 386. 
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bound to the will of literature.  Aikhenvald’s discussion is especially interesting for this study in 
his focus on actors’ lack of free-will: 
 However talented an actor may be, he follows another’s order, he fulfills another’s plan  
 [tema]: the actor is deprived of initiative, — can one, however, think of an artist without  
 initiative [bez initsiativy, bez pochina,], without self-will, an unfree artist?  The book  
 orders the actor, and all that he speaks and feels and does has been foreordained.  His  
 hands had been tied, his soul had been commissioned; he listens carefully to the   
 prompter-author. 244  
 
Some of Aikhenvald’s comments à propos the lack of the actors’ free will sound positively 
Bakhtinian.  For example, he says that the actor is “[s]entenced to the author, passive and obedient 
down to the root, the sacrifice of aesthetic fatalism,” and that he “does not have the most important 
thing [ne imeet glavnogo]: he does not have his own words [u nego net svoikh slov]”245  Further 
into his “Negation of Theater,” Aikhenvald’s discussion of actors and their lack of free will echoes 
one of the main themes of the Moscow Psychological Society and, indeed, of Bakhtin: the critique 
of the cultural reduction of man into an object.  Aikhenvald says that  
 A man [chelovek] is himself already a work of art, of divine art.  And he resists  
 insuperably, with his soul, with his organism, with his independent reality, to be  
 looked at, as material, to be made into something else, — for example, Salvini  
 into Othello.  Salvini is himself greater than Othello, Ermolova is greater than the  
 virgin from Orleans.  Man is the limit.  Man is a goal, and not a means [sredstvo];  
 theater looks at its own people, as means, and while people develop more and  
 more frequently it endures in this an essential wreck, — and here Gordon Craig,  
 as I have already said, wants to substitute uncomfortable and disobedient people  
 with comfortable and obedient marionettes. 246 
 
Aikhenvald’s mention of Gordon Craig, the English theater director and theorist, who collaborated 
with Konstantin Stanislavsky in the Moscow Art Theater production of Hamlet from 1910 to 1912, 
                                                 
 244 Iulii I. Aikhenval’d, “Otritsanie teatra,” 16. 
 245 Iulii I. Aikhenval’d, “Otritsanie teatra,” 16. 
 246 Iulii I. Aikhenval’d, “Otritsanie teatra,” 24. 
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is significant because of this theater theorist’s views on acting.247  Gordon Craig famously said 
“there is only one actor — nay one man who has the soul of the dramatic poet, and who has ever 
served as the true and loyal interpreter of the poet.  This is the Marionette.”248  
 Nabokov’s own thematic engagement with the theatrical metaphor for free-will also runs 
deep, according to Senderovich and Shvarts, who have written extensively on the topic.249 One of 
their articles, devoted to this engagement in the light of Schopenhauer’s influence, lists a plethora 
of Nabokov’s allusions, puns, and structural parallels to the motifs of puppets, marionettes, and to 
the metaphysical metaphor of the world as a stage in Invitation to a Beheading (Priglashenie na 
kazn’, 1936).250 In the next chapter, we would like to solidify, extend and nuance Senderovich and 
Shvarts’ argument of Schopenhauer’s influence upon Nabokov by examining several of his works: 
his early play The Tragedy of Mister Morn (Tragediia Mistera Morna, written in 1923-24, 
published 2012), Despair (Otchaianie, 1934), Invitation to a Beheading (Priglashenie na kazn’, 
1936), The Real Life of Sebastian Knight (1941) and Lolita (1955).  Our goal in this chapter will 
be to (1) demonstrate how pervasive Schopenhauer’s ideas were in Nabokov’s first extensive 
work, The Tragedy of Mister Morn.  Since it was composed during the early years of Nabokov’s 
acquaintance with Aikhenvald (1923-1924), the play will offer us a sort of a litmus test with which 
to compare older texts, such as Despar and Lolita in order to see how Nabokov’s engagement with 
Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer changed over time. Then we will (2) demonstrate the operation of 
                                                 
 247 for this production of Hamlet, see Laurence Senelick, Gordon Craig’s Moscow Hamlet: a 
reconstruction (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). 
 248 Edward Gordon Craig, The Theatre Advancing (New York: Benjamin Blom, Inc., 1963), 107.  
 249 Besides their “‘If We Put Our Heads…,” see also their articles “The Juice of Three Oranges: An 
Exploration of Nabokov's Language and World,” in Nabokov Studies 6 (2000/2001), 75-124; “The Tongue, That 
Punchinello: A Commentary on Nabokov's Pnin,” in Nabokov Studies 8 (2004), 23-42; “Verbnaia shtuchka,” in 
Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 24 (1997), 93-110; 26 (1997), 201-222, “Balagan smerti: Zametki k roman 
Nabokova Bend Sinister,” in I. Belobrovtseva , A. Danilevskii et al., eds., Kul’tura russkoi diaspory: Vladimir 
Nabokov — 100: Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii (Talinn - tartu, 14 -17 ianvaria 1999) (Tallinn: TPU Kirjastus, 
200), 356-370. 
 250 See “‘If We Put Our Heads…,”) 
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Schopenhauer’s ideas in the rest of these works, with special emphasis upon Despair and Lolita.  
Lastly, we will (3) show how the engagement with Schopenhauer’s ideas occurred within the 
context of a dialogue with Aikhenvald.  Ultimately, the furthering of Senderovich and Shvarts’ 
thesis will establish a strong rationale for the execution of one of the central tasks of this study: to 
use Schopenhauer as a conceptual bridge through which to compare Bakhtin and Nabokov.  The 




















CHAPTER THREE: NABOKOV’S THEATER OF THE WILLS 
 One of the most obvious indications that The Tragedy of Mister Morn seems to be 
engaged with a view of theater as a metaphor for determinism can be found in the character’s 
very names.251  The play is about a masked King with a double identity, known to his friends as 
Mr. Morn, and whose name is transparent in English and is probably, according to Babikov, an 
allusion to “the personification of morning in Hamlet.”252 Morn’s kingdom is under threat of 
attack by the revolutionary, Tremens, which, in Russian, is an anagram of smerten, i.e. 
‘mortal.’253  Dandilio, who is almost a spectator himself of all the drama that engulfs the realm 
and Mr. Morn, takes his name from the dandelion. 254 As Karshan noted above, Dandilio is an 
artistic sketch of Aikhenvald.  Klian, “who lauds Tremen’s violence,” seems to be named after 
Clio (also Cliia), the muse who glorifies.255   Midia, Morn’s lover and wife to Ganus, has 
bewitched both and hence probably owes her name, according to Gennadi Barabtarlo, to the 
enchantress of Greek mythology, Medea.  Barabtarlo also suggests that Midia’s jealous husband, 
Ganus, derives his name from either Janus (the two-faced God of doors, beginnings and ends) or 
                                                 
 251 For other studies on The Tragedy of Mister Morn, see Gennadi Barabtarlo, “Nabokov’s trinity: On the 
movement of Nabokov’s themes),” in Nabokov’s Fiction: New Perspectives, ed. Julian Connolly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 114-115; Siggy Frank, “Exile in Theatre/Theatre in Exile: Nabokov’s Early 
Plays, Tragediia Gospodina Morna and Chelovek iz SSSR,” in Slavonic and East European Review (October 2007), 
629-657; A. Iu. Meshchanskii, “‘Tragedia Gospodina Morna’ kak predtecha russkoiazychnoi prozy V.V. 
Nabokova,” in Voprosy filologii 11 (2002), 100-108; and R.V. Novikov, “‘Tragediia Gospodina Morna’ V. 
Nabokova: k poetike ‘p’esy-snovideniia,’ in Maloizvestnye stranitsy I novye kontseptsii istorii russkoi literatury XX 
v.: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Moskva” ed. L.F. Alekseeva and V.A. Skripkina (Moscow: 
Moscow State Open University, 2003), 181-187. 
 252 See Babikov, “Primechaniia,” TGM…, 573. See also Vladimir Nabokov, The Tragedy of Mister Morn, 
trans. Thomas Karshan and Anastasia Tolstoy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013).    
 253 Babikov, 32.  
 254 Ibid. Nabokov, in his synopsis of the play — included in the Azbuka edition of the play — says that 
Dandilio (though he spells his name differently, Dendileo) is “all soft and light, like a dandelion.”  Later, in a sketch 
of the characters’ personalities, Nabokov says that he has “a soul, like a dandelion.”  In the play itself, Morn calls 
Dandilio a “carefree dandelion.”  See Tragediia Gospodina Morna, 283, 305, 199, respectively. 
 255 Babikov, 32.  
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Jason the Argonaut.256  Though it is possible that Nabokov wanted to have these two 
interpretations open, it is clear that Ganus suffers something akin to Hamlet’s indecision and 
because of this he has “two faces:” he vacillates between being a revolutionary and going along 
with Morn’s peaceful political order; wishing to kill Morn out of jealousy and joining a 
monastery.  According to Barabtarlo, Edmin, Morn’s erstwhile loyal, and later unfaithful, 
servant, derives his name from the “root of the word attendant [prisluzhivaiushchii],” i.e. 
“admin.”257  Curiously, neither Babikov nor Barabtarlo give an etymology for Ella’s name, 
though this sensitive and artistic character is perhaps one of the more significant in terms of the 
play’s metaphysical undertones.  
 It could be argued that the naming of the characters in the play, which harks to the 
Russian literary tradition of “talking names,” of names that define the character, is a specific nod 
at Commedia dell’arte stock characters who have set behaviors and motivations.  What is clear is 
that the “talking” aspect indicates a presupposition of the character’s personalities and actions as 
determined – with a few notable exceptions – from the perspective of the play’s frame. 258  This 
determinism approximates both Schopenhauer’s analogy of human beings bound by their will to 
actors, puppets, or marionettes bound to their roles or strings, and to Aikhenvald’s view of 
theater and its actors as bound to a script written by someone else.  As we just hinted, not all the 
characters are unaware of their nature as parts playable by actors.  These characters’ awareness 
contrasts sharply with other characters’ lack of awareness of their natures. This awareness, 
coming from certain characters but also from the plot and props, is seen through the motif of the 
‘mask,’ and in chance lines of dialogue. 
                                                 
 256 Gennadi Barabtarlo, Sverkaiushchii obruch: O dvizhushchei sile u Nabokova (Sankt-Peterburg: 
Giperion, 2003), 261-262. 
 257 Barabtarlo, 262.  
 258 See Barabtarlo, 261.  
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 Mister Morn in particular demonstrates an awareness of his ‘created’ status several times 
during the play.259  It is perhaps due to this awareness that he judges situations aesthetically.  For 
example, he draws attention to the eternal nature of literary triangles.  He says   
  that in eternity all is eternal— 
  the genius’s thought and the neighbor’s  
  joke, the bewitched suffering of Tristan 
  and the most fleeting love […]260 
  
Babikov reminds us that after drinking a love potion, the Arthurian hero, Tristan, falls in love 
with Isolde, who was promised to king Mark.  “It is curious,” Babikov says, “that in the previous 
act Tremens reads Morn's name in Midia’s letter as ‘Mark.’  This is preceded by Midia’s words 
‘I am unhappy.’  In this way, Morn is correlated not with Tristan, but with King Mark, with 
whom Isolde was unhappy; the role of Tristan in the ‘tragedy’ is delegated to Edmin.”261  Morn’s 
philosophical aparte suggests a vaguely Neoplatonic or perhaps Aikhenvaldian or even a 
Shopenhauerian metaphysics.  Morn is not merely drawing an analogy between one literary love 
triangle and the situation in which he himself is involved – he gives a shorthand for all love 
triangles, including his, using a famous one as a symbol.  Thus the whole dynamic of interactions 
and emotions that make up a love triangle – infatuation, infidelity, and heartbreak – the very 
ones exemplified in the play Morn inhabits, are made banal by the very fact of their 
repetitiveness or eternality.  Morn, who has experienced both passion and “fleeting love” with 
Midia, is aware of his situation’s status as a cliché.  
 As for the motif of the masks, or costumes, there are three instances where these appear 
in the play.  In the first act of the play, Ella helps Ganus, an escaped convict, disguise himself as 
                                                 
 259 See TToMM, 64 and 103-104 for scenes where Tremens and Morn refer directly to their theatrical 
ontologies. 
 260 TToMM, 107. 
 261 Babikov, “Primechaniia,” in TGM, 573; translation mine.  
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Othello in order to be able to approach his wife at a party.  Ganus and Ella arrive to the party in 
the second act, where he sees Midia consorting with Morn.  Yet from the moment that Ganus 
begins to feel jealous, it becomes obvious that he is oblivious to the fact that he is re-playing the 
role of the jealous husband.262  Another occurrence of the “disguise-within-the-play” motif 
involves Klian and Dandilio.  Late in the play, after counter-revolutionaries reverse Tremens’ 
coup d’état, Klian hides in Dandilio’s house.  Dandilio offers Klian a choice between a 
‘shrovetide’ mask and a false beard and glasses to help him escape.263 
Morn too wears a mask in his role as king.  The mask he wears is the triangular Venetian 
bauta mask, frequently utilized by the Captain, one of the characters in Commedia dell’arte.264   
It seems that Mister Morn’s alter ego wears the mask because it confers him power.  At the end 
of the play, the masked Mister Morn says “[a]ll my power lay in my mysteriousness…”265  In the 
play’s synopsis, Tremens says that “this mysteriousness gives him a new power, which not one 
king [before him] had.”266  Yet the mask that he wears as king blurs Morn’s identity in 
appearance only, for Morn possesses magical powers that allow him to become who he is 
normally not.  Late in the play, Morn confesses to Midia: 
  I was — how shall I say? — an enchanter [volshebnikom], 
  a hypnotist…I read thoughts…I predicted fate, 
  twirling my crystal; 
  beneath my fingers the oak table rocked  
  like the deck of a ship, and the dead sighed, 
  spoke through my larynx, and the kings 
  of bygone ages inhabited me…267  
 
                                                 
 262 TToMM, 186. 
 263 TToMM, 116. 
 264 Tragediia…, 159.  Babikov explains the origin in his commentary, 571.   
 265 TToMM, 140; Tragediia…, 277. 
 266 Tragediia…, 282, translation mine. 
 267 TToMM, 107-108; Tragediia…, 244. 
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Thus in wearing his black bauta mask, Mister Morn-as-king not only hides his identity as king 
but communes and/or merges in some way with “the kings of bygone ages.”  This communion 
renders Morn the litsedei (actor) faceless in a metaphysical sense.268  If we were to read Morn’s 
masked communion with others through Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s thoughts on 
metaphysical communion and physiognomies (litsa), Mister Morn’s facelessness or “facial 
occlusion” (with a mask) renders him symbolically divine insofar as definite, individualized 
physiognomies are (in Schopenhauer) a sign of a heightened objectification of the will upon the 
individual and only the divestment of this individuality — symbolized by the loss of face (litso) 
in Aikhenvald’s Pushkin — can lead toward a selfless care for the other.  Needless to say, 
Morn’s ability to commune, and, as it were, unite, with kings of bygone ages strongly suggests a 
metaphysics of a monism of consciousness.   
Suggestive as Morn’s ability to commune with all past kings may be of a metaphysical 
monism of consciousness, this hint of monism is still surpassed by one of the central moments in 
the play.  The moment occurs when Ella has an epiphanic realization of the nature of reality and 
of her love for Ganus.  In Act 1, Scene 2, Ella sees how her efforts in disguising Ganus to help 
him gain access to Midia have failed, and resolves to try to do more:   
  How strange… my heart suddenly sang out:  
  I would give my whole life for this man  
  to be happy… a kind of light breeze  
  has passed by, and now I feel capable  
  of the most humble feat [tikhii podvig]. My poor Moor! 
  I’m such a fool, why did I bring him with me?  
  I never noticed before — only just now,  
  in feeling jealousy on his behalf [revnuia za nego],  
  did I at long last see that some secret  
  reverberating sound connects Midia  
  to swift Morn… All this is strange…269 
                                                 
 268 The word litsedei contains the word for face, litso.  We see the word applied to Ganus in the Othello 
scene at the very beginning of act two; see TToMM, 161. 




Ella’s selflessness is evident in her desire to give away precisely her self, her life for the 
happiness of Ganus.  Her sympathy (in Russian, sochuvstvie, “co-feeling”) or compassion arises 
precisely from her feeling the same feeling that Ganus feels.  Ultimately, it is in feeling his 
emotion that the truth of Morn’s liaision with Midia is revealed to her.  In Act 3, Scene 2, Ella 
has another, stronger moment of epiphany also preceded by the emotion of compassion: 
 Ella:  
    The other day all the squares  
  gazed at the sky… Laughter, screams, howls  
  of fury [dosady]… Saving themselves from the flames,  
  the flyers [letuny] soared up from all directions, came  
  together like crystal swallows, and quietly  
  the shimmering flock slipped away. One  
  fell behind and froze for a moment above 
  the tower, as though he had left his nest there,  
  and then unwillingly caught up his sorrowful  
  companions, — and all of them melted away  
  into a crystal dust in the sky  … I realized,  
  when they had disappeared, when in my eyes  
  swam blinding circles — from the sun —  
  I suddenly realized… that I love you… 
 
  [Pause. ELLA looks out of the window.] 
 Ganus: 
  I have remembered!… Ella, Ella… How frightening!… 
 Ella: 
  No, no, no— keep silent, dear. I look  
  at you, I look into the palace garden,  
  I look into myself, and now I know  
  that all is one: my love and the raw sun,  
  your pale face and the bright trickling icicles  
  beneath the roof, the amber spot upon 
  the porous sugary snow mound, the raw sun  
  and my love, my love…270 
   
As we can see from the two passages quoted above, Ella’s epiphanies follow a similar process: 
sympathy with the other brings about a realization about the world at large.  It is upon witnessing 
                                                 
 270 TToMM, 86-87; Tragediia…,   
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how the lone crystal-plane pilot hesitated above what could have been a “nest” (the pilot’s 
family?) before continuing his or her escape from the flames that Ella comes to the realization of 
her love for Ganus.  Her openness to the world allows her to detect suffering, and this openness, 
in turn, allows her to feel and profess a love that, judging by her past words and actions, would 
not seem to be anything but selfless.  Ultimately, the unity that Ella sees in the world and of 
which she herself is a part is more inclusive than Morn’s communion with kings of yore.  Also, 
her epiphanic process is more reminiscent of the process that Schopenhauer’s genius poet 
undergoes.  If we remember, in Schopenhauer, it is sympathy or compassion that allows the poet 
genius realize that Tat tvam asi, that is, that the self is literally everything in the universe.    
 Besides the suggestion of Schopenhauerian monistic metaphysics in Ella’s serial 
epiphanies, there are other moments in The Tragedy of Mister Morn that are also more 
suggestive of Aikhenvaldald’s literary take on metaphysics.  After seeing the remains of Morn’s 
quarters in the aftermath of Tremen’s coup d’état, Ganus laments: 
  A single thought torments me: here lived a hero… 
  these mirrors are sacred: they looked on him… 
  He sat here, in this mighty chair. His footsteps  
  linger in the palace, like the step of a hexameter  
  dwindling in one’s memory … Where did he die?  
  Where did his shot ring out? Who heard it?  
  Perhaps it was out there, outside the city,  
  in a mournful oak forest [dubrave], in the snows of night… 
  and his pale friend buried the hot corpse  
  in a drift of snow… Sin, inconceivable sin,  
  how can I expiate you? All of my blood  
  is grateful for the death of my rival and yet  
  all of my soul curses the death of the King… 
  We are duplicitous [dvoistvenny], we’re blind — and it is hard  
  to live, trusting only in life: earthly life  
  is a murky translation from the divine original;  
  the general thought is clear but the primordial [pervorodnoi] 
  music is missing in its words…What are passions?  
  Mistakes in the translation. What is love?  
  a rhyme lost in transmission to our discordant [nesozvuchnyi] 
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  language…It’s time for me to take up the original [podlinnik]!… 
  My dictionary? One simple little book with a cross  
  on its cover…I’ll seek out the stony arches, there,  
  where the respite of prayer and the full breath  
  of the soul will teach me the pronunciation of life…(84 / 220). 
 
In this passage we see that Ganus’s language is suggestive of the “poshlyi” metaphysical duality 
of man that Aikhenvald describes in “Immortal Poshlost’.”  In Karshan and Tolstoy’s English, 
Ganus says that “we,” i.e., mankind, are duplicitous; but in Russian, Ganus’s language seems 
borrowed straight from Aikhenvald: “We” are dvoistvenny, i.e. dualistic, doubled, ambiguous.  
In Aikhenvald “we” are dvoistvenny because “we” are eternally drawn in two separate directions, 
the material and the spiritual, which leaves us inert in the poshloe position of man.  Ganus seems 
to reproduce this logic when he says that it was his blood, i.e. his material self, that desired 
Morn’s death whereas his soul cursed his death.  Ganus goes on to couch man’s duality 
[dvoistvennost’] in a literary-metaphysical metaphor that, again, reflects Aikhenvald’s conflation 
of man’s ontological duality and the duality inherent in man’s verbal art.  This merging of the 
ontological and aesthetic, the metaphor of one through the other is evident when Aikhenvald 
says that man “is hopelessly styleless.”271  For Aikhenvald, as mentioned in our discussion in 
chapter 2, the poshlost’ of man’s duality deadens not only man, it deadens man’s language.  
Once the creativity of language is deadened, words are “withered, aroma-less, dry, without 
timbre and sonority;” they are “effaced, dulled coins” that “address the market of the vanity of 
life.”  “We don’t experience” dead words; they are “colorless,” and “stale.” 272  In Ganus’s 
“paraphrase,” life is an artless translation of a metaphysical ideal.  The passions and love are 
botched translations and transpositions from the world of the spirit into the world of matter.  
Ultimately, for Ganus, man himself is a faulty translation from a pure original.  Thus Ganus 
                                                 
 271 “Bessmertnaia poshlost’,” 20. 
 272 Ibid., 42, 51. 
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seeks to contemplate and disclose the divine “original” [podlinnik] of earthly life, the primordial 
music or rhythm, and to attempt a translation that would somehow eliminate the poshlost’ of 
mistranslation.   
 Opposite Morn, Ganus and Ella, with their tendency to bring about good deeds for others, 
stands Tremens, the leader of the revolutionaries in the play.273  Tremens, however, is not 
looking for political reform through violent means; he seeks revolution and violence for their 
own sake.  
Although Tremens is an ideologue of sorts, his is not an ideology that has anything to do with 
any utilitarian principles.  His destructive spirit does not even pretend to aspire to lofty goals.  
Yet neither is Tremens searching for something pettily egoistic.  He uses language reminiscent of 
Aikhenvald (“mediocrity” [posredstvennost’], “baseness” [poshlost’]) to characterize the 
pettiness of the “criminal” revolutionaries that he followed and whose slogans he mouthed, from 
whom he, nevertheless, distinguishes himself. 274  Instead Tremens’ drive for destruction is both 
generalized and conceptual in nature.  He desires destruction for its own sake and for its own 
benefit.  Far from being a simple rampaging madman, however, Tremens justifies his plans and 
actions by explaining that the universe is but an eternal process of entropy.  If anything, Tremens 
seems more like an agent that represents a universal force of destruction: 
the King is a great sorcerer [charodei]. Agreed. 
The sun has swollen the taut granaries,  
the wonders of science are accessible to all,  
labour is lightened by the play of hidden forces,    
and the air is clean in the warbling workshops—  
with all this I agree. But why do we  
always want to grow, to climb uphill [vzbirat’sia v goru] 
from one to a thousand, when the downward path—  
from one to zero— is faster and sweeter? Life  
                                                 
 273 Morn, for example, brought about the end of “Ugliness, boredom, blood” [Urodstvo, skuka, krov’] in his 
kingdom; see TToMM, 24-25. 
 274 TToMM, 16-17; Tragediia…, 151-152.  
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itself is the example— it rushes headlong  
into ash, it destroys everything in its way:  
first it gnaws through the umbilical cord,  
then tears up plants and birds [plody i ptits] into shreds, 
and our heart beats inside us like a greedy hoof,  
till it smashes through our chest  …   And the poet,  
who breaks up his thoughts into sounds? Or  
the maiden, who prays for the blow [udare] of a man’s love?  
Everything, Ganus, is destruction. And  
the faster it is, the sweeter, the sweeter…(18 / 153) 
 
In this “manifesto,” Tremens brings to mind aspects inherent in both Schopenhauer’s conception 
of the will and in Aikhenvald’s concept of poshlost’.  The images of life “gnaw[ing] through the 
umbilical cord,” and of life “tearing up plants and birds [plody i ptits] into shreds,” seem to go 
along perfectly with Schopenhauer’s view of life as constant striving — a striving that frequently 
resorts to the violent assertion of the self through the consumption of other life matter (plants, 
animals) in order to allow for the continuity of biological survival.  The mention of the poet who 
breaks up his thoughts into sounds resonates with Ganus' epiphany, later in the play, about the 
world’s status as a bad translation from a heavenly original.  The image of the poet, just as 
Ganus’ epiphany, is also redolent of Aikhenvald’s discussion of the “poshlification” of an artistic 
language that has lost its creative freshness.  Ultimately, Tremen’s vision of eternal destruction 
evokes Schopenhauer’s view of the will of a particular living entity, which is always striving 
towards death: it “toils on laboriously until this phenomenon perishes, and then others eagerly 
seize its place and its matter.”275  
Although more can be said about The Tragedy of Mister Morn as a possible response to 
Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald, the above discussion will have to suffice.276  We have touched on 
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only the most salient aspects of the play, that is, the most responsive to Aikhenvald’s and 
Schopenhauer’s concerns.  Schopenhauer’s will and Aikhenvald’s poshlost’, for example, are 
paralleled strikingly by Tremens’ ideology, which sees in destruction both the vulgarization of 
artistic language and the entropy inherent in the very drives that propel life.  On the other hand, 
Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s metaphysical event marking the poet genius’ merging with the 
world upon achieving a selfless love for the other is paralleled by Ella’s selfless act of love and 
her own epiphany that all is one.  Morn’s masked communion with kings of yore is also an event 
marking the singularization of plural consciousnesses.  What is significant about Morn’s own 
communion is the catalytic role played by his anonymity or facelessness.   
Nabokov’s play, however, diverges from Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s aesthetico-
metaphysical narrative in significant ways.  The divergences concern the theatrical metaphors 
established by Schopenhauer and by Aikhenvald.  With Schopenhauer, as we saw above, the 
metaphor of the “world as stage” is strictly linked to two (though related) kinds of theatrical 
genres: Commedia dell’arte theater and puppet theater.  People who lead life under the direct 
control of the will are, for Schopenhauer, but Pantaloons, Tartaglias, Brigellas, and Columbines; 
masked stock characters who portray the same kinds of emotions, play after play.  Or these same 
people are like puppets played by the Will as the puppeteer.  Aikhenvald, who nods at 
Schopenhauer when he says that the poshlyi life is like a “Devil’s vaudeville,” applies the latter’s 
logic to the relationship between theater and literature: the former is but a puppet of the latter.  
While Schopenahauer says that those ignorant of the world’s truth are unwittingly acting 
according to an unknown script, Aikhenvald says that because actors always act according to a 
script, i.e. literature, it lacks the latter’s vibrant creativity and independence.  Ultimately, if we 
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reconcile the aesthetics of Aikhenvald’s “Negation of Theater” and “Immortal Poshlost’,” acting 
is but a poshlyi recreation of literature. 
 Despite the fact that Nabokov alters Schopenhauer’s theatrical motif by employing the 
“world is a stage” metaphor with other generic and literary examples in place of Commedia 
dell’arte, Nabokov seems nevertheless to be evoking the germ of the meaning of Schopenhauer’s 
theatrical metaphor: Midia, Edmin, and Ganus’ actions have all been known before in literature 
and, therefore, fit the category of the aesthetic-ethical cliché.  For Schopenhauer as well as 
Nabokov, art and morals can only be furthered by the expulsion of such clichés.  One major 
divergence from Schopenhauer’s theatrical motif as well as Aikhenvald’s assumptions about 
acting is seen in Nabkov’s relegation of the semiotics of masks and masquerade displayed in 
Commedia dell’arte away from the Schopenhauerian/Aikhenvaldian negative semantics of the 
poshlost’/The Will to an opposing, positive semantic pole.  The divergence is especially marked 
in the main character, Morn, when he appears as a masked king.  Morn’s Venetian bauta mask is 
strongly associated with Commedia dell’arte as well as with the Venetian carnival.277  It is 
obvious that there is a carnivalesque atmosphere to the play, and Nabokov, in a prose sketch of 
the play, says that there is “something Venetian of the 18th century of the time of Casanova…” 
in the early masquerade scene.278  Though Commedia dell’arte stock characters are always 
associated with a distinctive mask — their roles are actually referred to as masks — Morn’s 
motive in using the bauta mask is clearly tied to a desire for anonymity, if we judge by the 
attention to the secrecy surrounding his identity in the play. 279  Morn’s choice of mask seems to 
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accord with actual historical use of the mask.   According to Michael L. Quinn, “[t]he carnival 
bauta was nearly uniform, and as such it erased the particular identity of the wearer; it effaced 
not only physiognomy but often class, gender, or even race.”280  Thus, on a certain level, Morn-
as-masked-king, whose powers of communion with previous dead kings and of ruling 
benevolently are associated with his masked ontology, follows Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s 
assumptions of a positive relationship between the loss of a definite physiognomy and the ability 
to overcome poshlost’/the Will.  Overcoming poshlost’ or the Will requires one (Schopenhauer’s 
genius poet / Aikhenvald’s Pushkin) to efface, to lose face and identity.  However, on another 
level, Morn's masked nature goes against Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s use of the theater 
motif to symbolize the unwitting manipulation by the Will (Schopenhauer) and the association 
with a poshlost’ form of non-art (Aikhenvald).  If we extend the metaphor of “world as 
stage”/Commedia/puppet theater continuously throughout Schopenhauer’s narrative, then the one 
who is to overcome the world Will must first cut loose from the puppet strings and cast off the 
Commedia mask.  Yet a paradox arises in Schopenhauer’s theatrical metaphor if it is extended 
too far: on the one hand, he suggests that an awakening from the mundane nightmare of the Will 
is akin to casting off the stock character mask, on the other hand, such an awakening involves 
not the revelation of one’s actual face, but its total erasure.   
 Nabokov avoids Schopenhauer’s conundrum of revelation and erasure by affirming both 
the role of theatricality and the diminishment of the self in the overcoming of the mundane, ever-
self-consumptive poshlyi world of The Tragedy of Mister Morn.  Morn’s mask is the symbol of 
effacement and erasure of identity needed for artistic and benevolent power.  This relationship is 
affirmed when, for example, Morn loses his powers after casting off the mask.  Yet Morn’s 
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effacement leads to a transformation — and not an annihilation — of face and of identity; his 
loss of identity (upon donning the mask) leads to the acquisition of a new identity — or identities 
— beyond his: the kings of yore.   Ultimately, while Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald deplore the 
actor’s craft through the negative theater metaphor and maintain that anonymity is the real face 
of a communion with a henotic unity, Nabokov would at one and the same time pay respect to 
this metaphorical relationship between mask and unwitting actor yet also allow one genius and 
witting actor to don the likenesses of others in a theatrical ritual that metaphorizes just such a 
henotic union.   
 Since Schopenhauer does not criticize theater as a genre per se — his criticism is of 
unexamined, recurrent behavior and emotions, which he analogizes with Commedia plays — 
Nabokov’s recasting of the motif seems to address the philosopher’s concerns with no major 
problems.  Aikhenvald’s objection to acting and theater in general, however, are based on a 
fundamental judgment of the genre as derivative of another, and thus suggestive of its inherent 
poshlost’.  Nabokov’s response to Aikhenvald on the topic of the theatrical motif will be dealt 
with at the end of this chapter, after our discussion of Lolita, for it is there that Nabokov makes 
the boldest positive use of the theatrical motif.   
 In Invitation to a Beheading, the use of the theatrical motif seems to tilt away from live 
theater imagery and toward that of puppets and marionettes.281  Cincinnatus, who lives in a 
society of transparent equals, stands out and is indeed condemned for being “opaque.”282   Yet it 
is Cincinnatus’ unique individuality that allows him to see the world around him for the sham 
that it is.  The deployment of Schopenhauer’s negative metaphor of life as puppet theater comes 
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precisely into effect in Cincinnatus’ recognition of the falsity of others and of the world.  Thus 
Cincinnatus calls the jail director a “rag doll [kukla]”283 and addresses all of his jailers as 
“dummies [kukly]” in his journal.284  He tells his wife Marthe “that we are surrounded by 
dummies [kuklami], and that you are a dummy [kukla] yourself.”285  Ultimately Cincinnatus 
regards everyone except himself as the same, as ordinary, and himself as someone apart.  
Senderovich and Shvarts indicate an instance of this opinion in their article with a short quote.  
We, however, will quote Cincinnatus’ thought in full, since it links up with an allusion to another 
philosophical theme found in Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald: 
 I am not an ordinary — I am the one among you who is alive — Not only are my eyes  
 different, and my hearing, and my sense of taste — not only is my sense of smell like a  
 deer’s, my sense of touch like a bat’s — but, most important, I have the capacity to  
 conjoin all of this in one point — No, the secret is not revealed yet — even this is but the  
 flint — and I have not even begun to speak of the kindling, of the fire itself.  My life.   
 Once, when I was a child, on a distant school excursion, when I had got separated from  
 the others — although I may have dreamt it — I found myself, under the sultry sun of  
 midday, in a drowsy little town, so drowsy that when a man who had been dozing on a  
 bench beneath a bright white-washed wall at last got up to help me find my way, his blue  
 shadow on the wall did not immediately follow him.  Oh, I know, I know, there must  
 have been some oversight, on my part, and the shadow did not linger at all, but simply,  
 shall we say, it caught on the wall’s unevenness…but here is what I want to express:  
 between his movement and the movement of the laggard shadow — that second, that  
 syncope — there is the rare kind of time in which I live — the pause, the hiatus, when the 
 heart is like a feather…And I would write also about the continual tremor — and about  
 how part of my thoughts is always crowding around the invisible umbilical cord that joins 
 this world to something—to what I shall not say yet… (52-53). 
 
As Senderovich and Shvarts explain, “[t]he very opposition between the plurality of dummies, or 
puppets, and the singularity of the one among them who is alive is Schopenhauerian.”286  
As for Cincinnatus’ proclamation that he is one among many “who is alive,” Senderovich and 
Shvarts point to Schopenhauer’s comparison of genius “to a living man playing along with the 
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large puppets of the famous puppet-show at Milan, who would be the only one among them who 
would understand everything, and would therefore gladly leave the stage for a while to enjoy the 
play from the boxes.”287  We also see in the quote above Cincinnatus’ claim to having a unique 
capacity to perceive and understand something of the nature of the world beyond the one in 
which he lives.  By calling all others in the novel “dolls” and by his acknowledging a world 
beyond the one in which he is incarcerated, Cincinnatus consciously hints at his being on par, 
metaphysically, with the Schopenhauerian living man amongst dolls, who sees the stage for what 
it is.  Indeed, Invitation to a Beheading ends in a scene much like Schopenhauer’s “living man” 
quitting the stage and the puppets as a participant in order to view them as a spectator.  In the last 
scene of the novel, the executioner and the jailers shrink in size and the platform where the 
execution was to be held, along with the entire square and its trees, teeter and are demolished 
like the falling scenery of an outdoor stage, all the while “Cincinnatus made his way in that 
direction where, to judge by the voices, stood beings akin to him” (223). 
 Senderovich and Shvarts also point to another, non-theatrical, set of allusions within 
Invitation to a Beheading that strengthen their proposition that the metaphysics in the novel are 
specifically Schopenhauerian.  The allusions are to Schopenhauer’s metaphor of the oak.  
According to Senderovich and Shvarts, Schopenhauer utilizes the oak to explain how the Will 
functions as a universal will-to-live in all phenomena (i.e, not just in one).  Though it is fully 
manifested in the particular (an oak tree, for example), it is not contained entirely within it — 
indeed, if anything, all particular phenomena are contained within the Will: 
 The will reveals itself just as completely and just as much in one oak as in millions.   
 Their number, their multiplication in space and time, has no meaning with regard to the  
 will, but only with regard to the plurality of the individuals who know in space and time,  
 and who are themselves multiplied and dispersed therein. But that same plurality of these  
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 individuals again applies not to the will, but only to its phenomenon. Therefore it could  
 be asserted that if, per impossible, a single being, even the most insignificant, were  
 entirely annihilated, the whole world would inevitably be destroyed with it.288 
 
The point is that the seeming destruction of one phenomenon, an oak tree, the vital engine of 
which is the Will, does not destroy the Will itself, the source of all life, since the Will is present 
in all the other oak trees and, indeed, in the oak tree that would replace the dead one.  
Senderovich and Shvarts point to a continuation of the metaphor, in the second volume of The 
World as Will and Representation, although the oak here has been generalized to a “tree,” and 
the analogy of one particular tree amongst many has been replaced by one particular leaf 
amongst many found in one tree: 
 Fading in the autumn and about to fall, this leaf grieves over its own extinction, and will  
 not be consoled by looking forward to the fresh green which will clothe the tree in spring, 
 but says as a lament: “I am not these! These are quite different leaves!” Oh, foolish leaf!  
 Whither do you want to go? And whence are the others supposed to come? Where is the  
 nothing, the abyss of which you fear? Know your own inner being, precisely that which  
 is so filled with the thirst for existence; recognize it once more in the inner, mysterious,  
 sprouting force of the tree. This force is always one and the same in all the generations of 
  leaves, and it remains untouched by arising and passing away.289 
 
Cincinnatus C., who has been sentenced to die for “the most terrible of crimes, gnostical 
turpitude…,”290 seeks consolation from a novel entitled Quercus (in Latin, “oak tree”) about a 
solitary oak tree, whose life spans hundreds of years and which witnesses the history that 
develops in that time.  The oak tree in the book Cincinnatus is reading is almost like a symbol for 
the Will as collective life-force, which stands as a constant amid the ever changeable ebb and 
flow of history conditioned by the volatile, plural manifestations of that same Will.  Cincinnatus, 
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however, cannot fully accept the worldview offered in Quercus.  At one point, he cannot 
concentrate on the book: 
 Cincinnatus read for a while and laid it aside. This work was unquestionably the best that  
 his age has produced; yet he overcame the pages with a melancholy feeling, plodded  
 through the pages with dull distress, and kept drowning out the tale in the stream of his  
 own meditation: what matters to me all this, distant, deceitful and dead-I, who am  
 preparing to die? 291 
 
According to Senderovich and Shvarts, Schopenhauer’s argument against considering the death 
of an individual to be death at all “is unacceptable to Cincinnatus C., who is entirely absorbed by 
the consciousness of his imminent death.” Nevertheless, Cincinnatus “probes Schopenhauer’s 
reasoning” and “undergoes a series of illusory rescues each marked by Schopenhauerian 
motifs.”292  In these illusory rescues Cincinnatus is presented either as a metaphorical bearer of 
leaves, or else he has visions of oak landscapes.293  
 Ultimately, Senderovich and Shvarts maintain that Cincinnatus rejected the 
Schopenhauerian argument that transcendence must entail a loss of individuality.294  Though 
Cincinnatus’ transcendental stroll through the fourth wall of the world-stage he inhabited leads 
him to “beings akin to him,” and though this transcendence affirms the metaphysics of 
Schopenhauerian theatrical motif, it is too ambiguous to interpret as a rejection or acceptance of 
the specifically henotic character of Schopenhauer’s view of transcendence.  It is nevertheless 
plain that the possibility of losing one’s individuality upon entering, or uniting with, the spiritual 
plane is part of Cincinnatus’ anxiety concerning death.  As Senderovich and Shvarts point out, 
both Invitation to a Beheading and The World as Will and Representation are works whose 
metaphysical speculation is inspired by an unusual (because constant) attention toward the event 
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of death.  Nabokov would consider the problem of what happens at the moment of death again, 
in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight (1941), his first novel in English.  This time, however, the 
meditation upon death leans decidedly toward a Schopenhauerian conclusion — not only 
because the transcendence described is henotic, but because the dramatization of this 
transcendence maintains the tropological structure of the world as theater — i.e., both the style 
and matter of the denouement of the novel are decidedly Schopenhauerian.  
 In the novel, the narrator-hero, V., embarks on the double enterprise of searching for his 
lost half-brother, Sebastian Knight, and writing his biography.  The search takes on the character 
of the genre of detective fiction, with V. deducing his brother’s last steps and the last people he 
met from the hints and clues left by Sebastian Knight.  All the while, V. reviews Sebastian 
Knight’s works and gains a deeper knowledge of him.  Ultimately, V. mistakenly visits an old 
man in the hospital thinking him to be his brother, who had actually died the day before.  V.’s 
investigation fails, yet his interviews of the people that knew Knight and the reading of his works 
allows V. to come to a very Schopenhauerian conclusion:  
 So I did not see Sebastian after all, or at least I did not see him alive.  But those few  
 minutes I spent listening to what I thought was his breathing changed my life as   
 completely as it would have been changed, had Sebastian spoken to me before dying.   
 Whatever his secret was, I have learnt one secret too, and namely: that the soul is but a  
 manner of being — not a constant state — that any soul may be yours, if you find and  
 follow its undulations.  The hereafter may be the full ability of consciously living in any  
 chosen soul, in any number of souls, all of them unconscious of their interchangeable  
 burden.  Thus — I am Sebastian Knight.  I feel as if I were impersonating him on a  
 lighted stage, with the people he knew coming and going… They move round Sebastian  
 — round me who am acting Sebastian, — and the old conjuror waits in the wings with  
 his hidden rabbit… And then the masquerade draws to a close.  The bald little prompter  
 shuts his book, as the light fades gently.  The end, the end.  They all go back to their  
 everyday life… but the hero remains, for, try as I may, I cannot get out of my part:  
 Sebastian’s mask clings to my face, the likeness will not be washed off.  I am Sebastian,  
 or Sebastian is I, or perhaps we both are someone whom neither of us knows.295 
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We see here Nabokov’s own confirmation of something similar to the metaphysical 
presumptions of Schopenhauer’s reading of Tat tvam asi (This you are).  However, this 
confirmation is given through the theatrical motif.  V.’s search for his brother put him into 
contact with people who, in some form or another, suffered.  The act of interviewing these 
people, coupled with his own compassion and love for his brother, leads V. to realize that, 
ultimately, one can access anybody’s identity if one chose to study it closely — thus this living 
thing and that living thing is I, ad infinitum.  By localizing the epiphany reminiscent of tat tvam 
asi at the very end of a theatrical production — where the people who knew Sebastian participate 
in some sort of masquerade yet promptly return to every day life at the end — Nabokov, again, 
alludes to Schopenhauer’s use of the “world as theater’ motif.296  Nevertheless, as in The 
Tragedy of Mister Morn, Nabokov again inverts Schopenhauer’s original metaphor.  Though the 
realization of our “true” One identity is, in Schopenhauer, correlated to the action of unmasking, 
Nabokov’s affirmation of a collective monistic identity is communicated through the ability to 
don many different masks.  Ultimately, both Schopenhauer and Nabokov (at least the Nabokov 
of The Real Life of Sebastian Knight) seem to be in agreement that transcendence involves the 
realization of the fiction of individuality. 
 
SHOOTING ACTORS IN A CINEMATIC DESPAIR  
 
 The nature of the search for transcendence in Despair (1937) seems related in a way to 
the one we see in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight.  What makes this novel the kind of narrative 
that it is, however, is that the transcendence the narrator-artist seeks is of a rather perverse sort.  
In Hermann Karlovich we see a distortion of the Romantic trope of the poet seer or poet genius.  
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Like the Romantic poet genius, he seeks to create a consummate work of art.  Unlike this poet 
genius, and the Schopenhauerian iteration, the scope of Hermann Karlovich’s artistic perception 
does not widen much beyond his own self.  Hermann Karlovich’s artistic goal was not so much 
to capture some sort of truth about the world, but to gain acceptance from others as an artist: 
I longed, to the point of pain, for that masterpiece of mine (finished and signed on the 
ninth of March in a gloomy wood) to be appreciated by men, or in other words, for the 
deception — and every work of art is a deception — to act successfully; as to the 
royalties, so to speak, paid by the insurance firm, that was in my mind a matter of 
secondary importance.  Oh, yes, I was the pure artist of romance. 297  
    
Beyond the desire for recognition, Hermann also expresses the desire for some sort of sublime 
transcendent-like experience, but his aesthetics are too muddled to be able to express this with 
any clarity: “What I feared, all alone in a treacherous world of reflections, was to break down 
instead of holding on till a certain extraordinary, madly happy, all-solving moment which it was 
imperative I should attain; the moment of an artist’s triumph; of pride, deliverance, bliss: was my 
picture a sensational success or was it a dismal flop?”298  Hermann’s lack of artistic clarity 
condemns him to artistic mediocrity.  This mediocrity is exemplified throughout Despair in his 
numerous and indecisively halting attempts at composing the introductions of chapters or the 
variations of the end to the novel.299   
Hermann’s appreciation for beauty is likewise reminiscent of Aikhenvald’s view of the 
philistine and Schopenhauer’s common, ordinary man, whose outlook is dominated entirely by 
the concerns of the will (and his own selfish will).  If we remember, Schopenhauer’s common 
and ordinary man  “can direct his attention to things only in so far as they have some relation to 
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his will …[H]e is very soon finished …with works of art, …He does not linger; he seeks only his 
way in life, or at most all that might at any time become his way.”300 Aikhenvald’s philistine 
would be unable to capture beauty in words.  If this person captured anything of the world in 
words, these words would come out worn, withered and he or she would render the world 
colorless.301 Hermann’s description of his surroundings at the beginning of Despair portray the 
narrator-observer as odd though unappreciative of beauty in a way similar to Schopenhauer and 
Aikhenvald’s conception of the unperceptive person:  
Then all of a sudden the row of houses broke, disclosing a vast stretch of land that 
at first glance seemed to me most rural and alluring.  
…Farther on, a hill, splendidly steep, sloped up into the sky.  Decided to climb it.  Its 
splendor proved to be a deception.  Among stunted beeches and elder shrubs a zigzag 
path with steps hewn into it went up and up.  I fancied at first that after the very next 
turning I should reach a spot of wild and wonderful beauty, but it never showed itself.  
That drab vegetation could not satisfy me.  The shrubs straggled on bare ground, polluted 
all over the scraps of paper, rags, battered tins… 
… I put both elbows on the gnarled wooden railing and, looking down, saw, far 
below and slightly veiled by mist, the city of Prague; shimmering roofs, smoking 
chimneys, the barracks I had just passed, a tiny white horse…  
…The only beautiful thing in the landscape was the dome of a gasholder on a hill: 
round and ruddy against the blue sky, it looked like a huge football.302  
 
Hermann’s inability to see beauty in nature seems to stem from the fact that he holds fast to some 
personal idea or preformed image of beauty (“its splendor proved to be a deception,” “I 
fancied…I should reach a spot of wild and wonderful beauty”) that routinely becomes 
disappointed. 
Hermann’s habit of following preconceived images seems to be related to his goal 
oriented mode of artistic production, a trait that he discloses several times throughout the novel:  
“…the further I write, the clearer it becomes that I will not leave matters so but hang on till my 
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main object is attained, when I will most certainly take the risk of having my work 
published…”303  Hermann’s attention, then, is attuned solely to his triumph, pride, deliverance, 
and bliss (the bliss that one perhaps feels upon achieving triumph, pride and deliverance).  The 
lack of breadth in his artistic and intentional focus seems to limit his horizon, however, for 
Hermann misses many signs and hints of events that occur in the sidelines, as it were, of his 
narrative.  Hermann’s most prominent oversight is his wife’s infidelity.  Ironically, this oversight 
is revealed when Hermann recounts his wife’s flaws: “…she used to forget everything.  Her 
umbrella stayed with all our acquaintances in turn; her lipstick turned up in incomprehensible 
places such as her cousin’s shirt pocket…”304   
Hermann is actually very fond of indicating other characters’ flaws.  For example, he 
describes Felix, the man he believes is his double and whom he eventually murders, as a tramp 
and an oaf.305  In pointing at Felix’s propensity to spit, Hermann also makes a negative 
generalization about “simple folk:” “It is always a wonder to me the amount of saliva that simple 
folk seem to possess.” 306  As we can see from this last comment, some of Hermann’s criticisms 
seem to come from his perceived superior position with respect to other people.  Thus, with 
respect to Felix and other “simple people,” Hermann views himself as somehow more 
aristocratic.  With respect to his wife, Lydia, he sees himself as more artistic.  Hermann argues 
this, ironically, by saying that Lydia is unaware of her natural environment: “The only kind of 
tree she is capable of identifying is the birch: reminds her of her native woodland…”307 
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Hermann’s contempt for others, his opportunism, his self-centered view of the world and 
ultimately, his disregard for life not only point to his aesthetic poshlost’ but to his moral one as 
well.  Curiously, his immoral and artless master plan (to kill his double, Felix, and switch 
identities with him) seems to be propelled by a force redolent of Schopenhauer’s will.  Just 
before Hermann meets Felix on a business trip in Prague, he finds himself with time to kill and 
without any motivation to do anything whatsoever:  
I have been sitting in a queer state of exhaustion, now listening to the rushing and  
crashing of the wind, now drawing noses in the margin of the page, now slipping into a 
vague slumber, and then starting up all aquiver.  And again there would grow in me that 
prickly feeling, that unendurable twitter…and my will lay limp in an empty world [i 
takoe bezvolie, takaia pustota]308 
 
Even Hermann’s narrative early in the novel seems to be pushed by some, not quite artistic force.  
Prior to narrating his encounter with Felix, Hermann is unmotivated to provide the details that 
lead to this encounter: “On the morning of the ninth of May I left my hotel in a taxi which took 
me…Dull work recounting all this.  Bores me to death.  But yearn as I may to reach the crucial 
point quickly, a few preliminary explanations seem necessary.”309  This motivational force seems 
only satisfied when the narrative reaches the moment of climax, the description of Hermann’s 
first encounter with Felix: “[a]t this point, now that I have got to the important part and quenched 
the fire of that itching, it is meet, I presume that I should bid my prose stand at ease…”310  After 
describing the encounter with Felix, Hermann focuses on his mental state that ninth of May and 
says that he was “absolutely empty and thus comparable to some translucid vessel doomed to 
receive contents as yet unknown…if anything did echo in my vast inward wilderness it was 
merely the dim sensation of some force driving me along.”311  As the narrative of Despair comes 
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closer to the execution of Hermann’s master plan, the force that pushes Hermann towards this 
execution, hence the execution of Felix, grows stronger:  
I could not quite make out at the time what was going on in me – but now I know 
what it was: my passion for my double was surging anew with a muffled but formidable 
violence which soon escaped all control.  It started by my becoming aware that, in the 
town of Berlin, there had appeared a certain dim central point round which a confused 
force compelled me to circle closer and closer… 
I remember that one day something very like somnambulism took me to a certain 
lane I knew well, and so there I was, moving nearer and nearer to the magnetic point that 
had become the peg of my being…312 
 
The magnetic point is the post office, where Felix’s letters to Hermann lay.  The reader later 
finds out that it is in answering these letters that Herman convinces Felix of meeting him in 
Berlin.  To Hermann, this much was obvious the moment he received them: 
I was suddenly aware that my scheme had received a final outline and that 
everything, or nearly everything, was already settled; a mere couple of details were still 
missing which would be no trouble to fix… 
Why, what is this talk about trouble, when it is the harmony of mathematical 
symbols, the movement of planets, the hitchless working of natural laws which have a 
true bearing upon the subject?313   
 
To recapitulate, we see that Hermann describes himself in the several passages just quoted 
almost as an object laying in motionless inertia until impelled by some force to devise and 
execute the plan of murdering Felix.  The force that Hermann experiences acts upon him in a 
manner that is both sexually libidinal and magnetic.  Ultimately, according to Hermann, the force 
that leads him to his master plan seems to be of the same kind that moves the universe.  Thus, by 
Hermann’s own account, his movements towards his goal either had already been predicted or 
were to follow with a mathematical certainty and exaction.  Hermann’s rendering of his own 
actions as propelled by an external force are remindful of Schopenhauer’s own description of the 
Will as a force inherent in every aspect of reality:  
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Persistent matter must constantly change the form, since, under the guidance of causality, 
mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear, 
snatch the matter from one another, for each wishes to reveal its own Idea…it 
occurs…when magnet forces magnetism on iron, in order to manifest its Idea in it…On a 
large scale, it shows itself in the relation between central body and planet; for although 
the planet is decidedly dependent, it always resists, just like the chemical forces in the 
organism.314 
 
Hermann too seems to want to impose his own idea upon Felix and he sees this with a pure 
mechanical causality.  
What is significant about Hermann’s imposition of his own idea upon others is his use of 
the theatrical metaphor to express his acts of usurpation.  Herman describes Felix, for example, 
as a mask and a disguise the first time that he meets him: “That man, especially when he slept, 
when his features were motionless, showed me my own face, my mask, the flawlessly pure 
image of my corpse.” 315  What is macabre, of course, is that the metaphor is quite literal: 
Hermann wants Felix’s face and body to stand in for his own.  Later on, when divulging to Felix 
his role in the master plan, Felix tells Hermann “[m]aybe you’re an actor.”316 Yet the role of the 
actor in the master plan is actually taken up by Felix himself.  Hermann explains to Felix that he 
is to be his ‘understudy,’ and ‘substitute’ him in what Hermann first describes as a film scene:  
The actor plays his part, with the camera shooting him; an insignificant little scene 
remains to be done; the hero, say, is to drive past in his car; but he can’t, he is in bed with 
a bad cold.  There is no time to be lost, and so his double takes over and coolly sails past 
in the car (splendid that you can manage cars) and when at last the film is shown, not a 
single spectator is aware of the substitution…317   
 
Ultimately, when he shoots Felix, Hermann uses the word “will,” though he curiously leaves it 
unqualified by a possessive adjective: “I knew instinctively that it was so, that my bullet had slid 
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with perfect exactitude along the short, air-dividing furrow which both will and eye had 
grooved.”318  A few pages later, Hermann ties the Schopenhauerian thematic of the selfish and 
conflictual will neatly with the theatrical motif: “Is a man’s will really so powerful as to be able 
to convert another into a dummy [kuklu]?319 Hermann also associates the will thematic with the 
theatrical motif in another scene in which he prepares his wife for the theatrical task of having to 
dissemble the emotions of widowhood upon Hermann’s fake death: “The whole of the next day 
we spent at home, and once more, meticulously and strenuously, I kept tutoring my wife, stuffing 
her with my will…”320 
 What is interesting about the way in which the theatrical motif operates in Despair is that 
however uncouth he is as a wielder of the pen in Despair, Hermann nevertheless occupies a 
position with respect to the other characters that is similar to the position of literature in 
Aikhenvald’s tension between literature and theater in his essay “Negation of Theater.”  Or 
perhaps Hermann’s position is like a malevolent Carlo Count Gozzi, who directs a 
Schopenhauerian Commedia dell’arte play.  In the theater or moving picture within Despair, 
Hermann, the playwright or maddened director, treats his actors as marionettes who are to 
pantomime exactly as he commands.  Felix is to die and give up his body, and Lydia is to play 
the part of the widow.  As we can see, Despair does not problematize the theater motif as it 
appears in Aikhenvald’s “Negation of Theater” or Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and 
Representation, instead Despair presents the theater motif much as it appears in these other 
works: as a metaphor that expresses a certain deterministic force that controls the individual, the 
actor, the marionette.  If Despair diverges from Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer, it does so in that 
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it sets up one individual as the mastermind or puppet-master.  Yet it is not hard to reconcile the 
image of this puppet-master with Schopenhauer’s set of metaphors.  If the world of people 
beholden to their will is like a puppet-show, then the puppet-master must cannot be anything else 
but a metaphor for that one will that manifests itself in the world as all particular wills.  Yet 
Hermann ultimately fails at his master plan and this must also mean that he, in some sense, was 
but a man perfectly dominated by his own selfish and grandiose desires. 
 
THE SCHOPENHAUERIAN STRUCTURE OF LOLITA 
 
 In Lolita (1955) we see yet another aspiring author that tries to play the other characters 
in his narrative as marionettes.  Yet in Lolita we don’t see a simple reiteration of the theater 
motif that we see in Invitation to a Beheading and in Despair.  What we see in this later novel is 
a total complication of the meaning of acting and of theater.  This complication becomes of 
pivotal significance in the interpretation of that novel. 
 Though Nabokov, in The Tragedy of Mister Morn, Invitation to a Beheading, and Lolita, 
associates the humor, fickleness, and pettiness of romantic liaisons with a Schopenhauerian take 
on the theatrical motif, he only makes specific references to Commedia dell’arte in Lolita.  Quite 
a few of these Commedia allusions are associated with the figure of Valeria, Humbert Humbert’s 
first wife.  The narrator marries the woman in order to conceal better his taboo desires, yet it is 
not long before Valeria cheats on H.H. and brings another character into the picture, effectively 
establishing a comedic love triangle.  Even before learning of her infidelity, Humbert Humbert 
noted that “my fat Valeria was not her usual self; had acquired a queer restlessness; even showed 
something like irritation at times, which was quite out of keeping with the stock character she 
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was supposed to impersonate.”321  Yet after finding out what made Valeria feel this way, her 
commedia stock character quality did not abate for H.H.: “…here she was, Valeria, the comedy 
wife, brazenly preparing to dispose in her own way of my comfort and fate.”322 The comedic love 
triangle is finally completed when H.H. meets Valeria’s lover: “I cannot say he [Valeria’s 
Russian taxi-driver lover] behaved insolently or anything like that; on the contrary, he displayed, 
as a small sideshow in the theatricals I had been inveigled in, a discreet old-world civility, 
punctuating his movements with all sorts of mispronounced apologies.”323   
 The narrator also extends the motif of commedia dell’arte theater to motion pictures.  
This extension can be seen early in the novel, where H.H. imbues motion pictures with the same 
or similar kind of dual reality found in commedia dell’arte theater when he reminisces about “an 
American kid, the son of a then celebrated motion-picture actress whom he seldom saw in the 
three-dimensional world.” 324  Later in the novel, H.H. ascribes an established set of characters, 
scenarios, and emotions to motion pictures. 325  Commedia dell’arte is similarly structured in that 
its characters, scenarios, and emotions have been established by tradition.  Indeed, it is the 
repetitiousness of these characters, scenarios and emotions that moved Schopenhauer to draw a 
metaphor between the repetitious emotions and actions of life and Commedia dell’arte.  Humbert 
Humbert similarly draws a metaphor between his comedic love triangle and the “rules of the 
movies:” “At last both were out of the quivering apartment—the vibration of the door I had 
slammed after them still rang in my every nerve, a poor substitute for the backhand slap with 
which I ought to have hit her across the cheekbone according to the rules of the movies.”326 Late 
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in the book, while Dolly Haze and Humbert Humbert are on their second cross country trip, the 
narrator makes another allusion to Commedia dell’arte theater.  This time the object of the 
metaphor is a man accompanied by “an elf-like girl, on an insect-like bicycle,” a couple that 
seems to serve briefly as a foil to Humbert and Dolly: “The girl I had seen on my way to town 
was now loaded with linen and engaged in helping a misshapen man whose big head and coarse 
features reminded me of the ‘Bertoldo’ character in low Italian comedy.  They were cleaning the 
cabins of which there was a dozen or so on Chestnut Crest, all pleasantly spaced amid the 
copious verdure” (213).  Although the relationship between the misshapen Bertoldo-like man 
and the elf-like girl is never elaborated, the strangeness of the fact of their working together at a 
remote motel is only matched by the strangeness of Humbert’s association with an unrelated pre-
adolescent Dolly.  The mirror-effect of the two pairs of characters in this scene of the novel is 
strengthened by the fact that Dolly is referred to as a “fairy princess” and a “nymph” countless 
times throughout the book by Humbert Humbert, and plays the part of a “woodland witch, or 
Diana” in a play written by Quilty.327   If the reader accepts that Dolly and the girl on the bicycle 
are associated with each other through their fairy natures, then he or she must at least entertain 
the thought that there must be something “misshapen” and Bertoldo-like about Humbert 
Humbert.  At the very least, the elf-like girl and the Bertoldo-like man, in their similarity to the 
two main characters of Lolita, may represent an alternate reality that Humbert Humbert and 
Dolly could have lived, one that is as drab and misshapen as the one portrayed in the book.  
Humbert also portrays Quilty as a Commedia-like figure with a mask: “…in the rain-dripping 
darkness, there stood a man holding before his face the mask of Jutting Chin, a grotesque sleuth 
in the funnies.” 328  
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 The Schopenhauer allusions in Lolita to a tragi-comic, repetitive reality full of worn 
gestures and scenarios (repetitive because the desires of the will never change throughout 
eternity) also extends to puppet theater, which, as we saw above, are rife in Invitation to a 
Beheading and The World as Will and Representation.  One instance of the puppet theater sub-
motif occurs while Humbert Humbert is bathing in Hourglass Lake with Charlotte, the Farlows, 
and the Chatfields.  He sees, on the bank opposite to his position, men hammering, apparently 
working on a wharf. “The knocks that reached us seemed so much bigger than what could be 
distinguished of those dwarfs’ arms and tools; indeed, one suspected the direction of those 
acrosonic effects to have been at odds with the puppet-master, especially since the hefty crack of 
each diminutive blow lagged behind its visual version.” 329  Though the puppet-master refers to 
some vague divinity, the narrator makes it known that he is aware at least of the conception of 
reality as dual; wherein one side determines the other as the puppet-master manipulates the 
puppets on a stage. 
 Humbert Humbert also involves Quilty in a strong allusion to the motif of puppet-theater.  
During the second cross-country tour with Dolly, with Quilty driving behind them, Humbert 
says: “The driver behind me, with his stuffed shoulders and Trappish mustache, looked like a 
display dummy, and his convertible seemed to move only because an invisible rope of silent silk 
connected it with our shabby vehicle.” 330  The narrator describes Quilty as a dummy again, at the 
end of the book, during their fight for the gun that Humbert dropped at Pavor Manor: “He and I 
were two large dummies, stuffed with dirty cotton and rags … I decided to inspect the pistol—
our sweat might have spoiled something—and regain my wind before proceeding to the main 
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item of the program.” 331 We notice in this last quote that Humbert Humbert also writes himself 
into the motif of puppet-theater. 
 Why does Humbert Humbert write himself into the Commedia dell’arte and puppet 
theater motifs?  Is Humbert Humbert consciously making an argument, expressed in bread-
crumb clues, that he, along with Quilty, are but puppets playing in a farcical (and 
Schopenhaueresque) fairground booth?  Perhaps Humbert Humbert is allowing himself some 
comedic self-pity.  Or does this argument belong to the ultimate puppet-master himself, 
Nabokov?  This mystery can never be solved with any degree of satisfaction.  It can, however, be 
said with a reasonable amount of certainty that Humbert Humbert’s (or Nabokov’s) framing of 
the love triangle between himself, Valeria, and her “taxi-driver lover” within the theater motif 
has more to do with framing the expectation of human behavioral frailty in terms of artistic 
clichés than with anything that promotes self-transcendence. 
 The self-transcendence that occurs in Lolita is expressed, as noted earlier, in a 
tropological discourse that also involves acting and the theater.  This other structure of theatrical 
motifs seems also to be connected to issues deeper within both Schopenhauer’s philosophy and  
with what Aage A. Hansen-Löve refers to as Nabokov’s “bioasthetics.”332 On the one hand, the 
theatrical motif evokes Schopenhauer’s ecology of the conflict of wills and focuses specifically 
on the relationship between predator and prey.  On the other hand, the motif structure is 
intimately linked with Nabokov’s particular view of ‘mimicry.’  Nabokov’s thoughts on mimicry 
are probably best known for their opposition to Darwin’s theory of evolution.  In Speak, 
Memory, for example, Nabokov says that “‘Natural selection,’  in the Darwinian sense, could not 
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explain the miraculous coincidence of imitative aspect and imitative behavior, nor could one 
appeal to the theory of the ‘struggle for life’ when a protective device was carried to a point of 
mimetic subtlety, exuberance, and luxury far in excess of a predator’s power of appreciation.” 333  
This sentiment, which has been regarded as old-fashioned and “metaphysical” by Nabokov 
commentators,334 would seem to exclude the possibility of a connection between mimicry on the 
one hand and the Schopenhauerian conflict between predator and prey on the other within Lolita.  
Yet, as happens in many of his pronouncements on other topics, Nabokov’s view of mimicry is a 
nuanced one and prone to misinterpretation.  Nabokov’s own descriptions of mimicry compel us 
to believe that concept is present in Lolita, operating within a theatrical metaphor, and precisely 
within a Schopenhauerian scenario of conflict between predator and prey.  Though he imbues 
mimicry with the artistry seemingly proper to humans— “[t]he mysteries of mimicry had a 
special attraction for me; [i]ts phenomena showed an artistic perfection usually associated with 
man-wrought things” — the instances of actual mimicry that Nabokov describes are at least 
superficially addressed to predators, something which Nabokov himself points out: “Consider the 
imitation of oozing poison by the bubble like macules on a wing (complete with pseudo-
refraction) or by glossy yellow knobs on a chrysalis (“Don’t eat me—I have already been 
squashed, sampled and rejected”).”335 If we look again at Nabokov’s comment on “‘Natural 
selection,’ in the Darwinian sense,” we see that he allows that mimicry is “a protective device” 
— what he seems to be arguing is that it is not only that.  Dieter Zimmer, who has written about 
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Nabokov’s thoughts on mimicry, seems to agree: “Nabokov did not quite say that mimicry is 
downright useless to the mimic…What he said was that there is an aesthetic surplus in mimicry 
that the mimic has no use for and that for this reason there is more to mimicry than can be 
explained by its purposes.”336  Ultimately, what convinces us of a connection between the second 
theatrical motif structure, the Schopenhauerian conflict of predator and prey, and Nabokovian 
mimicry is Nabokov’s own association of the latter with the activity of acting; of a mimesis that 
merely arises as a protective act with the mimesis for the (non-utilitarian) purpose of aesthetic 
effect:  
 Consider the tricks of an acrobatic caterpillar (of the Lobster Moth) which in infancy  
 looks like bird’s dung, but after molting develops scrabbly hymenopteroid appendages  
 and baroque characteristics, allowing the extraordinary fellow to play two parts at once  
 (like the actor in Oriental shows who becomes a pair of intertwisted wrestlers): that of a  
 writhing larva and that of a big ant seemingly harrowing it.  When a certain moth   
 resembles a certain wasp in shape and color, it also walks and moves its antennae in a  
 waspish, unmothlike manner.  When a butterfly has to look like a leaf, not only are the  
 details of a leaf beautifully rendered but markings mimicking grub-bored holes are  
 generously thrown in.337   
 
In essence, by looking like bird’s dung, or a leaf, or a wrestling ant-and-larva pair, the caterpillar, 
moth, or butterfly “acts” partly for the would-be predator striving to survive, but mostly for one 
whose potential for aesthetic and artistic perception is on another magnitude entirely and whose 
motives for glancing at the insect are beyond the every-day utilitarian needs of survival.  This 
“acting” or “mimicking” is, of course, an act of deception and illusion, perennial Nabokovian 
themes (Nabokov called both art and nature “form[s] of magic…[and] game[s] of intricate 
enchantment and deception”).338  It is our belief that Dolly Haze also mimicked through her 
acting and did so in such a way as to deceive and escape Humbert-as-predator; it is also our 
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belief that her gift for acting was something that Humbert Humbert could, in the end, never 
really appreciate in full. 
 Clues of Dolly as mimicking prey, and of Humbert Humbert as an unperceptive predator, 
are found all over Lolita.339 It should be noted, however, that though we use the terms “predator” 
and “prey” loosely, we are not attempting an interpretation whereby Dolly Haze is a mere stand-
in for a moth, butterfly, or some other insect trying to escape from a “Humbert-of-prey.”  What 
we are saying is that Dolly raises the human version of animal mimicry to new heights and that, 
somewhere between metaphor and reality (perhaps both), she is a prey and Humbert a predator; 
her courageous act of mimicry, however, ultimately allows Dolly to define herself as being 
something beyond prey.  In any case, Dolly’s mimicry is of the theatrical kind.  The possibility 
of her being an actress is raised early in the novel, even before Humbert Humbert introduces 
Dolly as a character, when he encounters her first name attached to that of another actress, Dolly 
Quine.340   There also seems to be a hinting at the significance of acting in Humbert’s 
transcription of a page of Who’s Who in the Limelight which lists the actress’ name, for the 
narrator gives us a curious mistake (“disappeared”) on the very last sentence: “Quine, Dolly.  
Born in 1882, in Dayton, Ohio.  Studied for stage at American Academy.  First played in Ottawa 
in 1900.  Made New York debut in 1904 in Never Talk to Strangers.  Has disappeared since in [a 
list of some thirty plays follows].”  This could be an allusion to the self-transcending and 
identity-changing power of acting, or it could be an allusion to Dolly’s actual disappearance after 
“talking to a stranger” (Humbert warns her not to do exactly this on pp. 138 and 309) — or to 
both, since Dolly disappears with a stranger after using powers of deception honed through 
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acting.  In any case, after the transcription mentioning Humbert’s “dear love’s name … affixed 
to some old hag of an actress,” the narrator allows that “[p]erhaps, she might have been an 
actress too.”  The first mention of Dolly’s having an actual predilection for acting is noted some 
thirty pages later when Charlotte, complaining of her daughter, says “she sees herself as a 
starlet.” 341  The first real instance of Dolly’s ability to dissemble, however, occurs later, during 
her and her captor’s first cross-country tour, after a verbal fight: 
 …I had happened to tell her that the day school she would attend at Beardsley was a  
 rather high-class, non-coeducational one, with no modern nonsense, whereupon Lo  
 treated me to one of those furious harangues of hers where entreaty and insult, self - 
 assertion and double talk, vicious vulgarity and childish despair, were interwoven in an  
 exasperating semblance of logic which prompted a semblance of explanation from me.  
 Enmeshed in her wild words (swell chance … I’d be a sap if I took your opinion   
 seriously … Stinker … You can’t boss me … I despise you … and so forth), I drove  
 through the slumbering town at a fifty-mile-per-hour pace in continuance of my smooth  
 highway swoosh, and a twosome of patrolmen put their spotlight on the car, and told me  
 to pull over. I shushed Lo who was automatically raving on. The men peered at her and  
 me with malevolent curiosity. Suddenly all dimples, she beamed sweetly at them, as she  
 never did at my orchideous masculinity; for, in a sense, my Lo was even more scared of  
 the law than I— and when the kind officers pardoned us and servilely we crawled on, her 
  eyelids closed and fluttered as she mimicked limp prostration. 342 
 
Dolly’s behavior in this scene could rightfully be called acting, in the sense that she feigned 
emotions and applied the corresponding facial expressions, yet it could also qualify as an 
example of protective mimicry insofar as it helped her avoid the policemen whom she feared.  
Another instance of Dolly’s acting ability is evident in her verbal fashioning of an alternate 
reality in order to transcend her drab reality.  This the narrator finds out not from Dolly at all, but 
from a conversation with a certain Reverend Rigger while “father and daughter” lived in 
Beardsley: “Walking across the campus with the college clergyman, the Rev. Rigger (who also 
taught Bible in Beardsley School).  ‘Somebody told me her mother was a celebrated actress 
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killed in an airplane accident.  Oh?  My mistake, I presume.  Is that so?  I see. How sad.’” 343 
Humbert Humbert concludes that Dolly was “sublimating her mother,” yet does not consider that 
Dolly’s dissembling might serve emotional purposes — and/or that they might serve quite 
aesthetic ones, that is, that Dolly might simply enjoy telling untrue stories in order to refashion 
herself. 
 As the narrative of Lolita progresses, Dolly becomes more and more involved in the 
study of theater and in the craft of acting.  At one point the narrator finds her “reading the 
chapter on ‘Dialogue’ in Baker’s Dramatic Technique,” and says that “[b]y the time spring had 
touched up Thayer Street [in Beardsley, back east, after the first cross-country tour] with yellow 
and green and pink, Lolita was irrevocably stage-struck.”344  Speaking of Dolly’s acting, Mona 
Dahl, a friend, praises her “responsiveneness … relaxed vitality … [and] charm.”345  Humbert 
Humbert himself says that Dolly “preferred acting to swimming, and swimming to tennis….” It 
was, of course, his desire that Dolly cultivate tennis to the point of becoming a champion: “had 
not something within her been broken by me—not that I realized it then!—she would have had 
on the top of her perfect [tennis] form the will to win, and would have become a real champion.” 
346   Yet it seems that Dolly’s will was not to win at tennis, but to transform herself through 
acting.   
 That Dolly utilized tennis, a game for which Humbert had a passion, — a passion he had 
since his youth and shared with his childhood sweetheart, Annabel (amongst the things they 
spoke about were “the plurality of inhabited worlds, competitive tennis, infinity, solipsism”347) 
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— as a medium for her acting is very significant for our reading of Lolita.  For in portraying the 
movements, gestures, and drama of tennis, Dolly seems to combine both the evasive and 
aesthetic aspects of mimicry/mimesis.  Indeed, Dolly’s ability to act reaches its aesthetic 
apotheosis in Humbert’s eyes through her ability to feign the movements of tennis.  The narrator, 
for example, reports that a certain teacher of Dolly’s, “Miss Gold, says Dolly’s tennis form is 
excellent to superb, even better than Linda Hall’s, but concentration and point accumulation are 
just ‘poor to fair.’” 348  Later in the novel, Humbert Humbert says that “[h]er tennis was the 
highest point to which I can imagine a young creature bringing the art of make-believe, although 
I daresay, for her it was the very geometry of basic reality … Her form was, indeed, an 
absolutely perfect imitation of absolutely top-notch tennis—without any utilitarian results.” 349   
The tennis-acting sub-motif develops at first in the novel in association with the idea of 
deception, i.e. as a pretext for Dolly to see Quilty: “Lo who had gone to play tennis at Linda’s 
country club had telephoned she might be a full half hour late, and so, would I entertain Mona 
who was coming to practice with her a scene from The Taming of the Shrew.” 350  Ultimately the 
link between Dolly’s ability for theatrical mimesis and deception is raised explicitly by Humbert 
Humbert himself:  
 By permitting Lolita to study acting I had, fond fool, suffered her to cultivate deceit. It  
 now appeared that it had not been merely a matter of learning the answers to such  
 questions as what is the basic conflict in “Hedda Gabler,” or where are the climaxes in  
 “Love under the Lindens,” or analyze the prevailing mood of “Cherry Orchard”; it was  
 really a matter of learning to betray me.  How I deplored now the exercises in sensual  
 simulation that I had so often seen her go through in our Beardsley parlor when I would  
 observe her from some strategic point while she, like a hypnotic subject or a performer in 
 a mystic rite, produced sophisticated versions of infantile make-believe by going through  
 the mimetic actions of hearing a moan in the dark, seeing for the first time a brand new  
 young stepmother, tasting something she hated, such as buttermilk, smelling crushed  
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 grass in a lush orchard, or touching mirages of objects with her sly, slender, girl-child  
 hands.” 351 
 
Indeed, it is very likely that Dolly’s powers of theatrical mimicry allowed her to ultimately 
deceive Humbert Humbert in order to escape confinement.  At the beginning of chapter 22 of 
Part II, Humbert Humbert mentions that “Lo had been dull and silent during the last lap … She 
hardly glanced at the famous, oddly shaped, splendidly flushed rock which jutted above the 
mountains and had been the take-off for nirvana on the part of a temperamental show girl.”352  A 
paragraph later, and upon their arrival at the Silver Spur Court in Elphinstone, the narrator 
reports that  
 Lo crawled out [of the car] and shivered a little: the luminous evening air was decidedly  
 crisp.  Upon entering the cabin, she sat down on a chair at a card table, buried her face in  
 the crook of her arm and said she felt awful.  Shamming, I thought, shamming, no doubt,  
 to evade my caresses; I was passionately parched; but she began to whimper in an  
 unusually dreary way when I attempted to fondle her.  Lolita ill.  Lolita dying.  Her skin  
 was scalding hot!  I took her temperature, orally, then looked up a scribbled formula I  
 fortunately had in a jotter and after laboriously reducing the, meaningless to me, degrees  
 Fahrenheit to the intimate centigrade of my childhood, found that she had 40.4, which at  
 least made sense…I would have given her a sip of hot spiced wine, and two aspirins, and  
 kissed the fever away, if, upon an examination of her lovely uvula, one of the gems of her 
 body, I had not seen that it was burning red.  I undressed her.  her breath was bittersweet.  
 Her brown rose tasted of blood.  She was shaking from head to toe.  She complained of a  
 painful stiffness in the upper vertebrae—and I thought of poliomyelitis as any American  
 parent would.  Giving up all hope of intercourse, I wrapped her up in a lap robe and  
 carried her into the car. 353  
 
Absent a concept of Dolly’s potential for deception, a reader could very well interpret the 
situation in the above passage in terms of an adolescent girl’s helplessness at the hands of her 
rapist captor that is furthered by her falling ill.  However, after the above scene, Humbert 
Humbert drives Dolly to the hospital, where she stays until she is picked up by Quilty through 
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some collusive design ultimately unknown to the narrator; although he does suspect some sort of 
conspiracy between Dolly and one of the nurses. 354  Furthermore, Humbert Humbert concludes 
chapter 21, which sees Dolly perform for Quilty’s pleasure, by noting the possibility of an 
imminent deception on the part of Dolly:  “I saw Lolita’s eyes, and they seemed to be more 
calculating than frightened.” 355  This line occurs right before chapter 22 and three paragraphs 
before the scene of Dolly’s falling ill.  It is very possible then — though thoroughly unprovable 
— that Dolly’s falling ill was a feat of method acting for the purpose of escape.   
 Whether Dolly fell ill by her own design or had not, in fact, foreseen this illness yet 
capitalized on the opportunity it revealed in order to escape Humbert Humbert is ultimately of no 
consequence for our reading of the acting motif — for the last time that Humbert Humbert sees 
Dolly at the hospital, he suspects a “plot” and accuses Dolly of playing a “double game:” 
 Est-ce que tu ne m’aimes plus, ma Carmen? She never had.  At the moment I knew my  
 love was as hopeless as ever — and I also knew the two girls were conspirators, plotting  
 in Basque, or Zemfirian, against my hopeless love.  I shall go further and say that Lo was  
 playing a double game since she was also fooling sentimental Mary whom she had told, I  
 suppose, that she wanted to dwell with her fun-loving young uncle and not with cruel  
 melancholy me.  And another nurse whom I never identified, and the village idiot who  
 carted cots and coffins into the elevator, and the idiotic green love birds in a cage in the  
 waiting room — all were in the plot, the sordid plot.  I suppose Mary thought comedy  
 father Professor Humbertoldi was interfering with the romance between Dolly and her  
 father-substitute, roly-poly Romeo (for you were rather lardy, you know, Rom, despite all  
 that “snow” and “joy juice”).356 
 
This scene, like the bulk of Lolita, has a palimpsestic quality to it.  On the one hand, something 
like it occurred before Humbert Humbert wrote it all down during his last captivity 
(chronologically the last event in his narration).  On the other hand, there is Humbert Humbert’s 
actual, post-facto record of the event (which is the passage above) with attendant 
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reconsiderations and re-evaluations.  The palimpsestic quality shows strongest in the last line 
above, for, though Dolly supposedly tells Humbert the identity of her co-eloper only after the 
events in Elphinstone, Humbert Humbert addresses Quilty in this passage and ascribes to him 
details he is yet to know, if we are to fix the events of the passage chronologically.  In any case, 
though we see that Humbert Humbert notes in the passage that Dolly was playing “a double 
game” — a punning nod to both Dolly’s act of double-agent-like deception and to her usual 
deceptive act of tennis — with the sentimental nurse by telling her a story (a Commedia 
dell’arte-like story, no less) of a romance interrupted by an overbearing father, it is unlikely that 
Humbert Humbert realized the extent of Dolly’s actual deception as he suggests it.  Dolly even 
flaunted her deception: “Incidentally, I want all my clothes…,” yet Humbert Humbert, who 
would spend the next four months frantically searching for Dolly following her escape after this 
scene, does not seem to react as he would have, had he known Dolly to be actively deceiving 
him. 357 
 Ultimately, Dolly deceives Humbert Humbert using the mimetic art of acting: she feeds 
the nurse false information, essentially co-opts her as an agent, and remains poker-faced in the 
presence of Humbert Humbert.  In blending non-utilitarian artistry (as noted by Humbert 
Humbert) and the utilitarian need to evade Humbert Humbert, Dolly’s use of acting matches up 
to Nabokov’s view of mimicry.  Furthermore, at the animalistic level of hunt and evasion, Dolly 
and Humbert Humbert display  the relationship between prey and predator, which forms the 
basis of — though not the ultimate justification for — Nabokovian mimicry in the natural world.  
This hunt and evasion is also found in Schopenhauer’s view of the will in the natural world, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter.  The conflict that the world Will produces between 
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its phenomenalized instantiations, i.e. between its manifested hunters and preys, is seen in Lolita 
in odd remarks and asides.  Allusions also abound that indicate Humbert Humbert as a hunter.  
The most obvious allusion “casting” Humbert Humbert as a hunter also has Dolly acting in an 
actual cast.  The allusion in question is also Lolita’s play within a play, Quilty’s The Enchanted 
Hunters, which he supposedly wrote while he, Dolly, and Humbert Humbert stayed at the 
eponymous hotel.  A disinterested Humbert Humbert describes the play thus: 
Being much occupied at the time with my own literary labors, I did not bother to read the 
complete text of The Enchanted Hunters, the playlet in which Dolly Haze was assigned 
the part of a farmer’s daughter who imagines herself to be a woodland witch, or Diana, or 
something, and who, having got hold of a book on hypnotism, plunges a number of lost 
hunters into various entertaining trances before falling in her turn under the spell of a 
vagabond poet (Mona Dahl) […] The red-capped, uniformly attired hunters, of which one 
was a banker, another a plumber, a third a policeman, a fourth an undertaker, a fifth an 
underwriter, a sixth an escaped convict (you see the possibilities!), went through a 
complete change of mind in Dolly’s Dell, and remembered their real lives only as dreams 
or nightmares from which little Diana had aroused them; but a seventh Hunter (in a green 
cap, the fool) was a Young Poet, and he insisted, much to Diana’s annoyance, that she 
and the entertainment provided (dancing nymphs, and elves, and monsters) were his, the 
Poet’s invention.  I understand that finally, in utter disgust at this cocksureness, 
barefooted Dolly was to lead check-trousered Mona to the paternal farm behind the 
Perilous Forest to prove to the braggard she was not a poet’s fancy, but a rustic, down-to-
brown-earth lass—and a last minute kiss was to enforce the play’s profound message, 
namely, that mirage and reality merge in love. (200-201) 
 
Dolly Haze’s role of a woodland witch (or the patron Goddess of hunters), which hypnotizes and 
variously enchants the green-capped hunters in Quilty’s narrative, mirrors Humbert’s narrative 
(which purportedly frames the former), if distortedly.  In his own narrative, Humbert shares the 
status of enchanted hunter with his double, Quilty. 
  Humbert’s status as predator or hunter is also frequently noted in Lolita.  The analogy of 
his sexual predation of Dolly with literal predation is made explicit in one scene, while Humbert 
indulges in voyeurism: “I felt that my perception of her, if properly concentrated upon, might be 
sufficient to have me attain a beggar’s bliss immediately; but, like some predator that prefers 
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moving prey to a motionless one, I planned to have this pitiful attainment coincide with one of 
the various girlish movements she made now and then…”358 A few pages later, the prime organ 
of the sexually predating voyeur and that of the predator tout court combine in one image: “Her 
adorable profile, parted lips, warm hair were some three inches from my bared eyetooth…”  A 
mere page later, Humbert Humbert compares himself to an actual predator: “I am like one of 
those inflated pale spiders you see in old gardens” 359  Finally, half-way into the book, Humbert 
Humbert notices that Quilty is following him and Dolly by car — another hunter has eyes for his 
prey/prize.  A chance policeman, however, interrupts the chase:  
 A traffic policeman, deep in the nightmare of crisscross streets — at half-past-four P.M. in 
 a factory town—was the hand of chance that interrupted the spell.  He beckoned me on,  
 and then with the same hand cut off my shadow.  A score of cars were launched in  
 between us, and I sped on, and deftly turned into a narrow lane.  A sparrow alighted with  
 a jumbo bread crumb, was tackled by another, and lost the crumb.”360  
 
The fact that Humbert doesn’t mention where, exactly (on the hood of the car?, on the street?, on 
a picnic table?), this sparrow alighted contributes to the impression that this otherwise unrelated 
tableau of animalistic conflict did not happen sequentially after the chase was cut off by the 
policeman but that it was the metaphorical retelling of a nearly successful hunt, predation or theft  
of Humbert’s prey by Humbert’s enemy.  In any event, the sparrow makes a reprise right after 
Humbert last sees Dolly at the Elphinstone hospital.  Back at the Silver Spur Court, Humbert  
 was a little delirious—and on the following day I was still a vibration rather than a solid,  
 for when I looked out of the bathroom window at the adjacent lawn, I saw Dolly’s  
 beautiful young bicycle propped up there on its support, the graceful front wheel looking  
 away from me, as it always did, and a sparrow perched on the saddle — but it was the  
 landlady’s bike…361 
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Just as the conflict seen in Quilty’s chase of Humbert is seemingly represented by the sparrows’ 
fighting over a jumbo piece of bread before it is momentarily interrupted, the conclusion of this 
conflict — one hunter’s stealth of another’s prize — seems to be represented by the lonely 
sparrow sitting on what seems to be the property of Humbert’s own, former prize. 
 Bearing Nabokov’s statements on mimicry in mind, we can see that Humbert Humbert’s 
deception by mimicry proves that, ontologically at least, Humbert Humbert is nothing higher 
than a mere predator, whose talents and abilities do not fall beyond the pale of the utilitarian 
motivations to hunt for what he desires.  For “when a protective device [is] carried to a point of 
mimetic subtlety, exuberance, and luxury far in excess of a predator’s power of appreciation,”362 
then only those who have aesthetically evolved beyond predators can appreciate it.  That 
Humbert Humbert has not achieved this kind of aesthetic — and moral and metaphysical — 
evolution can also be seen from his nearly complete ignorance of flora and fauna as 
demonstrated throughout the novel.  When he is picking Dolly up from Camp Q, for example, he 
sees “some gaudy moth or butterfly, still alive, safely pinned to the wall,” yet cannot decide how 
to classify the presumable lepidopteran even colloquially.363  Some twenty-odd pages later, 
Humbert cannot come up with the name for the “hundreds of powdered bugs wheeling around 
the lamps…” outside of the Enchanted Hunters Motel.364  Nor does he identify the “inquisitive 
butterfly” that “passe[s], dipping” between Dolly and him while playing tennis.365  In one scene, 
Humbert confuses a hawkmoth for a humming bird.366  As for his ignorance of flora, the narrator 
admits as much during his first cross-country trip with Dolly: “..as a lovely, lonely, supercilious 
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grove (oaks, I thought: American trees at that stage were beyond me) started to echo greenly the 
rush of our car…”.367  Later on, when describing a mountain scene, Humbert again registers 
vague plants: “heavenly-hued blossoms that I would fain call larkspur”. 368  On the same page, he 
claims that “in the Wilds of America the open-air lover will not find it easy to indulge in the 
most ancient of all crimes and pastimes” because ambiguous insects and plants will presumably 
make it difficult: “[p]oisonous plants burn his sweetheart’s buttocks, nameless insects sting his.”   
 Though Humbert Humbert is far from uncultured and uneducated, his epistemological 
domain seems to be restricted to literature.  It is as if he can know the world  only through 
literature.  This singularly literary perceptual prism is seen in his comments on nature: “We came 
to know —nous connûmes, to use a Flaubertian intonation—the stone cottages under enormous 
Chateaubriandesque trees…”369  A few pagers later, he describes two sets of flowers as “spired 
blue” and “dim,” respectively, giving the reader an impressionistic (though unclear) image of 
natural surroundings. 370  During the hospital scene in Elphinstone, using the “attractive botanical 
work” which he had brought for sick Dolly, Humbert “attempt[s]…to identify my flowers.  This 
proved impossible”.371  
  In positing a correspondence between nature, and specifically the camouflaged mimic 
qua hidden sign, and a higher realm of reality, Nabokov’s theory of mimicry seems like a 
specialized reiteration of the Romantic view of the correspondences between signs in the 
phenomenal world which point to a truer, eternal world.  This theory’s specific focus on flora 
and fauna, however, is also very reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s theory of natural signs.  In The 
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World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer dwells upon the ability to glimpse at this 
higher reality through the observation of, and meditation upon, plants and animals: 
 [The] knowledge of the Ideas at higher grades…can…be directly shared by us   
 through the purely contemplative perception of plants, and by the observation of animals, 
 and indeed of the latter in their free, natural, and easy state.  The objective contemplation  
 of their many different and marvelous forms, and of their actions and behaviour, is an  
 instructive lesson from the great book of nature; it is the deciphering of the true signatura 
 rerum [the signature of things].  We see in it the manifold grades and modes of   
 manifestation of the will that is one and the same in all beings and everywhere wills the  
 same thing.  This will objectifies itself as life, as existence, in such endless succession  
 and variety, in such different forms, all of which are accommodations to the various  
 external conditions, and can be compared to many variations of the same theme.  But if  
 we had to convey to the beholder, for reflection and in a word, the explanation and  
 information about their inner nature, it would be best for us to use the Sanskrit formula  
 which occurs so often in the sacred books of the Hindus, and is called Mahavakya, i.e.,  
 the great word: ‘Tat tvam asi,’ which means ‘This living thing art thou.’”372 
 
By “signature of things,” Schopenhauer makes reference to Jakob Boehme’s proposition that 
God left his signature upon all members of his creation.373  For Schopenhauer the truth of the 
world — that tat tvam asi — can be seen in nature, if it is observed closely and pondered.  Given 
that Humbert Humbert is incapable of parsing nature, and hence, of correctly observing it, he is 
incapable of truly understanding how the will operates in the natural world — a world of which 
he ultimately makes part.  
 Instead of quieting his will and meditating upon his relationship with nature and with 
others, Humbert Humbert uses the tools made available by his will in order to justify his position 
against others.   Due to the taboo status of his desires and the acts that he carries out, a good deal 
of his task as a narrator concerns the persuasion of the reader (and, generally, of those who 
would judge and condemn him) to accept his point of view.  To this end, Humbert Humbert 
employs a wide range of discourses, from the scientific to the historical to the sociological and 
                                                 
 372 L, 219-220.  
 373 See WaWaR I, 220n29. 
 
145 
even the purely biological, in order to persuade his would-be judgers to frame the act any 
reasonable person would term as child molestation and rape within relativizing and softening 
contexts.  These discourses appear in passages of a variety of lengths.  Sometimes Humbert 
Humbert drops “sociological” asides which point, for example, to what he views as the 
inconsistency of cultural mores.  He views, for example, the civilization in which he matured as 
one “which allows a man of twenty-five to court a girl of sixteen but not a girl of twelve.”374 In 
other passages, the narrator enumerates examples from other cultures and from history in order 
to characterize his desire for young girls as more ordinary:  
 Marriage and cohabitation before the age of puberty are still not uncommon in certain  
 East Indian provinces.  Lepcha old men of eighty copulate with girls of eight, and nobody 
 minds.  After all, Dante fell madly in love with his Beatrice when she was nine, a   
 sparkling girleen, painted and lovely, and bejeweled, in a crimson frock, and this was in  
 1274, in Florence, at a private feast in the merry month of May.  And when Petrarch fell  
 madly in love with his Laureen, she was a fair-haired nymphet of twelve…375 
 
Yet, as is evident from the above quote, H.H., who strives throughout the entire novel to be 
perceived as a gifted writer, also tries to persuade the reader that the experience of passion for a 
young girl is common among those endowed with artistic genius. 
 Sometimes Humbert Humbert blurs the line between science and pseudo-science or 
speculative theory in presenting his view of “nymphets.”  In such instances, the air of legitimacy 
that the language employed imbues on the discourse seems to marginalize the question of this 
discourse’s actual legitimacy: 
  Now I wish to introduce the following idea.  Between the age limits of nine and  
 fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain bewitched travelers, twice or many times  
 older than they, reveal their true nature which is not human, but nymphic (that is,   
 demoniac); and these chosen creatures I propose to designate as “nymphets.”  
  It will be marked that I substitute time terms for spatial ones.  In fact, I would  
 have the reader see “nine’ and “fourteen” as the boundaries—the mirror beaches and rosy 
 rocks—of an enchanted island haunted by those nymphets of mine and surrounded by a  
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 vast, misty sea.  Between those age limits, are all girl-children nymphets?  Of course not.  
 Otherwise, we who are in the know, we lone voyagers, we nympholepts, would have long 
 gone insane.  Neither are good looks any criterion; and vulgarity, or at least what a given  
 community terms so, does not necessarily impair certain mysterious characteristics, the  
 fey grace, the elusive, shifty, soul-shattering, insidious charm that separates the nymphet  
 from such coevals of hers as are incomparably more dependent on the spatial world of  
 synchronous phenomena than on that intangible island of entranced time where Lolita  
 plays with her likes.376 
 
The “idea” that Humbert Humbert introduces has many of the trappings of an educated, 
epistemologically self-certain discourse.  There is the preciseness in the delimitation of the age-
range at which a girl can be a nymphet — a 15 year-old girl cannot be a nymphet for Humbert 
Humbert.  There is the use of discourse-specific terminology: nymphic, nymphet, and 
nympholept.  This last term, with its scientific sounding suffix “-lept” adds an air of scientific 
legitimacy to Humbert’s “idea.”377  Lastly, in the quote above, there is talk of what is not part of 
the criteria for the proper categorization of nymphets.  H.H's indication of criteria presumes or 
would persuade one to presume the need here for the conceptual categorization of a phenomenon 
that is not simple, but complex — otherwise, why the need for conceptual categorization?  The 
learned passage above culminates, appropriately, with an experiment: “A normal man given a 
group photograph of schoolgirls or Girl Scouts and asked to point out the comeliest one will not 
necessarily choose the nymphet among them.” 378  It seems as though the object of the narrator’s 
description is both a psychological condition (nympholepsy) — also termed “pederosis,” on page 
55 — which would explain the appropriateness of a psychological experiment, and a discipline 
of study.  This last aspect is seen from the terminology and the theoretical delimitations that 
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Humbert Humbert employs.  He also acknowledges that the condition/discipline is something to 
be studied:   
 Furthermore, since the idea of time plays such a magic part in the matter, the student  
 should not be surprised to learn that there must be a gap of several years, never less  
 than ten I should say, generally thirty or forty, and as many as ninety in a few    
 known cases, between maiden and man to enable the latter to come under a nymphet’s  
 spell.  It is a question of focal adjustment, of a certain distance that the inner eye thrills to 
 surmount, and a certain contrast that the mind perceives with a gasp of perverse   
 delight.379 
                    
Humbert Humbert’s historical and sociological justifications for his desire also shade into legal 
arguments and arguments from nature:  
 The stipulation of the Roman law, according to which a girl may marry at twelve, was  
 adopted by the Church, and is still preserved, rather tacitly, in some of the United States.   
 And fifteen is lawful everywhere.  There is nothing wrong, say both hemispheres, when a 
 brute of forty, blessed by the local priest and bloated with drink, sheds his sweat-  
 drenched finery and thrusts himself up to the hilt into his youthful bride.  “In such  
 stimulating temperate climates [says an old magazine in this prison library] as St. Louis,  
 Chicago and Cincinnati, girls mature about the end of their twelfth year.”  Dolly Haze  
 was born less than three hundred miles from stimulating Cincinnati.  I have but followed  
 nature.  I am nature’s faithful hound.  Why then this horror that I cannot shake off?  Did I 
 deprive her of her flower?  Sensitive gentlewomen of the jury, I was not even her first  
 lover.380 
 
As we can see, Humbert Humbert, in his bid to convince the reader and anybody that would 
judge him, “hedges” his bet by using diverse rationalizing discourses.  Marriage to a twelve-
year-old had been legal in history, is tacitly accepted now, and Dolly is very close to the age at 
which marriage for a girl is definitely legal.  This pseudo-legal justification is then interrupted by 
a more rhetorical, yet no less effective, juxtaposition between the drunken brute and his 
“youthful bride.”  Finally Humbert Humbert ends by saying that since girls mature by the end of 
their twelfth year, certainly sex with them is also natural, hence worthy of moral and legal 
approval. 
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 That Nabokov may have constructed Humbert Humbert as an example of an entity under 
the direct control of the Schopenhauerian will is not far-fetched precisely because, in The World 
as Will and Representation as in Lolita, the desires of the will are always justified by the 
discourse of knowledge.  In Schopenhauer at least, knowledge in general, arises out of the will 
precisely as an extension, a mechanism that promotes it.  In Schopenhauer’s version of 
evolutionary biology, the capacity to represent the world in terms of systematized knowledge is 
something that appears at the higher grades of the will (i.e., in more complex organisms): 
 Objectifying itself more distinctly from grade to grade, yet still completely without  
 knowledge as an obscure driving force, the will acts in the plant kingdom. Here not  
 causes proper, but stimuli, are the bond of its phenomena. Finally, it also acts in the  
 vegetative part of the animal phenomenon, in the production and formation of every  
 animal, and in the maintenance of its interior economy, where mere stimuli still always  
 determine its phenomenon. The higher and higher grades of the will’s objectivity lead  
 ultimately to the point where the individual expressing the Idea could no longer obtain its 
 food for assimilation through mere movement consequent on stimuli. Such a stimulus  
 must be waited for; but here the food is of a kind that is more specially determined, and  
 with the ever-growing multiplicity of the phenomena, the crowd and confusion have  
 become so great that they disturb one another, and the chance event from which the  
 individual moved by mere stimuli has to expect its food would be too unfavourable. The  
 food must therefore be sought and selected, from the point where the animal has   
 delivered itself from the egg or the womb in which it vegetated without knowledge. Thus  
 movement consequent on motives and, because of this, knowledge, here become   
 necessary; and hence knowledge enters as an expedient, μηχανή, required at this stage of  
 the will’s objectification for the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the  
 species. It appears represented by the brain or a larger ganglion, just as every other effort  
 or determination of the self-objectifying will is represented by an organ, in other words,  
 is manifested for the representation as an organ.  But with this expedient, with this  
 μηχανή, the world as representation now stands out at one stroke with all its forms, object 
 and subject, time, space, plurality, and causality. The world now shows its second side;  
 hitherto mere will, it is now at the same time representation, object of the knowing  
 subject. 381 
 
Thus the ability to represent the world from data collected through perception is something that 
appears with the mobile living phenomena of the will, and, specifically, with foragers and 
hunters.  With the plant kingdom, the process of nutrition is supplied by external stimuli that 
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somehow affect the will directly.  The more complex the living being, the more complex the 
process of its nutrition, until it reaches a level of complexity where food must be acquired with a 
high degree of selectivity.  Food selection requires a representation of the world through 
knowledge.  Though this is the mere beginning of knowledge as an apparatus for the satisfaction 
of the phenomenalized will’s appetites and, ultimately the promulgation of its idea, 
Schopenhauer argues that the whole spectrum of knowledge is beholden to the will: 
 Thus knowledge in general, rational knowledge as well as mere knowledge from   
 perception, proceeds originally from the will itself, belongs to the inner being of the  
 higher grades of the will’s objectifications as a mere μηχανή [mechane, machine, 
 contrivance, device], a means for preserving the individual and the species, just like any  
 organ of the body.  Therefore, destined originally to serve the will for the achievement of  
 its aims, knowledge remains almost throughout entirely subordinate to its service; this is  
 the case with all animals and almost all men.” (152)  
 
Similarly, Humbert Humbert’s own rationalizations, his use of biological and historical 
knowledge seem to follow from the impulse to satisfy his appetites and to promote his idea, and 
not from some universal state of affairs.   
 Schopenhauer’s summation of knowledge is, however, not totally pessimistic: he says 
that “knowledge remains almost thoroughly entirely subordinate to [the] service” of the will.  
Yet  one’s epistemological subordination to the will is thrown off precisely in the moment 
knowledge is used to deny the will.  Humbert Humbert does not seem ultimately to shift away 
from a paradigm where his discourse deviates from his selfish desires.  He does seem at one 
point, however, to meditate upon his actions sincerely enough to be allowed one epiphany in the 
novel.  Humbert Humbert appropriately places the description of this epiphany at the very end of 
the novel.  After his describing the aftermath of his murder of Quilty, Humbert Humbert recounts 
that he “evoked a last mirage of wonder and hopelessness.” The mirage evoked is the memory of 
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a vision he saw on the road after Dolly’s disappearance.  After “an attack of abominable nausea 
forced” Humbert to pull to the side of the road, the narrator walks to a precipice above a valley: 
As I approached the friendly abyss, I grew aware of a melodious unity of sounds rising 
like vapor from a small mining town that lay at my feet, in a fold of the valley.  One 
could make out the geometry of the streets between blocks of red and gray roofs, and the 
green puffs of trees, and a serpentine stream, and the rich, ore-like glitter of the city 
dump, and beyond the town, roads crisscrossing the crazy quilt of dark and pale fields 
and behind it all, gray timbered mountains.  But even brighter than those quietly rejoicing 
colors—for there are colors and shades that seem to enjoy themselves in good 
company—both brighter and dreamier to the ear than they were to the eye, was that 
vapory vibration of accumulated sounds that never ceased for a moment, as it rose to the 
lip of granite where I stood wiping my foul mouth.  And soon I realized that all these 
sounds were of one nature, that no other sounds but these came from the streets of the 
transparent town, with the women at home and the men away.  Reader!  What I heard 
was but the melody of children at play, nothing but that, and so limpid was the air that 
within this vapor of blended voices, majestic and minute, remote and magically near, 
frank and divinely enigmatic—one could hear now and then, as if released, an almost 
articulate spurt of vivid laughter, or the crack of a bat, or the clatter of a toy wagon, but it 
was all really too far for the eye to distinguish any movement in the lightly etched streets.  
I stood listening to that musical vibration from my lofty slope, to those flashes of separate 
cries with a kind of demure murmur for background, and then I knew that the hopelessly 
poignant thing was not Lolita's absence form my side, but the absence of her voice from 
that concord.”382 
 
In structure and substance, this epiphany is strongly reminiscent of the metaphysical epiphany 
that Ella experiences in The Tragedy of Mister Morn and the one that V. experiences in The Real 
life of Sebastian Knight. Like Ella and V., Humbert experiences something akin to a selflessness 
vis-à-vis another person and this selflessness is associated with the realization that it is proper to 
belong to a sort of unity (or blend, or one nature).  Though its relationship to a metaphysical 
realm remains ambiguous, it is clear that this unity is a unity of consciousnesses, represented 
here by voices.  Humbert’s epiphany, however, is different from the ones that we have already 
seen in The Tragedy of Mister Morn and The Real Life of Sebastian Knight in some respects and 
is quite likely incomplete.  In The Tragedy of Mister Morn, Ella’s realization of suffering in the 
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world allowed her to see the oneness of things, whereas in Lolita, Humbert realizes he is the 
cause of suffering and because of this suffering, Dolly does not belong to the concord of voices.  
It is in this respect that Humbert’s vision (or aural experience) is also of a unity of innocent 
childhood of a communion of children at play.  
 Yet there is something curiously determinist about Humbert’s assertion that Dolly’s voice 
was not among that “melodious unity.”  The assertion, if it touches on metaphysics, ignores  the 
possibility that Schopenhauer’s Sanskrit dictum, tat tvam asi, “this you are too,” might be true 
and thus that Humbert and Dolly are also part of the unity.  If the assertion is made with 
reference to a more mundane plane, then it ignores the possibility that Dolly Haze’s practice of 
acting, which led her to her freedom, could also lead her to join a different, though just as joyful, 
unity.  In short, in asserting “that the hopelessly poignant thing was not Lolita's absence form my 
side, but the absence of her voice from that concord,” Humbert reenacts the very theft of Dolly’s 
possibility of self-transcendence (or transcendence tout court) that he had been committing for 
the entire duration of his interaction with Dolly. In the next chapter, when turn towards our 
comparison of Bakhtin and Nabokov, we will argue that this epiphany does exactly that.  We will 
argue that Humbert discounts the possibility that Dolly could ever join that concord of children’s 
voices precisely to retain narrative control and shape the story into a genre and version of events 
that he favors.  For now, let us say that the possibility of Dolly’s transcendence can only be 
considered if Lolita is read against Humbert’s narratological point of view.  
 Humbert Humbert also hints at a Schopenhauerian monism of consciousness through 
numerous hints that his arch-nemesis, Quilty, is his double.  Though the narrator ultimately 
blames Quilty for stealing Dolly from him, he also repeatedly alludes to a kinship with him.  
Humbert calls him “brother” in one instance, for example.  Two pages later, Dolly calls Quilty 
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Humbert’s brother. 383  The affirmation of kinship, or rather, the indications of an identity 
between Humbert and Quilty gain momentum when Humbert seeks revenge from his nemesis at 
the end of the novel.  When Quilty, shot and wounded, fled Humbert in the murder scene at 
Pavor manor, “he swept by me in a purple bathrobe, very like one I had.”384  At one point the 
narrator drops the gun and then wrestles for it with Quilty: “I rolled over him.  We rolled over 
me.  They rolled over him.  We rolled over us.” 385  In the second sentence of this quote, the “we” 
is definitely a collective plural, yet the “me” seems like a collective singular.  In the third 
sentence, “they” could refer to other consciousnesses that inhabit the “we” or “me” as well.  In 
the fourth sentence, the simultaneous identification of the subject and the object seems to make 
most sense within a metaphysical frame that allows the simultaneous possibility of individuation 
and henotic unity.  Even the fact that Humbert kills Quilty (or narrates that he does) is almost an 
act of denial that Quilty might share some sort of kinship with him.  The denial is evocative of 
Aikhenvald’s “restatement" of Schopenhauer’s Mahavakya: “This I am not, this I am not.”386 
Curiously, Humbert’s murder-as-denial of Quilty is itself reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s 
personal variation of the Mahavakya: “This animal that you kill, you are it too!”  For Quilty’s 
injuries, it seems, also affect Humbert: “His condition infected me, the weapon felt limp and 
clumsy in my hand.387”   Quilty’s blood and gore are metaphorically also Humbert’s own: “I 
reloaded the thing with hands that were black and bloody—I had touched something he had 
anointed with his thick gore.”  “I was all covered with Quilty—with the fell of that tumble before 
the bleeding” 388  
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 Ultimately, Humbert was blind or chose to be blind to the possibility of some unifying 
factor between him and Quilty.  His loss of Dolly was also due to a sort of blindness.  In a sense, 
Humbert Humbert’s blindness places him besides Ganus, in the role of Othello, or Midia, in the 
role of Isolde, or Cincinnatus’ jailers.  Nevertheless, what, exactly, Humbert Humbert is blind to 
is expressed differently in Lolita than the object of the other character’s blindness in The 
Tragedy of Mister Morn, and Invitation to a Beheading.  For Ganus, Midia, and Cincinnatus’ 
jailers, like Schopenhauer’s actors and marionettes, are ignorant of and blind to the fact of their 
replaying old roles.  Humbert Humbert, however, is blind to the role played by Dolly.  Even if 
we trust the narrator when he says that he suspected Dolly’s to be deceiving him as events 
unfolded (and not post facto, in his recording and redaction of these events), he was not astute 
enough to catch up with Dolly’s act.  The actor, then, is not blinded in Lolita, it is the one who 
makes blind.  Or perhaps there are many actors (or marionettes) in Lolita, and Dolly is the only 
one who is aware she is acting.   
 The blending, in Lolita, of the two theatrical motifs, one that equates acting with the 
peremptory following of an eternal, poshlyi script, and another that equates acting with willful 
self-assertion, self-transformation, and the evasion of the strictures of identity, whether imposed 
by the self or by another; this blending is reminiscent of the very tension between views of acting 
and of theater that Aikhenvald presented in his “Negation of Theater.”  In chapter 2, we noted 
that Aikhenvald viewed the medium of theater as essentially derivative, lacking in a true 
creativity properly its own, and always creatively determined by the always prior medium of 
prose.  In his speech and essay, Aikhenvald attempts to prove the non-artistic status of theater 
and theatricality by casting them as phenomena that arise at the very threshold of artistic 
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consciousness and/or life.389  To this end, he summarizes Nikolai Evreinov’s concept of 
“theatricality” (teatral’nost’), which the latter distinguishes from art and considers as pre-
artistic.390  However non- or pre-artistic Evreinov’s notion of theatricality may be,  this notion is 
still opposite to that of Aikhenvald’s view of theater, of the actor, as a subject of another artistic 
medium.  Evreinov’s notion of theatricality has nothing to do with being determined or being 
controlled by anything — on the contrary, his view of theatricality revolves around the actor’s 
control of his very nature.  Aikhenvald’s rather associative meditation and paraphrasing of 
Evreinov’s theory of theatricality ultimately leads us to a place within his thoughts on theater 
which signals a break in and reversal of his influence upon Nabokov, and to the possibility that 
Nabokov may have embellished and appropriated Evreinov’s notion of theatricality, either from 
Aikhenvald’s paraphrase or from Evreinov himself.  With this appropriation Nabokov effectively 
undoes Aikhenvald’s view of theatricality as subjection.  As for Evreinov’s view of theatricality, 
there seems to be an uncanny affinity between it and Nabokov’s portrayal of the acting motif, 
with its associated bioaesthetic sub-motif of mimicry, in Lolita.  According to 
Aikhenvald/Evreinov, theatricality “is a conscious change of the exterior of life, the striving to 
impart upon it something, to re-dress life.”391 The same is true of the actor, the Nabokovian 
mimic, and doubly, of Dolly Haze, whose last name carries within it the concept of 
changeability.  Aikhenvald/Evreinov puts this same thought succinctly: to “seem,” is better than 
to “be.”392  Dolly Haze explores this very parallax through her dissembling, when she adopts, for 
example, a fashionable cover story that explains her mother’s odd absence from her life.  For 
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Dolly, her seeming is definitely better than her being.  Dolly’s dissembling, her self-re-
fashioning, her desire to escape the drabness of her life with Humbert in order to embrace the 
possibilities of theater provided by Quilty are also reminiscent of Aikhenvald/Evreinov’s 
thoughts on nature: “nature does not want to be nature. Its self is too little for it.”393 In The 
Demon of Theatricality, Evreinov says further on nature: “Nature is not at all the great mother 
that bore us.  She is our creation.”394  Thus Evreinov’s view of nature is at odds with that 
ontology that is, in Schopenhauer, controlled by the will.  The Schopenhauerian Commedia 
dell’arte actor, the person who lives life abiding only by its practicalities and physical appetites, 
is played by nature.  Evreinov’s homo theatricus, on the other hand, controls nature and changes 
it at will.  It is our belief that Dolly Haze is just such an example of homo theatricus; she changes 
her form at will, and this transformation has two results, one practical and one aesthetic.  The 
practical result of Dolly’s mimicry is her evasion of Humbert Humbert.  The true aesthetic result 
of her mimicry can only be potentially discerned by the reader (i.e., not by H.H.) since Humbert 
Humbert only sees Dolly’s performance through the prism of mundane lust. 
 Thus Dolly Haze, the mimic and actress, takes the metaphysically positive motif of acting 
— a motif which starts with King Morn’s bauta mask and is seen again in V.’s “mask of his 
brother’s face” — full circle.  In both The Tragedy of Mister Morn and Lolita, the positive 
theatrical motif is displayed opposite the theatrical motif that negates self-transcendence and 
symbolizes subjection to a Sisyphean poshlost’.  Nabokov both retains the parameters of the 
Schopenhauerian/Aikhenvaldian theatrical symbolism of metaphysics and alters them.  We 
contend that he does so not to oppose Schopenhauerian/Aikhenvaldian metaphysics, but to 
amend it.  Thus, whereas the Schopenhauerian metaphysical Bildung requires man qua 
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marionette or actor to cut the wires or quit the stage in order to proceed toward a monistic 
henosis, the Nabokovian hero need only to realize that he or she is acting and to keep acting.  
Perhaps what is most important for the Nabokovian actor is the awareness that one is acting.  In 
any case, the transcendence afforded the conscious Nabokovian actor occurs within mechanics 
that parallel Schopenhauer’s.  At times, the conscious actor symbolizes the capacity to discern 
the divine sign that shines through to the mundane plane. This is seen in Morn’s otherworldly 
combination of political power and benevolent rule — his political wisdom comes from the 
blurring of his identity with a sort of regal monism.  At other times, as with Dolly Haze, the 
conscious actor symbolizes the divine sign itself, what Schopenhauer calls the signatura rerum 
(the divine signature on all things).   
 Yet in the world of Lolita, Dolly as the divine sign is ignored and/or left unrecognized.  
The non-recognition of the metaphysical aspect of Dolly’s acting points to another dimension of 
Nabokov’s retooling of the theatrical motif.  Whereas Schopenhauer and Aikhenvald’s unwitting 
actor symbolizes the state of being controlled by poshlost’/ the will, it is Humbert Humbert, the 
main spectator in Lolita, that exhibits all of the trappings associated with the dominion of an 
insurmountable appetite.  Humbert Humbert is a predator, in all of the senses of that term, and 
like an apex predator of the apex species, he is equipped with all tools necessary to safeguard, 
nurture, and satisfy his appetite.  He is endowed with an intelligence that successfully convinces 
him, and perhaps some of his readers, of the appropriateness of his appetite, thus his capacity for 
justification effectively aids his appetite.  However, like a predator training stereoscopic vision 
upon the slightest movements of his prey, he is blind to what lies outside of his practical focus; 
he is blind to the microscopic operations of a nature that seeks to continuously re-clad itself in 
difference and to seem different than what it is.  Like the Nabokovian predator that cannot 
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appreciate the sheer theatrical display put on by a Dead Leaf Butterfly, Humbert Humbert 
symbolizes both the generic appetite that drives conflict in nature and the philistinism that 
renders even a representative of the most aesthetically gifted species incapable of appreciating 
the kind of beauty that has nothing to do with his appetite.  Both this appetite and this 
philistinism characterize humankind’s fractured ontology for Schopenhauer, Aikhenvald, and 
Nabokov.  For the philosopher, critic, and author equally, only genuine art can make this 
ontology whole. 
 Although Humbert Humbert’s role of spectator to Dolly Haze’s performance is doubly 
analogous to the predator deceived by mimicry and to the philistine unable to see real beauty, his 
role as the narrator of the very narrative that contains Dolly and her performance also places him 
in the position to display why humankind as a species is representative of a near perfectly 
objectified Schopenhauerian will.  While animal hunters represent, for Schopenhauer, a 
significant link in the phenomenalized chain of the world will due to their capacity to perceive 
and represent the world and to use this capacity to satisfy their will-driven appetites, the human 
being raises this capacity to the point where the nature of the conflict that characterizes life is 
fundamentally shifted.  The specifically human domain of this conflict thus becomes war waged 
via knowledge, ideology, and symbolic representation.  Humbert Humbert, then, not only wages 
a conflict with Dolly in order to satisfy his appetite, he also wages a conflict of persuasion and of 
representation with his reader and with other characters in order to promote his version of truth 
— since his version of truth can ultimately only best serve his appetitive interests. 
 The task of the last chapter of this study is then to compare Hermann’s and Humbert 
Humbert’s ideological conflict in Lolita with Bakhtin’s concept of monologism.  This chapter 
will explore Bakhtin’s theory of monologism as a very descriptive addendum to Schopenhauer’s 
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theory of the will; i.e. it will look at monologism as the promulgation of the will through 
ideology, representation, and symbolism.  Yet since monologism in practice is never the stable 
insistence on a state of affairs which characterizes theoretical monologism, the next chapter will 
also look at how Bakhtin and Nabokov each formulate or dramatize a view of variable 
monologism — the kind of monologism whose fixity has less to do with a particular narrative 
and everything to do with the self of the monologist.  Since both Bakhtin and Nabokov lean on 
Dostoevsky for support in developing this kind of monologism, the next chapter will also explore 
the relationship between the two authors and the one critic.  The culmination of this study, 
however, will be the comparison of ideas that arise within Bakhtin and Nabokov.  Yet a closer 
look at the seeming analogies between the monologist, the first person narrator, and the artist qua 
lone subject representing the world will tease out unexpected conclusions concerning Bakhtin 
and Nabokov’s ultimate views of monologism 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONFLICT OF WILLS IN BAKHTIN AND NABOKOV 
 Though part of what draws our theorist and author conceptually near to each other seems 
to be the similarity of certain traits of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with Bakhtin’s theory and this 
philosophy’s influence upon Nabokov, Dostoevsky too forms another major bond between theorist 
and author.  It seems unnecessary to point out the importance of Dostoevsky in Bakhtin’s thought; 
his books themselves, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics and the prior Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Creativity, indicate the scope of this importance.  The importance Dostoevsky held for Nabokov, 
on the other hand, and the extent of this importance are trickier subjects of discussion.  
Nevertheless, a great deal of scholarly work has been done which addresses not only Dostoevsky 
as Nabokov’s parodic target but also as as a veritable source of literary techniques.395  Julian 
Connolly, for example, points out that  
  [w]hile there were enormous differences in artistic temperament, stylistic technique, and  
 philosophical world view, and Nabokov’s professed antipathy for Dostoevsky’s excesses  
 was both highly critical and highly public, the evidence of his prose fiction reveals a  
 more complex relationship.  When one looks at the entire body of Nabokov’s fiction, one  
 must conclude that Dostoevsky was not just a “figure of fun” to Nabokov the writer.396   
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Connolly concludes that “the young Nabokov found in Dostoevsky’s work a stimulating set of 
ideas and techniques that helped shape his own unique portraits of human imagination and 
obsession” (141).  It just so happens that among those stimulating ideas and techniques that 
Nabokov found and appropriated from Dostoevsky, many revolve around and portray one of the 
central concerns of Schopenhauer’s philosophy: the conflict that arises from a phenomenon’s397 
tendency to impose its Idea upon other phenomena.  As we saw in the first chapter of our study, 
this kind of conflict also forms the basis for the concepts of monologism and polyphony, and 
hence, the polyphonic drama that Bakhtin claims Dostoevsky inaugurated.  Though Bakhtin and 
Nabokov draw from Dostoevsky some conclusions about this conflict that ultimately diverge, there 
are some interesting convergences between the theorist and author. 
 In the following section, we will review those of Nabokov’s works (Tragedy of Mister 
Morn, Despair, Lolita) that have already been discussed in connection with Aikhenvald and 
Schopenhauer through the optic of Bakhtin’s concept of monologism as well as those dialogical 
concepts, the loophole, parody, that arise in reaction to monologism as well as the seemingly 
opposing concept of polyphony.  Two of these works, Despair and Lolita, are part of Nabokov’s 
own conscious response to Dostoevsky.  One further work, The Eye, will also be considered, due 
to the fact that, together with Despair and Lolita, it constitutes Nabokov’s deepest engagement 
with Dostoevsky. 398  It is, in fact, the nature of this engagement with Dostoevsky which will allow 
us to go beyond exploring how Nabokov employs a seemingly idiosyncratic version of 
monologism to see how Nabokov arrives at different though “Bakhtin-like” narratological and 
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philosophical conclusions from the very same Dostoevsky texts that form the basis for Bakhtin’s 
theory of monologism and polyphony. 
 
NARRATORIAL MONOLOGISM IN NABOKOV 
 In The Tragedy of Mister Morn, the most obvious monologist is Tremens.  Though 
Tremens reserves the possibility of being a monologist by virtue of being a character (according 
to Bakhtin’s view of characters), his monologism barely registers on the level of discourse.  
Besides verbal swipes at Ganus,399 Tremens does not really give self-serving descriptions of 
others.  Tremens’ monologism instead ensues from the ideology that he professes, an ideology of 
total destruction, which, if carried out to its logical conclusion, must of necessity go against the 
self-definition of all those who desire to exist.  Yet is Tremens conscious that the name he bears is 
an anagram of his very idea?  Did Tremens fashion a nom-de-guerre for himself or does he bear 
his name like a sign unbeknownst to him?  Though these questions cannot really be a answered, 
they raise the following issue: if we were to follow Bakhtin’s assumptions in interpreting the 
potential monologicity of a character within a literary work that is quite likely itself monological, 
we would but have to assume that Tremen’s ideology is an extension of the author’s in some 
manner.  Even if a character’s thoughts and ideas may seem to differ from the author’s, this does 
not by itself signal, according to Bakhtin, a polyphonic work and an independent character.  
Bakhtin draws attention to this possibility by saying that if a character’s thoughts and ideas 
seemingly contradict the author’s, “they are [ultimately] either polemically repudiated, or else they 
lose their power to signify directly and become simple elements of characterization, the mental 
gestures of the hero or his more stable mental qualities.”400  If an author agrees with the thoughts 
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uttered by characters, then these thoughts are “affirmed,” according to Bakhtin.  “Other thoughts 
and ideas — untrue or indifferent from the author’s point of view, not fitting into his world view 
— are not affirmed…” (ibid.).  Ultimately “an affirmed thought always sounds different from an 
unaffirmed one” (ibid.).  Indeed, Tremens’ ideology — which can be succinctly summarized by a 
couple of his lines: “Everything, Ganus, is destruction. And / the faster it is, the sweeter, the 
sweeter”401 — seems distinctly unaffirmed in The Tragedy of Mister Morn.  This ideology seems 
like sheer madness when compared, for example, to Ella’s message of selfless compassion for 
others.   
 Yet what makes Tremens’ ideology, and Hermann Karlovich’s and Humbert Humbert’s 
for that matter, unique from the point of view of a Bakhtinian analysis is not that they profess any 
old sort of ideology, but that they profess what could be termed as an anti-ideology.  For this 
reason, these characters’ monologisms merit at least a momentary consideration apart from any 
possible, overall authorial monologism.  Bakhtin holds that the ideologies professed by authors — 
and by characters in polyphonic novels — are idiosyncratic perspectives of themselves and the 
world and of their role in the world.  Because these perspectives see the entire world in a specific 
way, all others are relegated to roles that accord with this perspective.  However, a distinction 
needs to be made between perspectives which “merge” the roles of these other characters to the 
monologic vision of a specific author (or character) as a consequence of the totalizing vision of 
the world and perspectives whose vision is identified in the very monologization of the other.  
Bakhtin’s assumes the first kind of monological perspective throughout the Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  We, on the other hand, see the second kind of monological perspective 
operating in those of Nabokov’s works that we have reviewed by Nabokov; Tremens’, Hermann 
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Karlovich’s and Humbert Humbert’s ideologies seem to be geared for a specific objective: to 
monologize the other.  In Tremens, we see this objective in his advocacy for utter destruction.  
Tremens’ revolution, as we saw above, is not so much about shaping the world to conform to a 
better order, system or belief but about blotting the other — and the world — out utterly.  For all 
his talk about the “sweetness” or “beauty” of destruction, the symbol for Tremen’s ultimate goal 
is zero:  “…why do we / always want to grow, to climb uphill / from one to a thousand, when the 
downward path — from one to zero - is faster and sweeter?…”402  The monologism expounded by 
Tremens does not posit “something else,” — i.e. something other to the world-views of others — 
but literally nothing; it is defined by the very reduction of all others’ will and self-definition 
(indeed all others’ existence) to zero. 
 We also find the desire to nullify the other in the narrator of Despair, Hermann Karlovich.  
Like Tremens, Hermann displays much of his monological tendency on the level of content, that 
is, in what he says as opposed to how he says it.  A great deal of this ‘described’ monologism 
occurs within Hermann’s dynamic with the man he takes to be his double, Felix.  Another 
interesting aspect about Hermann’s monologism is that he is totally aware of it.  At one point in 
the novel, Hermann writes to Felix in order to lure him to a mortal trap, almost as if winking to the 
reader conscious of Bakhtin: “Dear Felix, I have found some work for you.  First of all we must 
have an eye-to-eye monologue and get things settled.”403  This eye-to-eye monologue — which 
invokes the outward semblance of a dialogue where one nevertheless does all the talking to the 
other — ultimately becomes the event where one murders the other (171).  Even the murder itself 
(murder being the ultimate symbol for the monological finalization of the other on the level of 
content) is the culmination of a series of acts that Hermann seduces Felix to undertake by 
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promising him monetary gain.  In fact, part of the plot of Despair is devoted to how Hermann gets 
Felix to do what he (Hermann) wants him to do.  According to Hermann, Felix was not always 
compliant:  “The fellow’s resistance, proper to one of limited intelligence and timorous humor, 
had to be broken down somehow.  So seduced was I by the neat naturalness of the theme, that I 
overlooked the probability of its being distasteful to him and even of its frightening him off as 
naturally as it had appealed to my fancy” (90).  In a discussion on monological finalization, 
Bakhtin comments on how Makar Devushkin felt upon reading Gogol’s The Overcoat: “he felt 
himself to be hopelessly predetermined and finished off, as if he were already quite dead…”404 In 
Despair, Hermann weaves a criminal narrative around Felix that literally predetermines him and 
literally makes him dead.  Bakhtin says further that “a living human being cannot be turned into 
the voiceless object of some secondhand [zaochnogo], finalizing cognitive process.”405 In Despair, 
Hermann objectifies Felix in the literal sense: by eliminating his subjectivity and treating his body 
as an object to further his plan. 
 Thus, on the level of content, one could easily argue that Hermann is most definitely 
monological with respect to Felix.  In positing this argument, however, we wouldn’t be able to 
rely on Bakhtin’s view of monologism directly.  This is due to the fact that Bakhtin’s theory of 
monologism restricts itself only to narratorial and character utterances and not to their actions (on 
this more further below).  Yet Hermann proves to be a monologist in the dimension of utterances 
as well — he is, after all, the one who recounts the entire narrative of Despair.  The most glaring 
example of narratorial monologism occurs at the beginning of chapter ten, after Felix’s death at 
the end of chapter nine.  Chapter ten begins morbidly: from the point of view of  Hermann’s revised 
version of Felix (175): 
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Since childhood I’ve loved violets and music.  I was born at Zwickau.  My father  
 was a shoemaker and my mother a washerwoman.  When she used to get angry she 
hissed at me in Czech.  Mine was a clouded and joyless childhood.  Hardly was I a man 
than I set forth on my wanderings.  I played the fiddle.  I’m a left-hander.  Face-oval.  Not 
married; show me one wife who is true.  I found the war pretty beastly; it passed, however, 
as all things pass.  Every mouse has its house….I like squirrels and sparrows.  Czech beer 
is cheaper.  Ah, if one could only get shod by a smith — how economical!  All state 
ministers are bribed, and all poetry is bilge.  One day at a fair I saw twins; you were 
promised a prize if you distinguished between them, so carroty Fritz cuffed one of the two 
and gave him a thick ear — that was the difference!  Golly, what a laugh we had! Beatings, 
stealings, slaughter, all is bad or good, according to circumstances. 
  I’ve appropriated money, whenever it came my way; what you’ve taken is yours,  
 there is no such thing as one’s own or another’s money; you don’t find written on a coin:  
 belongs to Müller.  I like money.  I’ve always wished to find a faithful friend; we’d have  
 made music together, he’d have bequeathed me his house and his orchard.  Money,  
 darling money.  Darling small money.  Darling big money.  I roved about; found work  
 here and there.  One day I met a swell fellow who kept saying he was like me.    
 Nonesense, he was not like me in the least.  But I did not argue with him, he being rich,  
 and whoever hobnobs with the rich can well become rich himself.  He wanted me to go  
 for a drive in his stead, leaving him to his business in queer street.  I killed the bluffer and 
 robbed him.  He lies in the wood, there is snow on the ground, crows caw, squirrels leap.  
 I like squirrels.  That poor gentleman in his fine overcoat lies dead, not far from his car.  I 
 can drive a car.  I love violets and music.  I was born at Zwickau.  My father was a bald- 
 headed bespectacled shoemaker, and my mother was a washerwoman with scarlet hands.  
 When she used to get angry—…”406 
 
In Bakhtin’s view of the polyphonic author, the author eschews monologism inasmuch as he values 
his hero’s self-consciousness.  The author helps the hero bring about and develop his self-
consciousness by arranging the novelistic atmosphere such that it allows the hero to find his own 
word and explain himself.407  Elsewhere Bakhtin makes it clear that the polyphonic author allows 
his hero freedom by allowing him to speak of himself: “only in the form of a confessional self-
utterance…could the final word about a person be given, a word truly adequate to him.”408 What 
we see in the quote above, on the other hand, is a narratorial attitude that flies in the face of the 
polyphonic “laissez faire” relationship between author-narrator and character.  Instead of letting 
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the hero be, Hermann, the murderous self-professed author “of this present tale,”409 devises a false 
autobiography and confession that aspires to give the impression of Felix’s own adequate word.  
Here Nabokov supplies an example of egregious monologism.  It is egregious for two reasons.  On 
the one hand, the finalization of Felix is passed off as his own self-explanation, as his own word 
about himself, as his autobiography and confession.  In fact, it seems Hermann’s successful 
evasion of legal repercussions for his crime would have relied precisely on a high degree of 
authenticity, however synthetic, of the confession.  On the other hand, the falsity of this 
autobiography and confession is so glaring so as to be obvious to the reader.  One immediately 
recognizes that the sparing bits of biographical facts have been stitched together piecemeal from 
the few awkward conversations that Hermann had with Felix while the latter was alive.  In certain 
parts, the sheer dearth of adjectives and the use of pithy declarative sentences, some of which lack 
verbs, demonstrate the very superficiality of Herman’s conception of Felix.  A further testament 
of Hermann’s effective finalization of Felix is the fact that once the faux autobiography 
communicated what it was designed to communicate — a false confession to the murder of 
Hermann — it ends right where it begins, with the details about his parents and where he was born.  
Ultimately, Hermann’s view of Felix was so limited that the fullest portrait of him that he could 
muster is an absurd one.  The discursive finalization of Felix’s image is further mirrored in the 
eternally recurring circle inherent in the confession’s structure.  Hermann may mull over Felix’s 
image continuously and, thus, give it the semblance of motion, but this narrative motion is doomed 
to trace over itself and never break the circle of sameness.  The autobiography that Hermann 
composes for Felix as if he were Felix himself never spirals out to become something in the next 
moment that it was not in the last.    
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 Hermann’s monologism does not stop at his descriptive treatment of other characters in 
Despair, he also attempts to extend it to the ultimate meaning of the novel. Had he been what he 
wanted to be — i.e., true author of Despair — Hermann would have shaped the narrative of the 
text of Despair into whatever suited him best.  Ultimately Hermman tries yet fails to wrest the 
narrative control from forces unknown to him.  Nevertheless, Hermann does manage to give the 
reader a hint of how he would have ended the novel: 
  […] One fine day at last Lydia joined me abroad; I called at her hotel.  “Not so  
 wildly,” I said with grave warning, as she was about to fling herself into my arms.   
 “Remember that my name is Felix, and that I am merely an acquaintance of yours.”  She  
 looked very comely in her widow’s weeds, just as my artistic black bow and nicely  
 trimmed beard suited me.  She began relating…yes, everything had worked as I had  
 expected, without a hitch.  It appeared she had wept quite sincerely during the crematory  
 service, when the pastor with a professional catch in his throbbing voice had spoken  
 about me, “…and this man, this noble hearted man, who—“ I imparted to her my further  
 plans and very soon began to court her. 
  We are married now, I and my little widow; we live in a quiet picturesque place,  
 in our cottage.  We spend long lazy hours in the little myrtle garden with its view of the  
 blue gulf far below, and talk very often of my poor dead brother.  I keep recounting to her 
 new episodes from his life.  “Fate, kismet,” says Lydia with a sigh.  “At least now, in  
 Heaven, his soul is consoled by our being happy.” 
  Yes, Lydia is happy with me; she needs nobody else.  “How glad I am,” she says  
 sometimes, “that we are forever rid of Ardalion.  I used to pity him a good deal, and gave 
 him a lot of my time, but, really, I could never stand the man.  Wonder where he is at  
 present.  Probably drinking himself to death, poor fellow.  That’s also fate!” 
  In the mornings I read and write; maybe I shall soon publish one or two little  
 things under my new name; a Russian author who lives in the neighborhood highly  
 praises my style and vivid imagination. 
  Occasionally Lydia receives a line from Orlovius — New Year’s greetings, say.   
 He invariably asks her to give his kindest regards to her husband whom he has not the  
 pleasure of knowing, and probably things the while: “Ah, here is a widow who is easily  
 comforted. Poor Hermann Karlovich!” 
  Do you feel the tang of this epilogue? I have concocted it according to a classic  
 recipe.  Something is told about every character in the book to wind up the tale; and in  
 doing so, the dribble of their existence is made to remain correctly, though summarily, in  
 keeping with what has been previously shown of their respective ways; also, a facetious  
 note is admitted—poking sly fun at life’s conservativeness (178-179). 
 
The first five paragraphs of this quote, Hermann’s “fantasy-epilogue,” constitute a very extreme 
example of Bakhtin’s view of what the monological author does with respect to his/her characters 
 
168 
in a novel.410  Instead of these characters coming to their own conclusions and reacting in their 
own way to the crime committed by Hermann, they all act in the very way that Hermann would 
have had them act.  Lydia, his wife, is compliant and does everything Hermann told her to do — 
she cried like she was supposed to during the fantasized “fake wake,” she meets Hermann at the 
appointed hotel, and she keeps his identity secret.  Ardalion, whom Hermann hated for exhibiting 
what he (Hermann) perceived as an annoying dependance on his wife, is out of the picture entirely.  
Lydia is made to seem glad that Ardalion is away (in fact, she had asked Hermann, as he hatched 
his plan before the crime, if Ardalion could come with them), and Orlovius pays private homage 
to Hermann.  In the last paragraph, however, we see that Hermann undoes the fantasy conclusion 
that he desired.  Hermann seems incapable of taking his tale onto a fictional plane that departs 
from the biographical parallelism — warped as it is by his own perspectival bias — between what 
he says is his narrative and the events leading to and after what turns out to be an unsuccessful 
attempt at a perfect crime.  It is as if the forces that Hermann cannot control, fate, his memory, his 
unremitting compulsion to continue writing the narrative even as he becomes cornered by the 
slowly unraveling truth of his crime, have conspired to show Hermann’s monological attitude to 
his narrative in stark chiaroscuro contrast: there is Hermann’s fantasy and then there is what really 
happened.411 
 Due to the conspiracy of the above-named forces, and to the black-and-white, irreversible 
nature of his crime, and/or even perhaps due to his lack of artistic imagination, Hermann tries yet 
is unsuccessful in building a narrative that is more convenient to his selfish needs.  He fails to 
consider how the murder of Felix could be recast and repurposed to tell a different tale, a tale of 
the “wrongfully accused fugitive,” for example; a tale that could have otherwise manipulated the 
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reader into according Hermann the recognition that he sought.  This failure makes Despair not 
nearly as insidious as it could have been — although this was not because of a lack of Hermann’s 
trying.  Lolita is also recounted by a narrator that repeats some of the basic acts and behaviors 
displayed by Hermann; a criminal narrator that tells events from his own very monological point 
of view, attempts to get away scot-free with the crime and to gain some sort of recognition with 
respect to the narrative.  Yet in Lolita, Humbert Humbert displays a narratorial savvy hitherto not 
seen in Hermann.  This savoir-faire seems ultimately to have extended Humbert’s range of 
monological power to the realm of genre-creation. 
 Yet before we turn to the discussion of how Humbert Humbert manipulates the genre of 
Lolita, let us explore how this narrator’s monologism generally conforms to the Bakhtinian model.  
On the level of content, the most obvious example of monologism in Lolita, indeed the event for 
which Lolita is known in popular consciousness, is what appears to be Humbert Humbert’s rape 
and abduction of Dolly as well as his murder of Clare Quilty.  Like Hermann, Humbert Humbert 
is very aware that he objectifies the people he describes in his narrative.  At the beginning of his 
acquaintance with Dolly, for example, Humbert Humbert first satisfies his lust for the girl by 
“solipsizing”412 her, that is, by “visually possess[ing]” her like he had done others in the past (55).  
The famous “couch scene,” involves Humbert Humbert luring Dolly into the outwardly innocent 
act of playing (he snatches her apple and she chases it) and contriving a way to pleasure himself 
while keeping her busy with the apple and ignorant of his true objective.  “[S]he had noticed 
nothing” (61), according to Humbert, which means that he was successful in creating an image of 
Dolly apart from her real life image.  Of these, one Dolly did exactly as Humbert bade in his 
imagination, while the other was manipulated into playing with Humbert but not made to do 
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something she did not want to do given her understanding of the situation.  It is interesting to think 
of the dual images that ensue from Humbert Humbert’s solipsistic process.  In order to, as he says, 
not “impinge” on the child’s “chastity” (55); that is, in order to not hurt the other, Humbert 
Humbert divides this other in two, finalizes one image — for the fantasy playing in Humbert’s 
head starring the solipsized image of a sexually alluring nymph is nothing if not its own kind of 
monological narrative — and leaves the other image to be independent of him.  This image-
duplicating process whereby the “duplicator” finalizes one image and leaves the other image be 
by itself seems to be a very apt analogy for how Bakhtin would view the difference between the 
world as conceived by a monological world-view and a polyphonic one.  That the bifurcated vision 
of Dolly comes from the very same source, the narrator, is indicative of one of the vexing 
ambiguities of Lolita — to what extent does Humbert Humbert monologize Dolly?  The extent of 
this monologization, though extreme in some cases, wavers in others, as we can see by the 
examples of dialogical polemic between Humbert Humbert and Dolly.413 
 In any case, as in Despair, the monologicity of Lolita does not remain confined to the level 
of content.  Like Bakhtin’s prototypical monological author-narrator, the narrator of Lolita, renders 
all characters according to his own finalizing view of them.  Yet unlike Bakhtin’s prototypical 
monological novel, but like Despair, the very fact that Humbert Humbert attempts to monologize 
others becomes part of the intrigue that moves the plot.  For example, Humbert Humbert, in typical 
monological fashion, renders Charlotte Haze’s image according to his own bias: “I think I had 
better describe her right away, to get it over with. The poor lady was in her middle thirties, she had 
a shiny forehead, plucked eyebrows and quite simple but not unattractive features of a type that 
may be defined as a weak solution of Marlene Dietrich” (37).  However, due to the fact that part 
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of Humbert Humbert’s very narrative is found in his not-so-secret diary, Charlotte Haze herself 
finds out of Humbert Humbert’s true conception of her and of his true designs for her daughter, 
Dolly, and reacts accordingly.  This reaction occurs during an impromptu confrontation as the 
narrator walks through the door of the Haze house: 
  [I] uttered a cheerful homecoming call as I opened the door of the living room.   
 With her cream-white nape and bronze bun to me, wearing the yellow blouse and maroon 
 slacks she had on when I first met her, Charlotte sat at the corner bureau writing a letter.   
 My hand still on the doorknob, I repeated my hearty cry.  Her writing hand stopped.  She  
 sat still for a moment; then she slowly turned in her chair and rested her elbow on its  
 curved back.  Her face, disfigured by her emotion, was not a pretty sight as she stared at  
 my legs and said: 
  “The Haze woman, the big bitch, the old cat, the obnoxious mamma, the—old  
 stupid Haze is no longer your dupe.  She has—she has…” 
  My fair accuser stopped, swallowing her venom and her tears.  Whatever   
 Humbert Humbert said—or attempted to say—is inessential.  She went on: 
  “You’re a monster. You’re a detestable, abominable, criminal fraud.  If you come  
 near—I’ll scream out the window.  Get back!” 
  Again, whatever H.H. murmured may be omitted, I think (95-96). 
   
In discovering that Humbert Humbert had a totally different conception of her and that he was a 
“criminal fraud,” Charlotte effects a sort of monological “turning of the tables.”  Just like the final 
conversation that Hermann Karlovich intended to have with Felix in Despair, Charlotte has a “one-
to-one monologue” with Humbert in which she both silences him and then establishes her own 
self-serving image of him.  Humbert Humbert counters with the suggestion that all that Charlotte 
happened upon were the beginnings of a novel: “‘The notes you found were fragments of a novel.  
Your name and hers were put in by mere chance.  Just because they came handy” (96).  This 
rationalization is, of course, ironic to the reader because the notes that Humbert Humbert refers to 
are treated in Lolita as an in-plot objectification of all of the narrated events leading up to the scene 
in question.  What Charlotte did not and could not know was that the novel Humbert was referring 
to would become the one that the reader is reading; the one which details the confrontation scene, 
the scenes prior and, ultimately, the scene of her very own death and the future abduction of Dolly 
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Haze.  In having Humbert suggest that the incriminating diary Charlotte read are actually notes to 
a novel, Nabokov hints at a very common literary topos, that of the novel within the novel.414 
However, Humbert’s indication that the incriminating notes were a novel is also a subtle act of 
deceptive honesty.  The truth is, of course, that Humbert’s diary are the notes to a future novel — 
but Humbert is also making a veiled confession as to the basic monological nature of the 
relationship between Charlotte, Dolly and himself; for how is the act of secretly recording material, 
descriptions and dialogue from the interaction with the other not monological?  Thus Humbert’s 
veiled revelation that his diary constitutes notes for a novel raises an issue about monologism 
hitherto never explored by Bakhtin — the monologism of writing the other, fashioning the other 
into a character in a novel without their knowledge or consent. 
 Perhaps the most convincing reason behind any possible fears of being written into a novel 
as a character is the possibility of being finalized by the “author.”  As we have seen, Humbert 
Humbert finalizes others just as much as Hermann Karlovich.  Yet, though Hermann calls the 
“classic recipe” (whereby “the dribble of [character’s] existence is made to remain… in keeping 
with what has been previously shown of their respective ways…”) a trite dream,415 Humbert 
Humbert, in truer monologist fashion perhaps, subscribes to the idea of the perennial stability of 
literary characters.  Thus when a character in Lolita manages to change the image that Humbert 
Humbert has of them, he expresses surprise.  This is exactly what happens with John Farlow, a 
friend of Charlotte Haze and Humbert Humbert.  A “letter which [he] opened and scanned rapidly 
in the elevator” was what made Humbert stop and reflect: 
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 I have often noticed that we are inclined to endow our friends with the stability of type  
 that literary characters acquire in the reader’s mind.  No matter how many times we  
 reopen “King Lear,” never shall we find the good king banging his tankard in high  
 revelry, all woes forgotten, at a jolly reunion with all three daughters and their lapdogs.   
 Never will Emma rally, revived by the sympathetic salts in Flaubert’s father's timely tear.  
 Whatever evolution this or that popular character has gone through between the book  
 covers, his fate is fixed in our minds, and, similarly, we expect our friends to follow this  
 or that logical and conventional pattern we have fixed for them.  Thus X will never  
 compose the immortal music that would clash with the second-rate symphonies he has  
 accustomed us to.  Y will never commit murder.  Under no circumstances can Z ever  
 betray us.  We have it all arranged in our minds, and the less often we see a particular  
 person the more satisfying it is to check how obediently he conforms to our notion of him 
 every time we hear of him.  Any deviation in the fates we have ordained would strike us  
 as not only anomalous but unethical.  We would prefer not to have known at all our  
 neighbor, the retired hot-dog stand operator, if it turns out he has just produced the  
 greatest book of poetry his age has seen.  
  I am saying all this in order to explain how bewildered I was by Farlow’s   
 hysterical letter.  I knew his wife had died but I certainly expected him to remain,   
 throughout a devout widowhood, the dull, sedate and reliable person he had always  
 been.416 
 
Humbert Humbert does two significant things in this reflection.  On the one hand, he tacitly 
acknowledges his perceived authorial position vis-à-vis the narrative and its characters by 
comparing his “friend,” John Farlow, to a literary character.  On the other hand, he tacitly 
acknowledges that he is what we would call a monological author for he views all literary 
characters as being conditioned by a  “stability of type.”  If we remember, Bakhtin includes 
character type, that is “the degree to which [a character] is…characterologically typical” 
amongst the “stable and objective qualities of a hero” which “serv[e] an author in creating a 
fixed and stable image of the hero.”417  The logic in the phrasing of the examples of stability that 
the narrator gives seems a bit off, however.  Reading Madame Bovary and already knowing what 
will happen to that book’s hero is different than assuming what will happen to a friend of ours, 
since the course of that friend’s life runs parallel to ours.  Nevertheless, when Humbert gives 
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further examples, interchanging names for mere capital letters, (“Y will never commit murder”) 
— we get a strong affirmation that what the narrator is really saying is that he is surprised that 
John Farlow did not follow the finalized and predetermined path that Humbert had mentally set 
out for him.  Humbert’s assumption of what John’s life would be like is conceptually identical to 
Bakhtin’s definition of the finalization of characters in a a monologic novel: 
    In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly  
 defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that  
 is, within the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is,  
 he cannot exceed the limits of his own character, typicality or temperament without  
 violating the author’s monologic design concerning him.418 
 
Humbert Humbert says that “Any deviation in the fates we have ordained would strike us as not 
only anomalous but unethical.” Keeping in mind that, according to Bakhtin, a character “cannot 
exceed the limits of his own character, typicality, or temperament without violating the author’s 
monologic design concerning him,” then perhaps we could posit that what really seems unethical 
to the narrator of Lolita is that John Farlow proves that he is not Humbert’s character and that 
Humbert is not John’s author. 
 John Farlow’s letter and Humbert’s reflection upon it is another example of how the 
narratorial monological perspective is highlighted in Lolita: the sharp contrast that results 
between Humbert’s conception and a seemingly more polyphonic one results in a sort of 
narrative dissonance.  A close Bakhtinian reading, however, could posit that John Farlow’s 
unexpected progression may have been explicitly designed by the author of Lolita in order to 
give the novel a semantic corrective and indicate to the reader where the actual meaning of the 
novel lies.  Or one could argue that John Farlow’s unexpected progression was the author’s 
visible attempt to wrest the narrative control from Humbert Humbert.  For Bakhtin, the 
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indication of meaning and of authority amount to the same thing.  The highlighted contrast here 
would then be between one monological conception, the narrator’s, and another such conception, 
the author’s.  It is unnecessary to get into the philosophical mire of whether there can be 100% 
character independence in even the most polyphonic of novels,419 since the question of whether 
or not Humbert is confronted by the authentic freedom (as far as this is possible) of John Farlow 
is rendered moot by Dolly Haze’s own escape from the narrator’s physical and monological 
confinement.  Ultimately, Dolly’s long attempts at escape from Humbert’s abusive abduction and 
finalizing words is characterized by many Bakhtinian features of dialogicity and also non-
Bakhtinian (i.e. Nabokovian) anti-monological motifs.420   
 Though Dolly Haze’s physical escape had already occurred in chapter 22 of part 2 of  
the novel, there is a possible hint that this was her ultimate and complete break from Humbert’s 
monological captivity when Humbert Humbert opens and reads a second letter after having read 
John Farlow’s.  Humbert Humbert renders a full quotation of Dolly’s letter immediately after 
paraphrasing John’s: 
 DEAR DAD 
  How’s everything? I’m married.  I’m going to have a baby.  I guess he’s going to  
 be a big one.  I guess he’ll come right for Christmas.  This is a hard letter to write.  I’m  
 going nuts because we don’t have enough to pay our debts and get out of here.  Dick is  
 promised a big job in Alaska in his very specialized corner of the mechanical field, that’s  
 all I know about it but it’s really grand.  Pardon me for withholding our home address but 
 you may still be mad at me, and Dick must not know.  This town is something.  You can’t 
 see the morons for the smog.  Please do send us a check, Dad.  We could manage with  
 three or four hundred or even less, anything is welcome, you might sell my old things,  
 because once we get there the dough will just start rolling in.  Write, please.  I have gone  
 through much sadness and hardship. 
   Yours expecting, 
    DOLLY  (MRS. RICHARD F. SCHILLER)421 
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This letter serves as a parallel to John Farlow’s letter in that both are “updates” — to both 
Humbert Humbert and the reader — of characters that have been absent from the narrative for 
some time.  This similarity is contrasted by two sharp differences: first, John Farlow is a minor 
character, whereas Dolly is the very focus of Humbert’s narrative.  Second: John Farlow breaks 
entirely with Humbert Humbert’s expectation of his progression, whereas Dolly does not seem to 
surprise Humbert — or some readers — with her marriage and pregnancy at all.  Besides 
fulfilling the expected trajectory of a child traumatized by abuse — an early marriage coupled by 
an early pregnancy — the epistolary Dolly fulfills all of Humbert’s earlier monological 
definitions of her.  We have noted in chapter 3 of this study Humbert’s qualifying of Dolly as a 
philistine, a “disgustingly conventional little girl” (148).  Dolly’s philistinism extended, 
according to Humbert, to a certain penchant for monetary gain.  During Humbert and Dolly’s 
second tour around the country, their sexual relationship progressed from one characterized by 
an exchange of sex for favors to one that exchanged sex for money (148).  Dolly’s “financial 
pragmatism” is also seen in the letter: the epistolary Dolly does not waste time to get to the point 
of her missive — asking for financial support. 
 The image of Dolly depicted in the letter also seems to extend to the image described in 
Humbert’s supposedly final reunion with her.  In the description of the reunion scene, Humbert 
confirms both Dolly’s desperation and ruin evident in the letter.  At the reunion, when the 
narrator asks Dolly to leave her husband and come with him, Dolly seems to hear the request for 
one last exchange of sex for money: “‘You mean,’ she said opening her eyes and raising herself 
slightly, the snake that may strike, ‘you mean you will give us [us] that money only if I go with 
you to a motel. Is that what you mean’” (278)?  Dolly’s financial, physical and spiritual ruin, on 
the other hand, is evident in the general shabbiness of the setting of the reunion, and her new, 
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nuptial dependence upon a poor laborer (269-280).  These details, however, pale in comparison 
to Humbert’s description of Dolly herself:  
…there she was with her ruined looks and her adult, rope-veined narrow hands and her 
goose-flesh white arms, and her shallow ears, and her unkempt armpits, there she was 
(my Lolita!), hopelessly worn at seventeen… She was only the faint violet whiff and 
dead  leaf echo of the nymphet I had rolled myself upon with such cries in the past […] 
this Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with another’s child… (277-278). 
 
The image of a broken Dolly may be touching for some readers and for Humbert Humbert, who 
interweaves his own sentimental exclamations of love for her in this description, but it is 
nevertheless an image of Dolly’s at seventeen that Humbert Humbert may just as well have 
extrapolated given his intimate knowledge of her past.  As we said above, Humbert Humbert 
himself admits that “we are inclined to endow our friends with the stability of type that literary 
characters acquire in the reader’s mind”  in context of having read John Farlow's letter (265).  
This admission occurs, as we remember, after Humbert reads Farlow’s letter and right before he 
reads Dolly Haze’s letter.  Farlow surprises Humbert with his unexpected development, but 
somehow, Dolly has turned out predictably.  Or did she?  Is it not just as possible that Humbert 
Humbert finished a portrait of Dolly according to his conception of her “stability of type?”  Did 
Humbert Humbert, then, change the narrative of the absent Dolly — the character whose 
outcome matters the most to the author-narrator — in order to suit his needs and the needs of his 
genre? 
 The narrator’s admission of a monological perspectival attitude towards others right after 
sketching one character’s unforeseen development and right before focusing on Dolly’s 
predictably ruined outcome is not, however, the only thing that casts doubt upon the veracity of 
Humbert’s vision of her.  There is also the issue of what Stephen Blackwell calls the “much-
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debated calendar anomaly.”422  The date of Humbert’s receipt of Dolly’s letter, September 22, 
1952,423 causes a calendrical conflict with the date of Humbert’s death, November 16, 1952,424 if 
we realize that it took the narrator fifty-six days to compose Lolita — which he moreover says 
was composed in institutional confinement.425  Yet fifty-six days prior to Humbert’s death was 
exactly September 22, 1952, the day he received John Farlow’s and Dolly’s letters.  If Humbert 
Humbert composed Lolita from September 22, 1952 until November 16 of the same year “in the 
psychopathic ward for observation, and then in…well-heated, albeit tombal, seclusion,” then 
how did he bend time and space in order to be able to travel to see Dolly, for their final reunion, 
and to Pavor Manor to kill Clare Quilty in the intervening time?     
 According to Julian Connolly, “[a] central theme in Nabokov’s work concerns the artist’s 
attempt to enshrine the transitory things of life in the more durable domain of art.”426 Could it be, 
then, that Humbert Humbert fictionalized Dolly’s letter, his reunion with her and his murder of 
Quilty in order to enshrine something out of his sordid, extra-fictional history with Dolly? 427  
This is Julian Connolly’s own reading and a convincing one too.  Connolly nevertheless believes 
“that the receipt of Dolly’s letter428 triggers in Humbert a recognition of growth and change in 
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his former love.  This in turn spurs his acknowledgement of the injustice he had done her in 
trying to resist such change and to distort her growth” (52).  We, however, point out that since 
Humbert Humbert’s narratorial sins are intimately intertwined with his interpersonal, moral ones, 
the fact that Humbert Humbert’s narratorial monological practices continue unabated until the 
end of the novel suggests that for all his professed remorse for having abused Dolly, the narrator 
has not really changed a basic truth about himself: his utter egocentrism.  For if Humbert 
Humbert transitioned from the pseudo-non-fiction typical of a story-teller’s perspectival bias to 
utter fiction in order to immortalize Dolly, why then choose to cast an immortal Dolly with such 
a predictable, finalizing, monological mold?  The Dolly that wrote the letter he supposedly 
received while he simultaneously and paradoxically lived in a “flat” in New York City and in a 
mental institution still bears the monological imprint of the monological narrator.  This Dolly 
reverts to her old ways — begging the very man that hurt her to help her.  Moreover, after 
driving to Hunter Road, Coalmont (“some eight hundred miles from New York City”429) and 
bearing simultaneous physical extension there as well as at the above mentioned mental 
institution, Humbert sees a Dolly that seems like the physical and visual embodiment of the very 
formal version of her name.  “She was Dolores on the dotted line,” the narrator says on the very 
first page of Lolita (9).  Her very name comes from one of the names of the Virgin Mary in 
Spanish: La Virgen María de los Dolores — Our Lady of Sorrows.  “I have gone through much 
sadness and hardship,” says Dolly, on the letter she supposedly wrote on September 18, 1952.  
Although John Ray, Jr. assures us that “her name is too closely interwound with the inmost fiber 
of the book to allow one to alter it,” who is to trust Humbert Humbert, a most unreliable narrator, 
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that the name of the child he abused is actually Dolly?  Who could prove that John Ray Jr. — the 
man who avers that Dolly was her name — was not actually Humbert Humbert himself?430  
Ultimately, whatever Dolly’s true name was — and even if it was indeed Dolly — what matters 
is that Humbert Humbert, the self-confessed monologist, makes of Dolly a final image that is 
defined by the very meaning of her name; as if Dolly the character was always to be defined by 
the germ contained in her very appellation.  Of John Farlow, Humbert Humbert says “I knew his 
wife had died but I certainly expected him to remain, through a devout widowhood, the dull, 
sedate and reliable person he had always been.”  Instead John Farlow “married a Spanish 
girl…stopped smoking and had gained thirty pounds.”431 How do we know that Dolly did not cut 
off communication completely and became something that Humbert Humbert’s egocentric 
consciousness could not predict — as he could not have predicted what John Farlow ultimately 
became?  After all, Dolly’s weapon against Humbert Humbert was the very ability of becoming 
that which she was not. 
 Ultimately in any case, we are not arguing that Humbert Humbert’s professions of 
remorse are false.  We do, however, point out that the narrator of Lolita leaves open the 
possibility that, faced with the (also possible) complete and utter absence of Dolly after her 
escape in Elphinstone, he detours from the genre of confession into the genre of high tragedy by 
way of a fictional denouement, starring Humbert Humbert as the tragic hero.  Instead of 
producing a narrative that places the weight of responsibility squarely upon himself, Humbert 
Humbert produces a generic hybrid that allows him, on the one hand, an underground-man-like 
pleasure out of confessional self-pity, and on the other hand, a majestic spiritual catharsis – 
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Humbert vomits immediately before having the epiphany of the children’s voices – and the 
effective circumvention of right ethical action provided by that topos of tragedy, a divinely 
caused tragic flaw (hamartia): “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, exhibit number one is what the 
seraphs, the misinformed, simple, noble-winged seraphs, envied.  Look at this tangle of thorns” 
(9).  Humbert Humbert’s monologism is thus not only announced in his narratorial practice but 
also in his simultaneous, two-pronged bid to transform himself into a bona fide author and to 
shape an already monological narrative into a quintessentially monological generic form.432 
 However we interpret the final events of Lolita beginning with Humbert Humbert’s 
reading of Dolly’s letter, there is the matter of one of the more important last scenes: Humbert's 
murder of Quilty. 433  Whether or not we question the authenticity of this event relative to the 
novel, we cannot help but note its parallel with the murder scene in Despair.  In fact, the acts of 
murder committed by the narrators of Lolita and Despair, along with the act of sexual child 
abuse committed by the narrator of the former novel, are also significant for this study in that 
they seem to be a direct response to Dostoevsky in general and to certain of his texts (The 
Double, Notes from the Underground, and Crime and Punishment), in particular. 434  While the 
idea of murder and rape would always invite an interpretation of monologism on the level of 
content, what is interesting about the murders in Despair and Lolita (novels deeply and 
intertextually engaged with Dostoevsky) and the events of rape and abuse in the latter novel is 
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that they do more than just signal monologism: they seem to argue or impute monologism back 
into Dostoevsky’s texts.  While there is no evidence that Nabokov has ever read Bakhtin,435 
Nabokov’s artistic arguments about these Dostoevsky texts take issue with and contradict a view 
of Dostoevsky that Bakhtin, as we know, conceptualized in his own language in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  This aspect of Nabokov’s artistic praxis is in keeping with his lectures on 
Dostoevsky.  In the lecture on Crime and Punishment, for example, Nabokov displays outrage at 
what he interprets as Dostoevsky’s portrayal of a moral equivalency between a Raskolnikov’s 
and Sonya’s respective crimes: “[t]he two are on completely different levels. The inhuman and 
idiotic crime of Raskolnikov cannot be even remotely compared to the plight of a girl who 
impairs human dignity by selling her body.”436 Nabokov also makes the observation that 
Dostoevsky gives more details for Raskolnikov’s crime than Sonya’s:  
 …look at the absence of artistic balance. We have been shown Raskolnikov's crime in all  
 sordid detail and we also have been given half a dozen different explanations for his  
 exploit. We have never been shown Sonya in the exercise of her trade. The situation is a  
 glorified cliché. The harlot's sin is taken for granted. Now I submit that the true artist is  
 the person who never takes anything for granted (110-111).  
 
It is not hard to formulate Nabokov’s observations into the language of Bakhtin.  As far as 
Dostoevsky gives plenty of details for Raskolnikov’s crime (and none for Sonya’s), he imbues 
the image of this character with a higher value than it should merit vis-à-vis the image of an 
impoverished prostitute, given the differing severities of their crimes.  Nabokov suggests that 
Dostoevsky does not even explore prostitution as a crime or as a set of actions but furnishes it to 
the reader as a ready-mage image inherent to the genre of the Sentimental novel: “[t]here is no 
rhetorical link between a filthy murderer, and this unfortunate girl.  There is only the 
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conventional link of the Gothic novel and the sentimental novel” (110).    Sonya is “taken for 
granted,” or, in another word, finalized, so that the idée reçue of her crime brings pathos to the 
scene where Sonya leads Raskolnikov to discover the New Testament.   
 In Despair and Lolita, Nabokov engages with the motif of murder with a more direct 
reference to Raskolnikov and suggests the equivalency between the act of murder and the act of 
“taking the other” for granted.437  With Lolita, the acts of rape and abuse, easily argued as acts 
that take the other for granted, refer to Svidrigailov from Crime and Punishment and to Nikolai 
Stavrogin from The Devils.438  Yet we must keep in mind that an equivalency or relationship 
between the acts of murder and rape is suggested by their being authored by one and the same 
criminal, Humbert Humbert.  As a matter of fact, Humbert and Hermann are both authors of a 
whole slew of behaviors exhibited by several of Dostoevsky’s characters, including Golyadkin, 
and the underground man.  These characters are known for behaviors such as: the craving for 
recognition for deeds done or the profession of a certain idea, the lashing out at others when not 
recognized in the way one wants to be recognized, the adoption of behavioral, discursive or even 
psychological defensive mechanisms in order to evade the hostile judgment of others and, 
ultimately, the murder of another in the name of an idea or world view.  In consolidating the 
above mentioned behaviors in Hermann and Humbert — criminal victimizers and serial 
finalizers — Nabokov implicates these behaviors in the hermeneutic crime of monologism. 
 What is remarkable about Nabokov’s portrayal of Hermann and Humbert as 
amalgamations of the above-described behaviors is that it forms a commentary upon and an 
alternative to those very portrayals by Dostoevsky of these behaviors which Bakhtin himself 
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theorizes and conceptualizes.  In the next section, we will look at Bakhtin and Nabokov’s views 
of these behaviors that involve self-other relations and compare them in order to gain a deeper 
sense of how Nabokov structures these behaviors with respect to his vision of monologism.  
Ultimately, since the characterization of monologism in Nabokov’s oeuvre that seems most akin 
to Bakhtin’s view of the concept, the kind seen in the monologist-murderer-authors, Hermann 
and Humbert, is one intimately involved with these character behaviors, a sketch of Nabokov’s 
view of monologism would be incomplete without their description.  One additional novel, The 
Eye, will also be examined in conjunction with Despair and Lolita.  Though lacking the 
important element of murder (monologism par excellence) in its plot, it nevertheless forms part 
of Nabokov’s deepest novelistic engagements with Dostoevsky.  The presence of The Eye in the 
following examination will aid in interpreting Nabokov’s transposition of that discursive defense 
mechanism in Dostoevsky that Bakhtin terms, alternatively, “word with a sideward glance” 
[slovo s ogliadkoi] and “loophole” [lazeika], and how Nabokov’s version of it evolves in Despair 
and Lolita. 
 
DIALOGICAL DISCURSIVITY IN THE EYE, DESPAIR, AND LOLITA 
 Bakhtin associates the loophole tactic most prominently with the underground man.  Within 
the underground man’s context, the tactic takes shape in the form of self-deprecating and 
overblown speech that repudiates not only itself but others’ speech as well.  This speech actively 
anticipates others’ replies or objections before they are even formulated.  This is evident in 
Bakhtin’s quotation from “Notes from Underground”: 
  ‘“Isn’t that shameful, isn’t that humiliating?” you will say, perhaps, shaking your  
 heads contemptuously.  “You long for life and try to settle the problems of life by a  
 logical tangle…You may be truthful in what you have said but you have no modesty; out  
 of the pettiest vanity you bring your truth to public exposure, to the market place, to  
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 ignominy.  You doubtlessly mean to say something, but hide your real meaning for fear,  
 because you lack the resolution to say it, and only have a cowardly impudence.  You  
 boast of consciousness, but you are unsure of your ground, for though your mind works,  
 yet your heart is corrupted by depravity, and you cannot have a full, genuine   
 consciousness without a pure heart.  And how tiresome your are, how you thrust yourself  
 on people and grimace! Lies, lies, lies!” 
  Of course I myself have made up just now all the things you say.  That, too, is  
 from underground.  For forty years I have been listening to your words there through a  
 crack under the floor.  I have invented them myself.  After all, there was nothing else I  
 could invent.  It is no wonder that I have learned them by heart and that it has taken a   
 literary form.’439 
 
Thus the underground man tries to anticipate anything that could be said about him — even the 
objection that he is trying to “hide [his] real meaning;” that is, even the objection that he is trying 
to reserve for himself the last word is anticipated.  The underground man scripts for himself the 
most odious objection to himself yet then reveals that he is responsible for it.  In fact, he even 
clearly suggests that he has already produced any objection that can be leveled against him.  Thus 
whatever conflict threatens the integrity of the underground man’s self is not even a threat because 
it always will have come from within his self and not from without.  
 Of all of Nabokov’s characters, the narrator of The Eye seems like Nabokov’s earliest and 
perhaps most direct response to this particular behavior of the underground man.  Stephen 
Blackwell, who has to date written the most significant article-length study440  of Nabokov’s 
specific engagement with the “loophole” tactic says that  
 [s]everal Nabokov novels, beginning with The Eye (1930), include characters   
 whose self-definitions are formed against a vivid backdrop of the possibility of being  
 described or defined by someone else’s words.  Like Dostoevsky’s characters, most of  
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 these characters retain—or try to retain—a loophole that will allow them to recast the  
 meanings of their words, wresting them free of the judgments of others.441    
 
The narrator of The Eye, Blackwell suggests, retains a defensive loophole for himself after 
undergoing a public humiliation — he is beaten by a jealous husband in front of his two charges 
— an event that defines him in a very public and negative way.442  Blackwell, however, does not 
mention that Smurov’s loophole tactic is not an exact adoption of the underground man’s.  To be 
fair, neither does Blackwell suggest that Smurov’s tactic is anything like the underground man’s 
— his is not a comparison of loophole tactics in Nabokov and Dostoevsky qua tactics, but how 
Nabokov’s conception of this tactic compares to Bakhtin’s.  Yet Blackwell's argument that Smurov 
does employ a very Bakhtinian loophole in The Eye takes into account Bakhtin’s most general 
definition of the loophole, 443  and for this reason the contrast between Smurov’s and the 
underground man’s loophole remains to be explored fully.  If we look above at Bakhtin’s quote 
from Notes from the Underground, we see that the underground man, unlike Smurov, achieves the 
loophole primarily discursively; that is, through an anticipatory discourse that Bakhtin calls the 
slovo s ogliadkoi (“word with a sideward glance”).444 Smurov, on the other hand, for the most part 
creates his loophole not discursively, that is, not by directly addressing or challenging or even 
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verbally miming his would-be-judgers or audience, but meta-discursively: by shifting the narrative 
perspective.  From a first person point of view of the world which includes himself as an “I,” 
Smurov shifts to a third person point of view with himself as an “other” within that field of view.  
This shift allows him to view himself objectively and to diminish the potential for any emotional 
pain caused by the judgments of others.  The shift is significantly portrayed as a sort of death and 
rebirth (the narrator attempted to shoot himself after the beating): “Ever since the shot — that shot 
which, in my opinion, had been fatal — I had observed myself with curiosity instead of sympathy, 
and my painful past — before the shot — was now foreign to me…In respect to myself I was now 
an onlooker.”445 There is a slight irony about the difference between the underground man’s and 
Smurov’s loophole tactic and Bakhtin’s view of the former.  For parts of Bakhtin’s assessment of 
the underground man seem to interpret Smurov’s behavior more adequately than the underground 
man’s: 
 The hero from the underground eavesdrops on every word someone else says about him,  
 he looks at himself, as it were, in all the mirrors of other people’s consciousnesses, he  
 knows all the possible refractions of his image in those mirrors.  And he also knows his  
 own objective definition, neutral both to the other’s consciousness and to his own self- 
 consciousness, and he takes into account the point of view of a “third person.”  But he  
 also knows that all these definitions, prejudiced as well as objective, rest in his hands and  
 he cannot finalize them precisely because he himself perceives them; he can go beyond  
 their limits and can thus make them inadequate.  He knows that he has the final word, and 
 he seeks at whatever cost to retain for himself this final word about himself, the word of  
 his self consciousness, in order to be come in it that which he is not.  His consciousness  
 of self lives by its unfinalizability, by its closeness and its indeterminacy.446  
 
As we can see, the sheer intensity of the underground man’s attentiveness to people’s (including 
his audience’s) reactions as he is producing his text/speech invites Bakhtin’s inherently 
metaphorical assessment.  In Dostoevsky, the underground preempts the possibility of others’ 
pouncing on him verbally by pouncing on himself in the same manner he determines others would 
                                                 
 445 Eye, 27,  
 446 PDP, 53; Ss VI, 62-63. This is also quoted by Blackwell, 4 
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and ultimately deflects these attacks by demonstrating that this was him all along.  Bakhtin 
visualizes this action in terms of a doubly optical and spatialized metaphor whereby the 
underground man looks at others as though they were mirrors reflecting him and this, hence, allows 
him to look at himself, so to speak (and this is exactly what Bakhtin says: so to speak — 
“Geroi…smotritsia kak by vo vse zerkala chuzhikh soznanii”447), as he would be able to look at a 
“third person.”  Bakhtin affirms the underground man’s observational and positional 
differentiation by saying that “he takes into account the point of view of “third person.” 
 Of course, the underground man does not look at mirrors and does not see his optical 
reflection — these are his actions as viewed through Bakhtin’s metaphorical analysis.  Smurov, 
however, does step outside of himself and looks at himself as though he were a third person — at 
least, this is the very optical illusion that passes for reality in The Eye.  Smurov also eavesdrops 
and even spies — the novel’s Russian name, Sogliadatai (Spies) refers to this very action — upon 
other’s judgments of him.448  As for the underground man’s tactic of verbally mimicking and 
anticipating other’s verbal attacks and objections to his discursive projection, Smurov significantly 
does not engage in it — that is, until the very last lines of The Eye (to which later).  In any case, 
Smurov and the underground man’s respective loophole tactics do share one core similarity.  Both 
the underground man and Smurov are capable of “go[ing] beyond th[e] limits [of others’ 
words]…and make them inadequate.”  The underground man does this by anticipating any 
objections preemptively and then owning them, thus replacing the dyad of self-other conflict with 
the dyad of conflict within oneself.  Smurov, on the other hand, lets others’ images of him become 
inadequate by allowing “all the possible refractions of his image in those mirrors” to nullify each 
                                                 
 447 Ss, VI, 63; italics mine.  
 448 See, for example, the scene where Smurov tries to steal a letter with information about him from Roman 
Bogdanovich, The Eye, 79-84.  
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other in their sheer relativity and by reserving for himself a sort of permanent third-person 
outsidedness with respect to himself:  “Kashmarin had borne away yet another image of Smurov.  
Does it make any difference which?  For I do not exist: there exist but the thousands of mirrors 
that reflect me.”449   
 Returning to Blackwell’s assessment of The Eye, he makes a very Bakhtinian conclusion 
about Smurov’s method: “Smurov manages to soften the impact of the words others say about him, 
but he does not, in their place, create a new, authoritative word” (7).  In saying that Smurov remains 
essentially open-ended, Blackwell seems to echo a bit of Bakhtin’s own ethical anxiety regarding 
the loophole (whether Blackwell does this consciously remains unclear from his article).  For 
Bakhtin brings up the loophole as a technique that can theoretically allow one to reach one’s own 
word, one’s own definition about one’s world and oneself — by oneself.  “[O]nly by arriving at 
himself will the hero arrive at his world,” Bakhtin says in connection with the loophole.450  
However, arriving at oneself is not, apparently, easy: “[i]n order to break through to his self the 
hero must travel a very long road.”451  Bakhtin makes it clear that this difficulty lies within the 
nature of the loophole itself: “[t]he loophole makes the hero ambiguous and elusive even for 
himself.”452  Thus we see that the underground man’s use of the loophole not only presents itself 
as a model for Smurov’s narrative and psychological strategy — it also presents itself as the 
precursor of a sort of curse.  For though the underground man will fight tooth and nail to resist 
others’ definitions of him, he is incapable of giving himself an account of his self with which he 
could be satisfied.  This Bakhtin notes from the very beginning of his comments on the 
underground man: 
                                                 
 449 E, 102-103  
 450 PDP, 236; Ss VI, 262.  
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  The Underground Man not only dissolves in himself all possible fixed features of  
 his person, making them all the object of his own introspection, but in fact he no longer  
 has any such traits at all, no fixed definitions, there is nothing to say about him, he figures 
 not as a person taken from life but rather as the subject of consciousness and dream.  And 
 for the author as well he is not a carrier of traits and qualities that could have been neutral 
 toward his self-consciousness and could have finalized him; no, what the author   
 visualizes is precisely the hero’s self-consciousness and the inescapable open-endedness,  
 the vicious circle [durnuiu beskonechnost’] of that self-consciousness.453 
 
Thus by not creating a “new, authoritative word,” it seems very possible that Smurov is also stuck 
in the same vicious and unending cycle of always-relative and ad-hoc definitions as the 
underground man.  Nevertheless, in trying to convince the reader that he is happy with his 
objective, third-person position, 454  Smurov signals that something is off.  Blackwell’s 
interpretation is that this happiness is doubtful, though that it ultimately cannot be proven as such: 
“[w]hether we believe in his happiness is another matter entirely: probably we do not, but if we 
follow the rules of Smurov’s game, neither can we fully believe in our disbelief.”455  We, on the 
other hand, disagree: we think that Smurov overplays his pose of happy spy or ghost.456  At the 
end of the novel, we learn that this pose of eternal and somehow disembodied observer is 
ultimately driven by the same motivation behind the underground man’s own loophole-discursivity 
— to which Smurov himself ultimately takes recourse in a last chance bid to convince his reader 
of the advantage of his pose.457  At the end of The Eye, Smurov, who throughout the novella never 
tried to engage his readers in an anticipatory challenge, says the following: “I am happy — yes, 
happy!  What more can I do to prove it, how to proclaim that I’m happy?  Oh, to shout it so that 
                                                 
 453 Ibid., 51 / 60-61  
 454 Even in his ability to adopt a third-person position, Smurov is very much like Bakhtin’s conception of 
the underground man, for this latter, according to Bakhtin “knows his own objective definition, neutral both to the 
others consciousness and to his own self-consciousness, and he takes into account the point of view of a “third 
person.” (PDP, 53 / Ss VI, 63  
 455 Blackwell,  7 
 456 Connolly also makes the same argument, but he does not develop it. See his “Madness and Doubling: 
From Dostoevsky’s The Double to Nabokov’s The Eye,” 136.  
 457 PDP, 196; Ss VI, 219. 
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all of you believe me at last, you cruel, smug people…” (104).  Here Smurov’s anticipation of his 
readers’ potential disbelief at his being happy with his status as a neutral observer of himself 
contradicts his argument of self-sufficiency in much the same way that the underground man’s 
anticipatory discourse contradicts his own pose.  For Bakhtin, the anticipatory word, the word with 
the sideward glance, and the loophole that it creates do not lead toward a stable psychology sure 
of its own word or self-definition: “[s]uch anticipation is marked by one peculiar structural trait: 
it tends toward a vicious circle.”458 In fact, the loophole ironically proves what it is employed to 
occlude: “…precisely in this act of anticipating the other’s response and in responding to it [the 
hero] again demonstrates to the other (and to himself) his own dependence on this other.”459  
Would Nabokov agree with Bakhtin’s assessment of the loophole with respect to Smurov?  We 
can only point to The Eye for clues: before the very end of the novella, and before his contradictory 
assurances that he is happy with his third-person pose, Smurov has an encounter with the very 
man, Kashmarin, that beat him and crushed his dignity at the beginning of the story.  Kashmarin 
catches up to Smurov in an effort to make amends with him; he shakes Smurov’s hand, and though 
he only manages a face-saving apology, he also offers him a job.  Smurov, who since his 
unsuccessful suicide attempt had experienced further rejection and ridicule, cannot help but beam 
positively at this unexpected instance of recognition: “All along I had to restrain a desire to say 
something nice, something to show how touched I was” (102).  Smurov’s reaction to this event, 
coupled with his contradictory slova s ogliadkoi show his pose for what it is: a thinly veiled attempt 
to protect himself from the negative characterizations of others — a pose which, if it meets with 
positive characterization from others, can crumble just as fast as it goes up.   
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 Smurov’s sheer joy at being recognized as a “Thou” and his addressing the reader in an 
anticipatory manner also prove that he is indeed in need of the other’s word, of recognition, of an 
other’s idea.  Thus, setting aside the differences in their face-saving tactics and perhaps their 
personal dispositions, Smurov’s loophole behavior and motivations are very similar to the 
underground man’s.  Like the underground man, Smurov not only tries to retain for himself the 
possibility of his own self-definition — he also wants a positive definition from others insofar as 
he wants to be recognized as a dashing hero.  Blackwell himself notes this parallel in his article: 
“[l]ike the underground man, who constantly dreams heroic and romantic plots for himself, 
Smurov wants to be part of a narrative — he wants to be a hero…”460  
 Thus we can see that both Nabokov’s The Eye and Dostoevsky’s “Notes from the 
Underground” deal with two closely related needs that can end up working at cross-purposes: the 
need for self-definition and the need for other’s to help out in that definition.  When characters (or 
“heroes,” to use Bakhtin’s parlance), such as the underground man and Smurov feel that they are 
defined in a way that does not sit well with their original self-definition — when an outside 
definition obliterates their self-definition — their need for self-definition sublimates into a need to 
fend off other’s definitions of their selves.  It is this will to fend off other wills which drives both 
the narrative intrigue and strategy in The Eye and as well as in Notes from the Underground.  
Bakhtin himself created a rich vocabulary with which to conceptualize the underground man’s all-
out defense of his own self.  The Bakhtinian concepts of the loophole, the word with a sideward 
glance, and double-voiced discourse, among others, are all part of an arsenal of tactics that a hero 
may employ in order to fend off monologism.  Though this latter concept is undefined and 
unnamed in The Eye, it or something akin to it is of utmost importance for this novel since it is 
                                                 
 460 Blackwell, 6.  Connolly originates this argument but compares Smurov to Golyadkin from The Double.  
see his “Madness and Doubling: From Dostoevsky’s The Double to Nabokov’s The Eye,” 130.  
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what motivates Smurov to narrate and relate to himself and others the way that he does.  Bakhtin 
himself describes the conflict that the underground man experiences in decidedly non-technical 
language, language with which Nabokov would seem to agree with respect to his Smurov: 
In each of [the underground man’s] thoughts about [the world, nature and society] there is 
a battle of voices, evaluations, points of view.  In everything he senses above all someone 
else’s will predetermining him.  It is within the framework of this alien will that he 
perceives the world order, nature with its mechanized necessity, the social order.461  
 
 This view would also seem to characterize Hermann Karlovich, the narrator of Despair,  
Nabokov’s next literary experimentation with the Dostoevskian fear of being defined.  In fact, 
Julian Connolly, who has devoted several articles462 to Despair, uses this very same quote to 
describe Hermann’s paranoia of being defined.463  Connolly says that “[l]ike the underground man, 
Hermann longs for independence of thought and self-assurance in action” (157).  Blackwell too 
notes the continuation of the loophole theme in Despair and says that the novel “can be viewed as 
an elaboration of this very anxiety.”464  Whereas Smurov’s fear of definition was projected on a 
characterological plane, Blackwell indicates that Hermann’s fear of being defined takes on an 
inter- and extra-textual dimension.  “Hermann is…acutely aware of others’ words—including 
Dostoevsky’s, the audience’s potential judging words, and the implied author’s power to generate 
Hermann’s own language” (8).  Hermann’s fear of being defined by others, within or without his 
narrative, centers on his desire for the recognition of his aesthetic project (and thus of being an 
artist): having the act of murdering Felix be read as a crime thriller where the murderer gets away 
                                                 
 461 PDP, 236; Ss VI, 263.  
 462 See his “Dostoevski and Vladimir Nabokov: the Case of Despair,” in Alexey Ugrinsky et al. (eds.) 
Dostoevski and the Human Condition after a Century (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 155-162; “The 
Function of Literary Allusion in Nabokov’s Despair,” in Slavic and East European Journal 26 (1982) 3, pp. 302-13; 
and “Nabokov’s (Re)Visions of Dostoevsky,” in Nabokov and His Fiction: New Perspectives, ed. Connolly 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 141–57.  
 463 Connolly, “Dostoevski and Vladimir Nabokov: The Case of Despair,” p. 157. 
 464 “Dostoevskian Problems…,” 8.  
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with the perfect crime.465  Since this project hinges on the belief that Felix is his double, Hermann 
tries to anticipate readerly disbelief in a classic Bakhtinian ‘word with a sideward glance:’ “How 
I long to convince you!  And I will, I will convince you!  I will force you all, you rogues, to 
believe…”466  Julian Connolly notes this exclamation and, though he does not tie it to Bakhtin’s 
concept of the loophole, he sees it as one extreme of Hermann’s variability in addressing his reader; 
a variability that parallels the underground man’s.  Thus in one scene Hermann wants to convince 
his readers that Felix is his double and in another he wants to prove to the reader that his powers 
of interpretation are inadequate by “making an April fool of” him.  Hermann continues in this vein: 
“And a damned good fool I have made of someone.  Who is he? Gentle reader, look at yourself in 
the mirror, as you seem to like mirrors so much” (24).  In Notes from the Underground, we find 
the underground man addressing readers and making his desire to be believed clear — “And 
believe me, ladies and gentlemen, I certainly suffered!” — a desire which, in another scene, turns 
into the affirmation that he does not care: “I don’t care in the least what you think.”467  Thus, 
according to Connolly, (156) both the underground man and Hermann engage in a sort of tug-of-
war with the reader, ingratiating themselves with him in order to obsequiously request for 
recognition, then hostilely rebuffing him, in order to signal that they do not require their 
recognition. 
 As we mentioned above, Hermann also creates “words with a sideward glance” in order to 
retain a loophole of self-definition with respect to other extra-textual authors, such as Arthur Conan 
                                                 
 465 In his “Dostoevski and Vladimir Nabokov: the Case of Despair,” Connolly notes that “both the act of 
murder and the act of writing are seen by Hermann as related pursuits.  He regards them both as vehicles to 
demonstrate his innate artistic talents…” (158).  The text of Despair, however, points to Hermann’s very blurring of 
the “relation” between these pursuits.  For Hermann treats the murder plot that he concocts and carries out as a 
literary narrative that can compete with the best of crime novelists. 
 466 D, 16; Note how closely this line parallels the very last line from The Eye.  
 467 See Connolly, “Dostoevski and Vladimir Nabokov: The Case of Despair,” 156.  
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Doyle, Dostoevsky and Nabokov.  Thus, for example, when meditating upon the crime 
story/criminal plan that he is creating — upon “crime as art”468 — Hermann tries to prod his 
readers to yield a more positive appraisal of his story/plan by suggesting aspects of his narrative 
that Arthur Conan Doyle himself could have incorporated into his own Sherlock Holmes stories: 
 Oh, Conan Doyle!  How marvelously you could have crowned your creation when your  
 two heroes began boring you!  What an opportunity, what a subject you missed!  For you  
 could have written one last tale concluding the whole Sherlock Holmes epic; one last  
 episode beautifully setting off the rest: the murderer in that tale should have turned out to  
 be not the one-legged bookkeeper, not the Chinaman Ching and not the woman in  
 crimson, but the very chronicler of the crime stories, Dr. Watson himself—Watson, who,  
 so to speak, knew what was Whatson.  A staggering surprise for the reader (121-122). 
 
One interesting aspect in Hermann’s attempt at having the reader contrast his talent positively with 
Doyle’s is that he hides his awareness of his literary status in plain view.  In the narrative that 
Hermann is trying to create, he is the murderer-chronicler himself.  Yet how far does Hermann go 
with the comparison?  If Hermann is the “Watson” in the narrative that he inhabits, who is Conan 
Doyle?  Hermann’s hint at his non-authorial-just-merely-narratorial status is all the more peculiar 
in light of his desire to be seen as an author fully in control of the narrative that he inhabits.  This 
desire extends to the desire to be seen as a greater author than some that the reader of his narrative 
knows: “But what are they—Doyle, Dostoevsky, Leblanc, Wallace—what are all the great 
novelists who wrote of nimble criminals, what are all the great criminals who never read the nimble 
novelists—what are they in comparison with me? Blundering fools!”469 
 As for Hermann’s relationship with Dostoevsky, it is complex and this complexity is seen 
in the many allusions and direct references to this author.  It seems Connolly was right when he 
said that “in a very real sense Despair may be the single work by Nabokov that displays the most 
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prominent array of Dostoevsky intertexts.”470  Much of the complexity in Hermann’s relationship 
to Dostoevsky, at least in the English translation and revision of Otchaianie, is due in part to the 
contradictory attitudes that he expresses towards the author.  On the one hand, he does signal to 
the reader that he should read him as better than Dostoevsky, as we saw in the quote above.  On 
the other hand, we see references to Dostoevsky that lie in an ambiguous territory between  the 
narratorial parody of Dostoevsky and the implied author’s [i.e. Nabokov’s] parody of Hermann.471 
There is one instance in the novel where Hermann resorts to outright mimicry of the underground 
man.  In “Notes from the Underground,” the underground man succumbs to hysterics after having 
been “caught by the prostitute Liza in his room railing at his inconsiderate servant.”472 Similarly, 
toward the end of Despair, after Hermann is confronted by the doctor that he insulted, he “fell 
upon [his] bed and sobbed violently.”473  Hermann then says that he “felt all the Dusty-and-Dusky 
charm of hysterics…” (188).  Thus, though he is supposedly better than Dostoevsky, Hermann 
mimics the very tactics found in “Notes from the Underground” and even acknowledges the 
appropriation.  The appropriated hysterics also happens to be an instance of the loophole.  Indeed, 
Hermann himself indicates the usefulness of this tactic: “I felt…something dimly advantageous to 
me, so I continued to shake and heave…” (188).  Though it would seem that Hermann’s vanity 
would prompt him to argue away the appropriation of the techniques of “lesser” authors as literary 
pragmatism or as parody, he demonstrates, just a page later, that his references to Dostoevsky are 
                                                 
 470 “Nabokov’s (revisions) of Dostoevsky,” 147.  The Russian version of Despair, Otchaianie, carries the 
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not so simply explained away: “In spite of a grotesque resemblance to Rascalnikov—No, that’s 
wrong. Canceled” (189).  
 With respect to the author of Despair, Hermann makes reference to him in passing, then 
addresses him directly and even accuses him of wanting to steal his narrative: 
There…I have mentioned you, my first reader, you, the well-known author of 
psychological novels.  I have read them and found them very artificial, though not badly 
constructed.  What will you feel, reader-writer, when you tackle my tale?  Delight? Envy? 
 Or even…who knows?…you may use my termless removal to give out my stuff for 
your own…for the fruit of your own crafty…yes, I grant you that…crafty and experienced 
imagination; leaving me out in the cold.  It would not be hard for me to take in advance 
proper measures against such impudence.  Whether I shall take them, that is another 
question.  What if I find it rather flatter in that you should steal my property?  Theft is the 
best compliment one can possibly pay a thing.  And do you know the most amusing part?  
I assume that, having made up your mind to effect that pleasant robbery, you will suppress 
the compromising lines, the very lines I am writing now, and, moreover, fashion certain 
bits to your liking (which is a less pleasant thought) just as a motorcar thief 
 repaints the car he has stolen (80-81). 
 
Though Blackwell mentions in his article that Hermann addresses his author “in comic effort to 
discredit [his] authorship” he does not analyze the full extent of this act of address.  By the way 
that he addresses the “well-known” author, it is clear that Hermann experiences both an inadequacy 
with regards to his own authorial effort and jealousy towards this author’s.  Hermann, for example, 
tries to put him down by calling his novels “artificial,” but begrudgingly compliments their “not 
bad” construction and “grant[s]” the implied author a “crafty and experienced imagination.”  
Hermann’s suggestion that the “well-known author,” whom the reader knows to be Hermann’s 
author but whom Hermann here casts as merely another author, may steal “his” narrative and 
publish it as his (“the well-known author’s”) own nevertheless betrays the hint of a suspicion that 
this author may indeed be his author.  Why, for example, would Hermann suspect the implied 
author of wanting to steal his narrative?  Is Hermann perhaps conflating the fear of having his 
narrative stolen with the fear that he, along with his narrative, have already been written by 
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someone else?  The possibility of this conflation is suggested some twenty pages later, where 
Hermann introduces the sixth chapter with a discourse denying the existence of God.  Part of the 
reason that God cannot exist, according to Hermann, seems to boil down to the fear of lacking free 
will and the freedom to be artistically original:  
 [A]nother reason why I cannot, nor wish to, believe in God: the fairy tale about him is not 
 really mine, it belongs to strangers, to all men: it is soaked through by the evil-smelling  
 effluvia of millions of other souls that have spun about a little under the sun and then  
 burst; it swarms with primordial fears […] If I am not master of my life, not sultan of my  
 own being, then no man’s logic and no man’s ecstatic fits may force me to find less silly  
 my impossibly silly position: that of God’s slave; no, not his slave even, but just a match  
 which is aimlessly struck and then blown out by some inquisitive child, the terror of his  
 toys (101-102). 
 
Though Hermann tries to argue away the existence of God, his conditional musings (“the fairy tale 
about him is not really mine…;” “If I am not master of my life…”) betray a worry that a divine 
state of affairs might be true.  If God does exist, then for him that would mean that he lacks total 
volition and, hence, artistic independence.  That this God might also be identified with the author 
is suggested by the logical kinship between the anxieties that Herman feels — the fear of artistic 
theft by the author he considers not his own and the general theft of independence, creative or 
otherwise, in a divine state of affairs from which one must depend ontologically.  Ultimately, the 
identification between the author and God to which Hermann alludes is a common topos in 
Nabokov’s oeuvre.474   
 Besides using anticipatory loopholes and ‘words with a sideward glance’ in order hopefully 
to goad unwanted judgments of his self into wanted ones, Hermann also displays varying kinds of 
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physical and moral dissociations of identity, dissociations that are roughly conceptually analogous 
to the Bakhtinian concept of the loophole.  These dissociations are reminiscent of Smurov’s own 
self-dissociations, designed as they are to split the self into a judgeable (finalizeable) physically 
extended self and a seemingly extensionless observatorial “I” (the floating “I” or “Eye”).  Hermann 
first suggests this kind of dissociation of the self in chapter two of Despair:  
 I have grown much too used to an outside view of myself, to being both painter and  
 model, so no wonder my style is denied the blessed grace of spontaneity.  Try as I may I  
 do not succeed in getting back into my original envelope, let alone making myself  
 comfortable in my old self; the disorder there is far too great; things have been moved,  
 the lamp is black and dead, bits of my past litter the floor.475 
 
Taking Hermann’s general attitude in the novel into account — viz. he wants to get away with the 
perfect crime by blaming someone else — it seems that the reason behind his dissociation of self 
might lie in the reason why he does “not succeed in getting back into [his] original envelope.”  
Dissociating his “old self” further by making it into a room, Hermann suggests that there are things 
about his self that he cannot countenance.  Hermann also describes his dissociations from his self 
literally — these, in turn, are very analogous to Smurov’s dissociation with himself in The Eye: 
 I am referring to a well-known kind of “dissociation.”  With me it started in fragmentary  
 fashion a few months before my trip to Prague.  For example, I would be in bed with  
 Lydia, winding up the brief series of preparatory caresses she was supposed to be entitled 
 to, when all at once I would become aware that imp Split had taken over.  My face was  
 buried in the folds of her neck, her legs had started to clamp me, the ashtray toppled off  
 the bed table, the universe followed—but at the same time, incomprehensively and  
 delightfully, I was standing naked in the middle of the room, one hand resting on the back 
 of the chair where she had left her stockings and panties.  The sensation of being int two  
 places at once gave me an extraordinary kick… (26) 
 
The fact that Hermann describes his body “standing, naked,” and his “hand resting on the back of 
the chair,” clashes with the implied suggestion that Lydia can only perceive Hermann’s observed 
self.  If this is true, then Hermann’s observatorial self must then take some other form of 
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incorporeality: one that is nevertheless embodied yet invisible.  At the end of his description, 
Hermann reveals to the reader what he or she probably already suspected:  
Alas, one April night, with the harps of rain aphrodisiacally burbling in the orchestra, as I 
was sitting  at my maximum distance of fifteen rows of seats and looking forward to an 
especially good show — which indeed, had already started, with my acting self in colossal 
form and most  inventive — from the distant bed, where I thought I was, came Lydia’s 
yawn and voice stupidly saying that if I were not yet coming to bed, I might bring her the 
red book she had left in the parlor” (28). 
 
Thus the very feats of dissociation of which Hermann believes himself capable, all seem to be in 
his head.  This passage also confirms to us our initial suspicion — that Hermann presumed that 
his dissociative doubling split him into an observable participator in the material world, and an 
unobservable (immaterial?) observatorial “I.”  The narrator of Despair apparently underwent 
several episodes of this dissociation, all described in the span of two pages.  In each subsequent 
episode, Hermann would, as we saw above, reach a farther distance between his two selves.  
Although Hermann’s description of his physical dissociations presents the reader with a very odd 
tangent in the story, they seem to indicate a desire on the part of Hermann to become an observer 
of himself within the context of an artistic or theatrical spectacle.  This is also seen in the quote 
above and when he says: “I longed to discover some means to remove myself at least a hundred 
yards from the lighted stage where I performed” (28).  Hermann’s analogy between his observed 
and observing selves on the one hand and performers and audience on the other seems to map 
somewhat upon the roles that he desires to retain in the novel — that of the narratively embedded 
and embodied hero and the unobserved yet ever-observatorial author. 
 Later in the novel, we see that Hermann treats the very murder of Felix as an act of 
dissociation.  The  reader of Despair will remember that the very crux of Hermann’s supposedly 
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perfect crime 476 is that, by making Felix dress as himself (i.e. Hermann) before shooting him, 
Hermann intends for others (society, the law etc.) to believe that it was Felix who shot Hermann 
and that it is Felix who is at large.  In planning Felix’s murder and in the very murder, Hermann 
treats Felix as his own inanimate physical self, whereas his observing “I” (“eye”) retains both the 
omniscience and incorporeality proper to the authorial status he imagines he has.  Hermann is so 
sure of the foolproof nature of the switch at the center of his plan that he would not be suspected 
of being the murderer even if he turned himself in: “[i]f the deed is planned and performed 
correctly, then the force of creative art is such, that were the criminal to give himself up on the 
very next morning, none would believe him, the invention of art containing far more intrinsically 
truth than life’s reality” (122).  This particular switch, analogous to Hermann’s previous feats of 
dissociation, is related to Smurov’s dissociation in The Eye and can therefore be considered to be 
the kind of loophole tactic expressed at the level of narratorial description (as opposed to the 
rendered speech of characters).  Conceptually, Hermann’s criminal plan (or crime thriller) allows 
him to retain precisely that last word sought by the criminal who tries to execute the perfect crime: 
he seeks to erase his identity and therefore, his agency, in order to escape legal judgment.  In 
Hermann’s case, he attempts to deflect any possible judgment for the murder onto the very person 
that he murdered!  Yet Hermann not only wants to avoid legal judgment, he also wants to avoid 
moral judgment from himself.  In this too, Hermann takes recourse to dissociation.  At a crucial 
moment in the chain of events leading to the climax of his plan, when he is about to mail the letter 
that is to lure Felix to Berlin, Hermann cannot mail the letter: “I did not drop the letter in” (124).  
Instead he convinces a little girl to drop the letter for him, after which he says: “…my conscience 
is clear.  Not I wrote to Felix, but he wrote to me; not I sent him the answer, but an unknown child” 
                                                 




(125).  Somehow, the little girl absorbs the responsibility for setting the events that lead to Felix’s 
death in motion. 
 Humbert Humbert too employs the loophole strategy in order to fend off unwanted 
definitions and to retain the right to the last words about himself.  According to Blackwell, the 
most prominent example of Humbert’s use of the loophole seems to be his possible fictionalization 
of part of the last fifty-six days of his life during which important events, such as the last encounter 
with Dolly and Quilty’s murder, were supposed to have happened.    
 If Humbert has willfully given a misleading number (fifty-six days), his act undermines  
 our finalization of his image, since it casts doubt on his last three days of freedom…A  
 Dostoevskian (that is, loophole-oriented) reading would grant architectonic plausibility to 
 the presumption that either Humbert fabricates the number, or he fabricates the murder  
 scene,477 and that by his own design we cannot decide which. In this way, Humbert’s  
 character remains as an artistically free image, not subject to finalization by readers,  
 juries, or judges (11-12). 
 
Whichever way we are to read Humbert’s calendrical accounting, this possible instance of the 
loophole is not the only one found in Lolita.  We have already, in the third chapter of this study, 
discussed Humbert Humbert’s employment of arguments grounded on historical, biological, 
sociological and legal discourses designed to justify his actions.  The employment of these 
discourses open up a discursive loophole, for they anticipate the reader’s objections to Humbert’s 
desires and attempt to mollify them with the respectability and authority of science.  The narrator 
of Lolita also addresses his readers with anticipatory remarks, much like the underground man.478 
The underground man, for example, uses such addresses in order to punctuate the very point that 
he tries to prove: “‘Loafer’ — why, after all, it is a calling and an appointment, it is a career, 
gentlemen.”479  Humbert Humbert, who knowingly addresses not just an audience, but an audience 
                                                 
 477 And, potentially, the reunion with Dolly — FP.  
 478 In this connection, see Connolly’s “Nabokov’s (revisions) of Dostoevsky,” 152. 
 479 See Bakhtin, PDP, 50-51.  
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whose judgment carries severe legal consequences, tries to mollify their judgment with the act of 
address and a tragic pose: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, exhibit number one is what the 
seraphs, the misinformed, simple, noble-winged seraphs, envied.  Look at this tangle of thorns.”480   
Humbert Humbert at times closely mimics the underground man in this regard.  Thus the 
underground man’s angry spurning of his would-be judgers — “I don’t care in the least what you 
think”481 — is duplicated when Humbert Humbert says “[m]y judges will regard all of this as a 
piece of mummery on the part of a madman with a gross liking fro the fruit vert.  Au fond, ça m’est 
bien égal.” 482  We see clearly that, though the narrator delivers the part of the line most 
characteristic of the underground man in his native French, it is quite a faithful translation of the 
spirit of the underground man’s attitude.  As a matter of fact, if there are any striking similarities 
between the underground man and Humbert Humbert, it is in their employment of anticipatory 
‘words with a sideward glance’ addressed directly to their would-be judgers.483 
 
DOUBLES AND PARODY 
 If Bakhtin associates the concept of the loophole most prominently with the underground 
man, 484  his meditation on the peculiar dialogism that occurs between doubles centers on 
Dostoevsky’s The Double and upon its protagonists, Golyadkin senior and his double, Golyadkin 
junior.  Likewise, whereas Hermann and Humbert’s loophole activity (especially the discursive 
variant) mostly refers to the underground man, both murderer-narrators have their own doubles of 
                                                 
 480 L, 9.  
 481 See Connolly, “Dostoevski and Vladimir Nabokov: The Case of Despair,” 156.  
 482 L, 40.  
 483 Besides the instance mentioned above, Humbert Humbert’s anticipatory addresses occur in L, 40, 69, 70, 
103, 123, 125, and 132.  
 484 See PDP, 208, 222, 232-236, 241, 258, et passim.  
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sorts and in this they refer to The Double as well.485 As for Bakhtin’s view of The Double, The 
reason for the appearance of Golyadkin junior has to do with an important layer in the conflict-
dynamic of self and other, the receipt of recognition from the other: “At the base of the intrigue, 
therefore, lies Golyadkin’s attempt — in view of the total nonrecognition of his personality on the 
part of others — to find for himself a substitute for the other.”486  Golyadkin however acts as if he 
does not want recognition from others: “Golyadkin’s speech seeks, above all, to simulate total 
independence from the other’s words…;” he has a “desire to hide from [the other’s discourse], to 
avoid attracting attention to himself, to bury himself in the crowd, to go unnoticed: ‘After all he’s 
just like everyone else, he’s nothing special, just like everyone else.’”487  With Despair and Lolita, 
however, Hermann’s designation of Felix as his double and Humbert Humbert’s allusion to Quilty 
as his have nothing to do with being recognized as “Thou’s” in their respective narratives.  
Hermann does need Felix in order to achieve recognition but only after using Felix to fulfill his 
ghastly aesthetic project — he does not engage in dialogue with him in order to achieve this 
recognition.  Instead, both Hermann and Humbert turn their respective relationships with their 
doubles into opportunities to create moral loopholes.488  
 With respect to the Schopenhauerian and Bakhtinian conceptual plane of conflict, the 
similarities that Despair and Lolita have with The Double seem to lie more in the antagonistic 
relationship that develops between the Golyadkins.  Bakhtin says that, at first, Golyadkin junior 
“behaves like the first and uncertain voice in Golyadkin’s internal dialogue…[…] But later on the 
                                                 
 485 For connections between Dostoevsky’s The Double and Nabokov’s The Eye, Despair and Lolita, see 
Julian Connolly “Madness and Doubling: From Dostoevsky’s The Double to Nabokov’s The Eye;” and “Nabokov’s 
(re)visions of Dostoevsky.”   
 486 PDP, 215; Ss VI, 239-240. 
 487 Ibid, 212/237  
 488 Connolly says that, in murdering Quilty, Humbert “indulges in a form of scapegoating: he attempts to 
create an external substitute to serve as a repository for his own guilt” (“Nature’s Reality, 59). 
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roles change: the treacherous double takes over the tone of Golyadkin’s second voice, parodically 
exaggerating its affectionate familiarity”489 Bakhtin ultimately characterizes Golyadkin junior and 
senior as different forces battling within the same psyche: “What results is a peculiar sort of 
mystery play, or rather morality play, in which the actors are not whole people but rather the 
spiritual forces battling within them…” 490    Elsewhere, Bakhtin connects the treachery of 
Golyadkin’s parodic exaggerations to this psychical battle: 
 in contrast to stylization parody introduces into…discourse a semantic intention that is  
 directly opposed to the original one.  The second voice, once having made its home in the 
 other’s discourse, clashes hostilely with its primordial host and forces him to serve  
 directly opposing aims.  Discourse becomes an arena of battle between two voices…the  
 voices are not only isolated from one another, separated by a distance, but are…    
 hostilely opposed.491 
 
Parody, then, is the one dialogical relationship described by Bakhtin that seems most akin to the 
concept of monologism.  We see the kinship specifically within the hostility and conflict inherent 
in the finalization of the other that is always enacted by the monological self.  The self’s 
finalization of the other is always “a semantic intention that is directly opposed” to that other. 
 Ultimately, though the reasons for Hermann and Humbert’s conjuring of their perceived 
(or real) doubles differ from Golyadkin’s reasons, the relationships between doubles in all three 
works are analogous: they are all characterized by a hostile bid to dominate the other, whether by 
way of parody or finalization.  The main difference would be that it is the copy and not his model 
in The Double which is hostile, whereas in Despair and Lolita, the models shoot their copies to 
death.  One could even argue that Quilty himself is a parody of Humbert — both are artists and 
are interested in the same adolescent girl.  His needling of Humbert by leaving him clues in hotel 
                                                 
 489 PDP, 215-216; Ss VI, 240.  
 490 Ibid., 217/241.  
 491 Ibid., 193/ 216  
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registers of his and Dolly’s whereabouts is analogous to Golyadkin junior’s needling of Golyadkin 
senior.492  Moreover, the clues themselves parody the kind of literary allusions that Humbert 
himself makes.  
 Readers of Nabokov, however, tend to perceive parody in Lolita as a mainstay of the 
narrator himself.493  This makes sense as he is by far the greatest source of intercharacterological 
hostility, discursive or otherwise, in the novel.  Dolly too, however, uses parody to combat 
Humbert’s monological despotism.  Though at one point a lonely Humbert exclaims to himself 
“Oh, my Lolita, I have only words to play with!,” for most of the novel, Dolly literally has only 
words to fight back with.  Sometimes Dolly’s parody of Humbert follows the Bakhtinian definition 
— “speak[ing] in someone else’s discourse” but with “a semantic intention…directly opposed to 
the original one”494 — exactly.  This is seen, for example, when Dolly mimics Humbert’s speech: 
“Because, my dahrling, when darling Mother finds out she’ll divorce you and strangle me.”495  
During their second road trip through the country, after Humbert successfully evades Quilty’s car, 
Dolly reacts, mixing sarcasm and parody together: “You should—ah—check them by—ah—
keeping in touch with him, fahther deah,” said Lo, writhing in the coils of her own sarcasm.  “Gee, 
you are mean,” she added in her ordinary voice” (220).  Humbert’s noting Dolly’s “ordinary 
voice,” points, of course, to the fact that she has a whole collection of non-ordinary ones.  Dolly 
continues: “Your humor,…is sidesplitting, dean fahther” (220).    At one point, Humbert describes 
Dolly’s parodic mimicry of his behavior: “I discovered this tic nerveux because cruel Lo was the 
                                                 
 492 L, 248-252  
 493 For parody in Lolita from the point of view of the narrator and the implied author, see Alfred Appel, 
Jr.’s “‘Lolita’: The Springboard of Parody,” Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature 8.2 (Spring, 1967), pp. 
204-241. 
 494 PDP, 193; Ss VI, 216.  
 495 L, 119; emphasis mine.  
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first to mimic it” (161). Dolly is also equally adept at a whole range of discursive relatives of 
parody, which, according to Bakhtin, form part of double-voiced discourses: 
  Analogous to parodistic discourse is ironic, or any other double-voiced, use of  
 someone else’s words; in those instances too another’s discourse is used for conveying  
 aspirations that are hostile to it. In the ordinary speech of our everyday life such a use of  
 another’s words is extremely widespread, especially in dialogue, where one speaker very  
 often literally repeats the statement of the other speaker, investing it with new value and  
 accenting it in his own way — with expressions of doubt, indignation, irony, mockery,  
 ridicule, and the like.496  
 
We find Dolly employing irony and ridicule in the first few acts of addressing Humbert as her 
father: “‘What thing, Dad?’ (she let the word expand with ironic deliberation).”497   The irony is 
repeated some moments later, with a greater admixture of ridicule: “You talk like a book, Dad” 
(114).  Dolly’s ridicule draws attention to the narrator’s “foreign” way of talking more than once: 
at Humbert’s reference to some “idol of your coevals,” Dolly responds: “Of my what? Speak 
English” (149). 
 In fact, the reader familiar with Bakhtin could conceive of Dolly’s irony, her ridicule and 
parody of Humbert, her parodic contrasts between his language and hers, and finally, the skillful 
employment of her talent for acting (detailed in chapter three) to deceive the narrator’s real and 
discursive control to correspond to Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalization of language and culture.  
Though Bakhtin places the ideas of carnival and carnivalization in opposition to official culture, 
language and genre, it is not difficult to place this dichotomy parallel to the dichotomy of dialogism 
and monologism.  This can be seen plainly in Bakhtin’s example of the person who experienced 
the heyday of the symmetrical dualism of the carnivalesque and official culture, which was during 
the Middle ages: 
 [A] person of the Middle Ages lived, as it were, two lives: one was the official life,  
 monolithically serious and gloomy, subjugated to a strict hierarchical order, full of terror,  
                                                 
 496 “‘Socratic irony’ is reduced carnival laughter” (PDP, 132  
 497 L, 112 
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 dogmatism, reverence, and piety; the other was the life of the carnival square, free and  
 unrestricted, full of ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the profanation of everything sacred, 
 full of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and everything.498 
 
The monolithically serious and gloomy official life is life according to the powers that be.  The 
life of the carnival square, however, is the kind of life that overturns that hegemony and literally 
vulgarizes it by unfettering decorum from the political and/or religious center and handing it to the 
people to do as they will.  It is not difficult to see that the life that Dolly is forced to lead, though 
a secretive life, is nonetheless a monolithic and gloomy one mandated by the hegemonic other.  
The life that she sometimes pretends to lead,499  on the other hand, is one that is “free and 
unrestricted,” where she is capable of casting off decorum if need be.  Dolly’s pretending, of 
course, takes form in her acting and deception.  Even Bakhtin makes an association between theater 
and the carnivalesque: “[c]ertain elements of carnival are also preserved in the life of the theater 
and spectacle in modern times.”500  Dolly’s ability for deception make her a sort of rogue [plut] 
character in Lolita.  In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin discusses the carivalization of literature 
through “[t]he cheerful deception of the rogue — justified by its very address to liars, stupidity 
[glupost’] — the justified failure to understand a lie[.]”  Deception and stupidity are “two prosaic 
answers to high pathos and any kind of seriousness and conventionality.”501  According to Bakhtin, 
“…the rogue’s gay deception” also “parodies high languages…” (405).  Dolly is a rogue, in the 
generic sense, with respect to Humbert on many differing levels: she parodies his European 
sophistication (hegemonic vis-à-vis her American adolescent pop-culture sensibility) as embodied 
                                                 
 498 PDP, 129-130; Ss VI, 146-147.  
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in his language, she ridicules and thus de-sacralizes his semantics, and deceives him in actual fact 
in order to shake off his actual despotism and gain her actual freedom. 
 
BAKHTINIAN AND NABOKVIAN MONOLOGISM AND DIALOGISM 
 One of the more significant conclusions for this study is the extent to which Bakhtin and 
Nabokov’s engagement with Dostoevsky yielded remarkably similar conceptions of authorial 
monologism.  Yet in speaking about monologism here, we are not making the same point made in 
Pekka Tammi’s Problems of Nabokov’s Poetics, viz. that Nabokov’s oeuvre exemplifies 
monologism.502  As Stephen Blackwell notes, Tammi’s argument about Nabokov “appears true for 
most of the non-third-person narratives, and these form the bulk of Tammi’s evidence” with 
regards to Nabokov’s monologism.503  Indeed, our arguments regarding Nabokov’s portrayal of 
what Bakhtin calls authorial monologism focuses on two of Nabokov’s first-person narratives.  
There are three important elements to these narratives, Despair and Lolita, which set them apart 
from the rest of Nabokov’s oeuvre:  (1) their narrators purport to be the actual authors of the stories 
they narrate, (2) these narrators carry out crimes, murder and rape, that severely affect the integrity 
of others — crimes committed in Crime and Punishment, The Brothers Karamazov, and The 
Devils, and (3) in parallel with these crimes of murder and abuse, these narrator-authors maintain 
or try to maintain a monological relationship with respect to the rest of the characters inhabiting 
their narratives.  In casting these two narrators as villains whose aesthetic failures are intrinsically 
tied with their moral ones, Nabokov posits a conception of monologism as a moral transgression 
against the other, a conception with equally valid and compelling permutations across conceptual 
                                                 
 502 See Tammi, Problems of Nabokov’s Poetics: A narratological Analysis (Helsinki: Suomalainen 
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 503 See Blackwell, “Dostoevskian Problems in Nabokov’s Poetics,” 5.  See also Tammi, above. 
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and philosophical boundaries: at the level of narrative as representation of the world, it is a 
hermeneutic crime that falsifies and distorts the epistemological underpinnings of a world made 
up of multiple consciousnesses; at the level of interpersonal ethics, monologism is the metaphor 
for acts that can lead to the literal silence of others.  Bakhtin, whose subject matter in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics would seem to be entirely contained within novelistic poetics, is nevertheless 
known for habitually breaking out into ethical commentary.  Perhaps his most direct remarks 
regarding the ethics of monologism occur in relation to his commentary of Dostoevsky’s Makar 
Devushkin and his sense of being finalized by Gogol’s The Overcoat: “a living human being 
cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process.  In a 
human being there is always something that only he can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness 
and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.”504  A 
repentant Humbert Humbert reaches a similar conclusion with similar language at the very end of 
Lolita: “I knew that the hopelessly poignant thing was not Lolita's absence form my side, but the 
absence of her voice from that concord.”  The concord he refers to was the “melody of children at 
play.”505  Yet, as we may remember, Humbert Humbert also said “that we are inclined to endow 
our friends with the stability of type that literary characters acquire in the reader’s mind” (266).  
Whatever the value of his repentance for his deeds towards Dolly, Humbert Humbert, along with 
Hermann, is also a virtual theoretical advocate for monologism.  Both Hermann and Humbert 
actively explain the practices of dissociation and “solipsization” — processes which make part of 
the passive assumptions inherent in the act of monological authoring.  The “solipsized” Dolly is 
the finalized Dolly, and Hermann’s ideal of the extensionless, observatorial “I,” is exactly that 
position, the position sub specie aeternitatis, taken by the monological author.  For Bakhtin “all is 
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seen and depicted in the all-encompassing and all-knowing krugozor [horizon, or “round-gaze”] 
of the author.”506  
 The surprising similarity between the Bakhtinian (from the Dostoevsky book) and 
Nabokovian optic metaphors for observation is deepened when we also think of the early Bakhtin’s 
(from Toward a Philosophy of the Act) deontological dynamics of being with their tropology of 
space.  In Hermann’s conception (as in Smurov’s), the observatorial “I” leaves or “dissociates 
from” its corporeal and material encasement in the field of third-person objects and dissolves any 
relationship to it.  Humbert too dissociates from his sinful corporeal reality in the form of Quilty, 
who absorbs grotesque characteristics as well as the narrator’s jealousy.  The ontological split that 
Hermann and Humbert rip open with the help of their “doubling” is reminiscent of Bakhtin’s 
notion of the “dvoinik-samozvanets” (“double-pretender”) as well as ordinary form of 
“samozvanets” or alibi-in-being. 507   In attempting to assume the divine-like properties 
(omniscience, extensionlessness) of the author, Hermann and Humbert actually cut all ethical ties 
to a world that now seems entirely outside of them and of their making.  They are “pretenders” 
because instead of “authoring” their actions, they continuously reliativize these actions and 
theoretically re-transcribe the ethical laws and ontological implications in a way that safeguards 
their authorial power and ethical privileges (i.e. the privileges to do what others cannot do by the 
simple fact that one has authorial power).  In other words, Hermann and Humbert open loopholes 
that allow them to continuously redefine their actions in order to retain their authorial 
status/authority.  Hermann and Humbert are thus pretenders in Bakhtin’s eyes by virtue of not 
authoring their actions and pretenders in the original sense of the word: as unworthy seekers of a 
divinely given authority.   
                                                 
 506  Ss II, 83. 
507 Ss I, 21.  See also Gogotishvili’s commentary, p. 359. 
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With Humbert and Hermann, one major divergence between Bakhtin and Nabokov 
becomes clear.  For Bakhtin, the loophole is the exclusive tool of the character who tries to avoid 
being finalized by the other.  Nabokov, on the other hand, shows that the loophole can be utilized 
by would-be authors in order to perpetuate their discursive, and non-discursive, abuses.  It is in 
this way that Humbert Humbert attempts to shape his readers’ interpretations of his ultimately 
abusive actions.  Hermann too shapes his readers’ interpretations by drawing attention away from 
his basic moral failure with a crime thriller.   In Dostoevsky’s the underground man and Nabokov’s 
early character, Smurov, loopholes are also veiled cries for recognition.  The difference between 
these two characters, on the one hand, and Nabokov’s author-murderers, on the other hand is that 
the latter two seek the recognition of the very narratives that they are trying to craft.  Humbert 
wants nothing more than for his tragic apotheosis from abuse to love to be believed.  Hermann 
wants appreciation for the crime thriller (or, simply, crime) that he has composed.  Both want their 
authorial positions validated.  Yet both also seek validation for their utterly selfish desires.  Perhaps 
Nabokov intended to shed light on this scarier aspect of the loophole: an excessive use of 
anticipatory challenges and spurnings of others’ definitions hides an all-consuming thirst for the 
recognition of a dangerous desire or an insane idea.  This very thirst for recognition is seen at the 
end of Despair in the high degree of offense that Herman takes at being revealed to be the 
murderer:  
 …the guilt has been laid upon me, straightaway, unreservedly, with cold and callous  
 promptitude, as though they were joyfully eager to convict me, as though it were   
 vengeance, as though I had long been offending them and they had long been thirsting to  
 punish me.  Not only taking for granted, with strange predication, that the dead man  
 could not be I: not only failing to observe our resemblance, but, as it were, a priori,  
 excluding its possibility (for people do not see what they are loath to see), the police gave 
 a brilliant example of logic when they expressed their surprise at my having hoped to  
 deceive the world simply by dressing up in my clothes an individual who was not in the  
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 least like me.  The imbecility and blatant unfairness of such reasoning are highly   
 comic.508 
 
An analogous moment is seen in Lolita when Humbert Humbert involves Dolly in his morally 
inappropriate leering of other adolescent girls:  
 I would park at a strategic point, with my vagrant schoolgirl beside me in the car, to  
 watch the children leave school—always a pretty sight.  This sort of thing soon began to  
 bore my so easily bored Lolita, and, having a childish lack of sympathy for other people’s 
 whims, she would insult me and my desire to have her caress me while blue-eyed little  
 brunettes in blue shorts, copperheads in green boleros, and blurred boyish blondes in  
 faded slacks passed by in the sun.509 
 
Thus Hermann wants others to see past the significant horror of murder and to notice his staggering 
artistic genius.  Humbert wants Dolly herself to see past her abusive and squalid situation to help 
him achieve what he desires with an all-consuming intensity.  It could be that Nabokov might be 
pointing back at the selfishness displayed by Hermann and Humbert’s very models, the 
underground man and Raskolnikov most prominently.  The underground man’s behavior towards 
Liza, for example, is nothing if not one-sided and psychologically abusive.  Raskolnikov considers 
homicide to be justified if the life of the murder victim is somehow judged to be of lesser value 
than what is to be gained by murder.  In this respect, Bakhtin also differs from Nabokov, for he 
considers Raskolnikov’s devotion to working out the implications of his idea as somehow 
“unselfish:” 
  It is given to all of Dostoevsky’s characters to “think and seek higher things”; in  
 each of them there is a “great and unresolved thought”; all of them must, before all else, 
 “get a thought straight.”  And in this resolution of a thought (an idea) lies their entire real  
 life and their own personal unfinalizability.  If one were to think away the idea in which  
 they live, their image would be totally destroyed.  In other words, the image of the hero is 
 inseparably linked with the image of an idea and cannot be detached from it.  We see the  
 hero in the idea and through the idea, and we see the idea in him and through him.   
  All of Dostoevsky’s major characters, as people of an idea, are absolutely   
 unselfish, insofar as the ida has really taken control of the deepest core of their   
                                                 
 508 D, 191  
 509 L, 161  
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 personality….In this sense even Raskolnikov, who killed and robbed the old pawnbroker, 
 is absolutely unselfish, as is the prostitute Sonya, as is Ivan the accomplice in his father’s  
 murder…510 
 
Yet Raskolnikov’s murder of the pawnbroker (and her niece) is part of his own “getting his thought 
straight.”  He murders in order to test the idea.  Perhaps because the event of murder occurs on the 
level of narratorial description and not on the level of dialogue — although, how can murder ever 
be conceived as dialogue or dialogic — Bakhtin somehow disqualifies it from being an essential 
part of the process of “getting a thought straight” through the dialogical interactivity between 
characters.  Nabokov, on the other hand, as we have seen, portrays murder as analogically linked 
with monologism.  He also shows how the kind of dialogical strategies that fend off others’ 
finalization of the self can merely safeguard one’s own utter egocentricity, the germ of 
monologism. 
                                                 




 Taking a step back and looking at the thematic interrelationships between Mikhail Bakhtin 
and Vladimir Nabokov, we can see that they dealt with the same field of ethical problems, 
attempted to theorize similar solutions to these problems and used the same over-arching tropology 
to express these.  Much of the philosophical and tropological overlap between Bakhtin and 
Nabokov is due to their creative appropriation and application of the thought of philosophers who 
already possessed a set of shared concerns and who had shaped (some more, some less) the 
discourses of the Silver Age – Solov’ev, Ivanov, Aikhenvald and Schopenhauer.  As we had 
discussed in the first chapter, one concern that bound the Silver Age together was the focus on the 
person and on his or her divinely fashioned ontology of perfectibility.  As Michelson argued, the 
ethical and metaphysical-minded thinkers, writers and artists of the Silver Age borrowed this 
progressive definition of personhood in part from a context of renewed interest in the church 
fathers and Orthodox theology.  Many of these writers would then creatively merge this theological 
personalism with the one implied by the Neo-Kantian conception of the asymptotic nature of 
scientific discovery.   
It is to this set of writers that Bakhtin belongs.  Yet unlike Ivanov or Berdiaev or Sergei 
Bulgakov, Bakhtin further transformed the Neo-Kantianized theological notions of image as 
givenness, likeness as positedness and sobornost’ into aesthetic categories that allowed him to 
interrelate ethics of action with an aesthetics of the written word.  In Bakhtin’s aesthetic ethics (or 
ethical aesthetics), the word or idea I have of myself must always be developed, dialogically, into 
a new word.  Ultimately only a polyphonic mentality can broaden the self to the point of being 
able to see the world as a constellation of perfectible consciousnesses mutually aiding – or 
attempting to detract from – each others’ perfectibility. Though Bakhtin never really says it 
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explicitly, it would seem that this capacity to broaden one’s consciousness in order to consider the 
other along with his or her potentiality could at least be one distant milestone of personal aesthetic 
and ethical progress.  In any case, to the diversity within unity of sobornost’ Bakhtin juxtaposes 
the analogous unity within diversity of the polyphonic representation of the world.  Dostoevsky 
thus becomes a sort of demiurgic receptacle for the artistic sobornost’ of the souls he is capable of 
perceiving in their open-endedness.  With this idea of the artist as container of the world, Bakhtin 
seems to stray from overtly Neo-Kantian and theological sources.  In fact, the optical-spatial 
metaphor that he sometimes uses to communicate the idea of “containing” (or maximally 
perceiving and representing) the other is enigmatically reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s own 
metaphor of “the eye of the world.”  Bakhtin expresses his metaphor through the term “krugozor,” 
which is variously rendered as “field of vision” or “horizon” in English.511  However, if we 
rendered the word momentarily as “round-view” or even as “cyclorama”512 we would get a more 
accurate sense of what the metaphor is trying to communicate.  The metaphor situates visual 
perception at the center of a nominally unobstructed 360-degree field of vision within a two-
dimensional plane.  The only thing that would seemingly obstruct this panoramic vision or 
understanding is the broadness of its circumference.  We know that Dostoevsky’s krugozor is 
broad because it can contain other krugozory.  In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Dostoevsky 
broadens his consciousness by utilizing the polyphonic/dialogic artistic method.  Yet if we 
considered the ethics and aesthetics of Towards a Philosophy of the Act as implicit in the 
Dostoevsky book, then we could conceive of Dostoevsky as broadening his consciousness due to 
                                                 
511 Vadim Liapunov traces the origin of Bakhtin’s usage of krugozor to Husserl’s Gesichtskreis.  See M.M. Bakhtin, 
Art and Answerrability: Early Philosophical Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, 
trans. and comm. Vadim Liapunov (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 236. 
512 From “κύκλος,” [kuklos], or “ring, circle, round,” and “ὅραμα,” or “that which is seen, a sight, a spectacle;” see 
The Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 455, 565.  Panorama is also a useful word to keep in mind here.  Our 
understanding of krugozor, however, does not include any reference to the 19th century fairground exhibition devices 
to which panorama and cyclorama historically refer. 
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his ability to “self-exclude” (i.e. destroy the monologic type of krugozor) in order to “lovingly 
observe” the other.  Similarly, in Schopenhauer, the poet genius gathers the world within a 
krugozor-like unity, which the German philosopher calls “the eye of the world.”  The poet genius 
can only become the eye of the world in a manner similar to Bakhtin’s polyphonic author: by 
excluding the self and selflessly loving the other.  Contrary to Bakhtin, however, Schopenhauer 
has no compulsion in denying diversity: at a certain aesthetically and metaphysically climactic 
moment for the poet, he or she realizes that he or she “is also an other, another living thing” (tat 
tvam asi).  Ultimately, the Schopenhauerian “eye of the world,” and Bakhtin’s polyphonic 
“horizon of horizons,”513 both capture a wide panorama – a cosmos – of interrelationships of other 
consciousnesses. 
Though several of Nabokov’s more artistic and perceptive characters assert 
Schopenhauer’s “great word” through acts of selflessness, this author’s allegiance to the Silver 
Age concern for the perfectibility of the individual is frequently ambiguous, and when it is direct, 
it is expressed apophatically.  True, Nabokov does lay out basic precepts of readerly interpretation 
with which Bakhtin would certainly agree. 514  However, Nabokov’s uncannily direct response to 
Bakhtin is most productively conceived as through a looking glass.  Lolita, Despair, and Problems 
of Dostoevsky’s Poetics seem to depict the same ethical and aesthetic structure but from opposing 
angles.  Whereas Bakhtin praises Dostoevsky’s polyphonic method for having supplanted 
egocentric monologism as a credible artistic method, Nabokov shows the evil deception of 
                                                 
513 Bakhtin does not use the term krugozor krugozorov (horizon of horizons) but he does use the phrase 
nadkrugozornoe edinstvo [over-horizonal unity] to refer to a krugozor that encompasses other krugozory.  See Ss VI, 
23. 
514 The “comparativiely lowly kind [of imagination] which turns for support to the simple emotions and is of a 
definitely personal nature…A situation in a book is intensely felt because it reminds us of something that happened 
to us or to someone we know or knew.  Or, a gain, a reader treasures a book mainly because it evokes a country, a 
landscape, a mode of living which he nostalgically recalls as part of his own past.  Or, and this is the worst thing a 
reader can do, he identifies himself with a character in the book.  This lowly variety is not the kind of imagination I 
would like readers to use” (LoL, 4).  
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monologism and its terrible obstruction of polyphony.  Humbert Humbert’s vision of the “concord 
of voices” at the end of Lolita and the epiphanic realization that he had conditioned “the absence 
of her voice from that concord” can be interpreted not only as his failure to realize that both he 
and Dolly belonged to some Schopenhauerian Unity (or simply that Dolly deserved such a unity), 
but also as a failure of upholding Bakhtin’s ethical code: by finalizing Dolly in word and deed, 
Humbert Humbert effectively obstructs any real Dolly from joining a polyphonic unity (308).  Both 
Humbert and Herman’s actions are reminiscent of Early Bakhtinian ethics and aesthetics in that 
they operate in the world by going against its ethical grain.  In order to ease the friction of their 
own consciences, Herman and Humbert objectivize their identities and project it upon something 
lying outside of their subjectivity yet within their field of view (krugozor).  Thus Hermann 
displaces his physical body and projects it upon Felix and resolves to continue life by committing 
the ultimate dissociation – making his body vitally inert.  Humbert doesn’t displace his body, he 
displaces a view of himself he does not want to countenance.  In both cases both Humbert and 
Herman “pretend” to a position of authorial omniscience, spiritual omnipresence and a physical 
lack of extension or presence.  Their pretendership is ultimately valid only within a solipsistic 
space.  Of course, neither Herman nor Humbert had actually monolithically monologic views of 
themselves.  Humbert and Herman knew how to use relativistic sophistry in order to evade any 
kind of denunciation or disapproval as authors or as performers of deeds.  Theirs is an updated 
form of monologism, relativistic monologism, which does away with stable self-definitions but 
asserts the original stability of the semantic orientation upheld in monolithic monologism: meaning 
is always to be related to the ego, regardless of whatever that ego decides it is.  Thus the 
exploitation of loopholes comes forth as outright malevolent in Nabokov as opposed to Bakhtin, 
where it serves only the hero’s goal to stave off others’ finalizing words about him or her. 
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 Yet relativizing loopholes are not just a tool at the disposal of the villainous in Nabokov.  
Dolly Haze herself masterfully utilizes a whole range of strategies in Lolita that are opposed to the 
narrator’s serious and monologic position and air of cultural superiority.  Despite the differences 
between Bakhtin and Nabokov; despite the numerous examples of Nabokov’s personification of 
serial author-dieties in his other novels, Nabokov comes surprisingly close to the spirit of Bakhtin’s 
work in the figure of Dolores Haze.  Her calling is acting, the ability to always keep seeking for a 
new word and new image of her own.  Her semantic proteanism allows her to fulfill distinctly 
Bakhtinian functions within Lolita.  She is the “loopholing” other to the monologizing author.  She 
is the voice of parody, mockery, laughter and thorough lack of seriousness.  She fulfills the 
Bakhtinian elemental role that is the harlequin-rouge character and through this role is the only 
genre-distabilizing element in Lolita.  Were it not for Dolly’s parody and mockery of Humbert 
Humbert and her successful escape, or rather “slipping away” from her captor, Lolita could have 
been more straightforward in its pretense towards a serious and tragic confessional genre.   
A problematic aspect of Lolita for assessing Nabokov’s aesthetics is the way that the 
discourse of poshlost’/philistinism is deployed in the novel.  Though Nabokov seems to have 
inherited Aikhenvald’s dual categories of the spiritually sublime and poshlost’, these are 
thoroughly inverted in Lolita.  It is Humbert Humbert who is intellectually, culturally and 
artistically refined and it is Dolly who is thoroughly integrated into her era’s popular culture and 
engages in “vulgar” cultural practices such as reading comics and reading about Hollwood stars.  
Yet it is also Dolly’s philistine interest in movie stardom that propels her interest in acting and it 
is this latter that ultimately saves from her Humbert Humbert.  From the perspective of Dolly – the 
one that Bakhtin would take – Humbert Humbert’s discourse of poshlost’ is but the monological 
discourse of the superiority of a given cultural outlook that Humbert associates with his identity.  
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To the Bakhtinian observer, it is Dolly’s seeming philistinism, i.e. her interest in the comical and 
frivolous and her embodiment of the protean nature of acting, that makes her a “non-typified” 
character.  She is the one actor that is awake and refuses to follow the script that binds all of the 
other actor-marionettes to the ever-recurring theater of life: she wants no part of Humbert 
Humbert’s self-confessional narrative – Dostoevsky had already written plenty of them.   
 Yet Dolly’s protean theatricality was also a matter of her survival.  This fact points to a 
hitherto unmentioned topos shared by Schopenhauer, Bakhtin and Nabokov: their evocation of a 
savage state of nature.  Bakhtin says that what “unfolds on the levels of [Dostoevsky’s] novels is 
not a polyphony of reconciled voices but a polyphony of battling and internally divided voices.”515 
In Nabokov’s novels, we either see the artistically-inept and savage persecute artist-heretics or 
author-pretenders and usurpers who utilize others to compose paeans to their very own selves.  
These two views of life and art are entirely consonant with Schopenhauer’s ecology of eternal 
strife and conflict.  Homo homini lupus – man is the wolf of man for Schopenhauer, and the 
internecine viciousness conjured by Plautus’ aphorism is seen in the animal kingdom’s devouring 
of the plant kingdom, in the animal kingdom’s own war for territory and resources with itself, and 
finally in man’s own violent nature.516  For Schopenhauer, every living thing is trying to promote 
its own idea by either literally incorporating others (i.e. by eating others) or eliminating them to 
take their physical space and/or resources.  Man has achieved a hegemonic status in the food chain 
due to the fact that its idea is best suited for domination.  Yet Bakhtin and Nabokov seem to chart 
a territory of conflict not described by Schopenhauer: the conflict waged by human against human 
at the level of representation: humanity’s inter-imposition of ideas and ideologies.  Both Bakhtin 
and Nabokov portray a similar anti-hero on this field of conflict, one who promotes the best 
                                                 
515 PDP, 250. 
516 WaWaR I, 147. 
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representation of the self as possible as a way to survive and dominate the ideological field.  It is 
not for nothing that, in both Bakhtin and Schopenhauer, monologism and the will, respectively, 
figure as deeply egocentric forces.  For Schopenhauer, scientific discourse, built as it is on man’s 
ability to represent, is always already a machination of the desire of the will to impose its idea 
upon the other.  Though Bakhtin does not make an explicit ontological connection between the 
theoretism of cultural methodologies and the monologic procedure of monologic authors, he does 
present the complex of the loving observation of the other / dialogic orientation to the other that 
retains the other’s perfectibility intact in response to both methodological theoretism and 
individual monologism. Bakhtin must have felt an ontological tie between the cultural-
methodological monologism and the monologism ensuing from the individual.  In both of these 
monologisms, the idiosyncrasies of the studied object are always flattened, smoothed out and 
interchanged in order to make that object consonant with the telos or idea of the original 
monological position.   
Ironically, Nabokov’s reading of Dostoevsky’s rendering of Raskolnikov as a very 
ideological representation of a character can not only point out a chink in Bakhtin’s armor, i.e. his 
polyphonic conception of Dostoevsky, but can also cast this oversight as potentially due to 
Bakhtin’s own monologic view of Dostoevsky’s polyphonicity.  Just like Dostoevsky 
demonstrates a monological preference for Raskolnikov over Sonya by drawing all of the dramatic 
attention to his crime while leaving the details of Sonya’s crime to be absorbed by her 
Sentimentalist typification, Bakhtin demonstrates a monologic preference for Dostoevsky by 
glossing over Raskolnikov as an “unselfish” character and not exploring the obviously monologic 
subtext in the narrative and world that Raskolnikov himself is trying to create.  Why Bakhtin hides 
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this and other potential fatal flaws in Dostoevsky is unknown.  Either way, Bakhtin’s reading of 
Dostoevsky has the intermixture of his own idea. 
Imbuing the other or fashioning the other with one’s own idea is always metaphorical of 
God’s relationship with his creation – this is one of the central metaphor-themes that binds Bakhtin 
and Nabokov. To argue that Dostoevsky lent the image of Raskolnikov material from his own idea 
would be to suggest that he as an author had a more divine status vis-à-vis his “creation.”  The 
same would be true if we were talking about Bakhtin and Dostoevsky.  Of course, Bakhtin would 
balk at these arguments.  Nabokov, however, actively promoted the view of his divine status vis-
à-vis his characters. Yet Nabokov does more than that: despite being capable of composing such 
works as Lolita and Despair, where imbuing the other with one’s own idea is a catastrophically 
unethical act, Nabokov actually flaunts his contradiction of Vyacheslav Ivanov’s conception of the 
ideal artist, an ideal that Bakhtin and – sometimes, Nabokov – seem to follow: “Will the artist-
theurge be an artist-tyrant, of whom Nietzsche dreamed, an artist-enslaver, who re-evaluates all 
aesthetic values and breaks the old tablets of beauty, singularly following his own ‘will-to-
power…’”517 Hermann, for example, despairs over the possibility of having been created by such 
an artist-divinity: “If I am not master of my life, not sultan of my own being, then no man’s logic 
and no man’s ecstatic fits may force me to find less silly my impossibly silly position: that of 
God’s slave…”518 If Hermann was right about anything, he was right to despair, for Nabokov did 
say: “My characters are galley slaves…”519 Nabokov’s simultaneous promotion and flaunting of 
Ivanov’s image of the artist seems due to a möbius-strip aesthetic and metaphysical logic.  Thus, 
despite the fact that the ultimate novelistic architecture in which Hermann and Humbert are 
                                                 
 517 Viacheslav Ivanov, “Dve stikhii v sovremennom simvolizme,” 144.  Translation mine. 
 518 D, 101-102.  
 519 SO, 81. 
 
223 
embedded arrests their desires, these desires were geared to execute their own monologic 
endeavors in the first place.  Within this circularity we can nevertheless see a distinction between 
the kind of monologism that Nabokov allows within his universe and the kind that he does not.  
The kind of monologism that Nabokov approves of is one that is based on love, the one that he 
does not approve of is the kind that does not bear any love toward the other.  For example, in Bend 
Sinister, the author, who is symbolized by the “anthropomorphic deity impersonated by me,” takes 
pity upon his hero and pulls him out of the horrible terror state, whose monologic designs he had 
hitherto been enduring.520  Even when the implied or metaphorized image of Nabokov seems to 
be perpetrating any sort of egocentric usurpation, this kind of monologism is still denied.  For 
example, the eponymous hero of Pnin roundly subverts VN’s, the narrator’s, monological 
usurpation of his (the hero’s) image.  After the VN emerges as a full-fledged character towards the 
end of the novel and casts doubts as to his narratorial trustworthiness, he attempts a subtle form of 
psychological usurpation.  Having been hired to replace Pnin in the position of Russian language 
lecturer, the narrator nevertheless tries to have Pnin work for him.  Pnin, however, thinks it better 
not to sacrifice his pride and leaves Waindell at the very end of the novel (191).  Plot-wise, the 
departure is the climax of the Novel.  At the level of author and hero relations, “Pnin…resists the 
story he is a part of and refutes his own narrator.”521   
* * * 
In “From Notes Made in 1970-71,” Bakhtin brings up a metaphor pairing the activity of 
authoring with divine creation that was in wide use during European Romanticism and which is 
invoked by Nabokov incessantly:  
 The primary (not created) and secondary author (the image of the author created by the  
 primary author).  The primary—natura non creata quae creat; the secondary author— 
                                                 
 520 Nabokov, “Introduction,” BS, xviii and BS, 240-241. 
 521 Blackwell, Dostoevskian Problems in Nabokov’s Poetics, 150. 
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 natura creata quae non creat.  The image of the hero—natura creata quae non creat.   
 The primary author cannot be an image.  He eludes any figurative representation.  When  
 we try to imagine the primary author figuratively, we ourselves are creating his image,  
 that is, we ourselves become the primary author of the image.  The creating image (i.e.,  
 the primary author) can never enter into any image that he has created.522 
       
Bakhtin’s point in making the above distinction seems clear: the mundane author does not create 
in the sense that the divine author does, therefore, they are forever different.  The distinction 
between the divine and the mundane is, however, elided by a label that applies to both.  This 
connection may be the key to answering the question of why Bakhtin and Nabokov may ultimately 
be incapable of promoting a totally non-monological view of literary art.  If a great though 
mundane author is he who quiets his self in order to let the world in, how must this author then 
record this gathered world?  It is only through an always already metaphorical language, a language 
that always requires any principle of transcription – from image or experience or dream to word – 











                                                 
 522 SG, 148-149.  
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